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The hub and spokes structure that characterises Euro-Mediterranean 
relations is often attributed to the lack of integration among Arab 
countries.  Successive regional projects implemented in areas like the 
Maghreb have been supported by empirical evidence on the potential 
welfare effects of trade and the costs of non-integration. However, the 
high interest in these aspects contrasts with a limited effort to investigate 
the root causes of non-integration.  
The aim of this work is to understand the reasons behind the 
apparent contradiction between the potential of South-South regionalism 
and the limited scope of its achievements in the Euro-Mediterranean area. 
Taking into account the intricate relationship between economic 
integration and foreign policy affairs, this thesis analyses the interplay 
between the different frameworks that coexist in this area through a 
historical review that focuses on the interests of the agents involved.  
The case of Morocco shows the role of preferential agreements in the 
continuity of economic relations prior to decolonisation and the role of 
international institutions in their settlement. In particular, archival 
research on the Association Agreements following European integration 
offers an interpretation of Euro-Mediterranean trade that contrasts with 
institutional analyses of the same phenomenon. The path of the European 
Union’s neighbouring countries suggests that South-South agreements in 
this framework were designed to strengthen North-South relations in a 
context of open regionalism favourable to the interaction between 
economic blocs. Thus, the critical analysis of South-South agreements 
implemented since the 1980s in the Euro-Mediterranean area calls into 
question the causality between economic integration, trade and welfare 
that conventional theories presuppose. And, consequently, it invites to 
reconsider the pertinence of assuming the potential welfare effects of 








La estructura de centro y radios que caracteriza las relaciones Euro-
Mediterráneas se atribuye con frecuencia a la escasa integración entre los 
países árabes. Los sucesivos proyectos regionales implementados en 
áreas como el Magreb se han sustentado en la evidencia empírica sobre 
los efectos potenciales del comercio para el bienestar y sobre los costes 
de la no-integración. Sin embargo, el elevado interés por estos aspectos 
contrasta con un limitado esfuerzo por indagar en las causas 
fundamentales de la no-integración.  
Este trabajo tiene como objetivo comprender los motivos que 
subyacen a la aparente contradicción entre las potencialidades del 
regionalismo Sur-Sur y el escaso alcance de sus logros en el área Euro-
Mediterránea. Teniendo en cuenta la íntima relación que existe entre 
integración económica y política exterior, esta tesis analiza el encaje 
entre los distintos marcos que cohabitan en este contexto a través de una 
revisión histórica que presta especial atención a los intereses de los 
agentes implicados.  
El caso de Marruecos muestra el rol de los acuerdos preferenciales 
en la continuidad de relaciones económicas precedentes a la 
descolonización y el papel de las instituciones internacionales en su 
arbitraje. En concreto, la investigación archivística sobre los Acuerdos de 
Asociación tras la integración europea ofrece una clave de lectura sobre 
el comercio euro-mediterráneo que contrasta con el análisis de las 
instituciones sobre este mismo fenómeno. La senda de los países vecinos 
de la Unión Europea sugiere que la integración Sur-Sur en este marco 
refuerza las relaciones Norte-Sur en un contexto de open regionalism 
favorable a la interacción entre bloques económicos. Así pues, el análisis 
crítico de los acuerdos Sur-Sur implementados desde los ochenta en el 
área Euro-Mediterránea pone en entredicho la causalidad entre 









A estrutura de centro e raios que caracteriza as relacións Euro-
Mediterráneas atribúese con frecuencia á escasa integración entre os 
países árabes. Os sucesivos proxectos rexionais implementados en áreas 
como o Magreb sustentáronse na evidencia empírica sobre os efectos 
potenciais do comercio para o benestar e sobre os custos da non-
integración. Con todo, o elevado interés por estes aspectos contrasta cun 
limitado esforzo por indagar nas causas fundamentais da non-integración.  
Este traballo ten por obxectivo comprender os motivos que subxacen 
á aparente contradición entre as potencialidades do rexionalismo Sur-Sur 
e o escaso alcance dos seus logros na área Euro-Mediterránea. Tendo en 
conta a íntima relación que existe entre integración económica e política 
exterior, este traballo analiza o encaixe entre os distintos marcos que 
cohabitan neste contexto a través dunha revisión histórica que presta 
especial atención aos intereses dos axentes implicados.  
O caso de Marrocos amosa o rol dos acordos preferenciais na 
continuidade de relacións económicas precedentes á descolonización e o 
papel das institucións internacionais na súa arbitraxe. En concreto, la 
investigación arquivística sobre os Acordos de Asociación tras a 
integración europea ofrece unha clave de lectura sobre o comercio euro-
mediterráneo que contrasta cos traballos das institucións sobre este 
mesmo fenómeno. As características da senda rexional seguida polos 
países veciños da Unión Europea suxire que a integración Sur-Sur neste 
marco vén reforzar as relacións Norte-Sur nun contexto de open 
regionalism favorable á interacción entre bloques económicos. Xa que 
logo, a análise crítica dos acordos Sur-Sur implementados dende os 
oitenta na área Euro-Mediterránea pon en entredito a causalidade entre 
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Regionalism and multilateralism appear nowadays as two 
complementary pieces of the global puzzle. The different disciplines of 
Social Sciences that study the structure of international relations are 
linked by the awareness that globalisation is a block-to-block one. 
Regardless of the nature of the flows analysed or the context of 
transnational relations, a number of features gather consensus in this 
regard.  
The first one is that regionalism, as we know it, builds on the 
ashes of WWII. Reconstruction in Europe and decolonisation in the 
South would become key elements in the battlefield of a longstanding 
Cold War. To a large extent, the massive size of the East-West quarrel 
reduced the capacity of single states to have a say in the international 
arena. Following this logic, it is not surprising that Third World 
movements and European recovery were to be thought as transnational 
projects.  
The first economic document identified by Fritz Machlup (1977, p. 
10) in his inquire into the genealogy of integration had been handled by 
George F. Kennan when drafting the Marshall Plan. In 1947, he received 
from three economists the proposal of a “coordinate European Recovery 
Program” directed “toward a strong and economically integrated Europe”. 
The urge to rekindle the economic and political weight of post-war 
Europe led to the enlarging protectionist concerns to the supranational 
regional sphere (Machlup, 1977). Against that background, Viner (1950) 
tried to elucidate the conditions under which CUs are not harmful to 
FÁTIMA FERNÁNDEZ FERNÁNDEZ
2 
global output in a context where multilateralism is not feasible in the 
short term. The Customs Union Issue (Viner, 1950) gave rise to numerous 
publications that, throughout the decade, would build the theoretical 
corpus of the discipline by answering, completing, criticising or merely 
implementing the arguments presented by Viner. Ten years after Viner’s 
contribution to the analysis of Customs Unions (CUs), Balassa’s Theory 
of Economic Integration (1961) described the standard phases of the 
phenomenon and distinguished between static and dynamic effects. 
Among the former, the concepts of Trade Creation (TC) and Trade 
Diversion (TD) became key analytic instruments to evaluate the effects of 
integration on welfare. Notwithstanding, the stagnation of the European 
process would spread the perception of ‘obsolescence’ (Haas, 1976) of 
what came to be called Old Regionalism (Hettne and Inotai, 1994, p. 1) to 
offer sound explanations and predictions about international integration. 
This, together with the rapid advance of globalisation, opened new 
avenues for New Regionalism to deepen on the dynamic effects of 
integration through the lenses of New Trade Theories (NTT), economic 
geography and other related strands.  
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, it looked like the road towards 
multilateralisation would be definitely reopened. Notwithstanding, far 
from disappearing, integration processes awakened an unprecedented 
interest in many fields of Social Sciences. The proliferation of preferential 
treaties relatively neutralised the regional exception to the Most Favoured 
Nation (MFN) clause and, together with stronger inter-regional 
exchanges, led to a situation of de facto multilateralism (Baldwin, Freund, 
2011). Against this background, among mainstream theories, the 
assessment of dynamic effects of integration became increasingly 
sophisticated. Within this framework, some authors tried to solve the 
shortcomings in the study of dynamic effects on competitiveness, 
investment flows, economies of scale or productivity (De Melo, 
Panagariya, 1993; Fernández, 1997; Lawrence, 1997). Besides, guided by 
the consideration of capital as  the only factor with actual mobility, 
dynamic effects for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) attracted great 
attention (Baldwin et al., 1995; Dunning, Robson, 1998; Schiff, Winters, 
1998,2003).  
The second one is the place of the European Union as the 
archetype of regionalism ever since. In the North, the coincidence 
between the first theoretical contributions to the phenomenon and the 
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establishment of the European Economic Community would be followed 
by an everlasting parallelism between the advance of integration and the 
developments of the discipline. In the South, both the aim to catch-up 
with developed countries and the will to delink from their hegemony were 
bound by a great attention to the European process. Similarly, current 
debates on European regionalism differ on its effects, but not on the scope 
of its impact.  
In this regard, some strands of new regional approaches argue that 
EU acts a hegemonic regional power that uses its economic and 
normative weight to build a series of asymmetric bilateral relations to 
transfer of its norms and values (Haukkala, 2011). In this light, several 
authors agree that EU’s strategy does not allow for a significant 
participation of its partners in the agenda-setting: the goals and means are 
non-negotiable and the sole moment when partners could be consulted is 
when individual action plans are negotiated under clear benchmarks 
(Haukkala, 2011, p. 56). In this sense, they note in EU’s behaviour the 
will to “replicate itself by encouraging regional integration around the 
world” (Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002). However, they point out that it 
often fails to recognise that what is being promoted “is not the EU as 
such, but an EU-topia” (Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002). 
The last one is that the ‘direction’ of regionalism matters. In this 
regard, the conditions, goals and effects of integration appear to obey to 
different logics depending on their North-North, North-South or South-
South nature. Particularly, the latter scheme is frequently regarded as a 
sort of testing-ground that should enhance the capacity of developing 
countries to entertain international balanced relations.  
In the framework of the debate set by Viner and Balassa on CUs, 
some economists paid attention to welfare outcomes depending on the 
relative level of development  (Linder, 1961; Sakamoto, 1969; Bhagwati, 
1971) or on the size of the participating economies (Kreinin, 1964). They 
questioned the purely negative view of trade diversion for welfare in less 
industrialised countries (Bhambri, 1962; Sakamoto, 1969). In this sense, 
Cooper and Massell (1965) pointed out that for Southern countries, a CU 
can be understood as an efficient protectionist policy that may also help 
industrialisation. Indeed, the intensification of trade between the Northern 
regions during the 1960s and the weak trade relations between countries 
of the South led some economists to promote ‘developmental 
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regionalism’ (Sloan, 1971). Notwithstanding, others (Hirschman, 1945; 
Perroux, 1954; Myrdal, 1957,1958) criticised the excessive optimism of 
integration theories and their scant adaptability to the problems of the 
South (Amin, 2013).  
North-South debates reached their peak of influence in the 1960s, 
which were baptised in the United Nations (UN) as the “Decade of 
Development”. In the field of orthodox economics, W. W. Rostow (1960) 
published the book that some consider a foundational work of 
development economics under the title The stages of economic growth. 
While mainstream economics was concerned about how to steer Southern 
countries towards the path of growth within global capitalism, numerous 
authors (Meier, 1960; Allen, 1961; Bhambri, 1962; Mikesell, 1963; 
Balassa, 1965; Cooper, Massell, 1965) argued that the orthodox analysis 
of economic integration was designed by and for industrialized countries 
and hence was of little applicability in LCDs. For the latter, the 
incoherence of the analysis began from its actual goals. Where the 
orthodox economy was wondering about the effects of discriminatory 
trade preferences on global welfare, the question for the South was how to 
undertake the path of progress without deepening into structural 
dependence from the North. The aim to reverse the structure of the 
international division of labour inherited from European colonialism was 
at the centre of their contributions on South-South regionalism, which 
they saw as a means to enhance their self-sufficiency and bargaining 
capacity in international trade (Baer, 1972). Theories of dependence 
criticised the rhetoric of development as an instrument to conceal the 
perpetuation of colonial power relations, through the means of what 
André Gunder Frank (1966, p. 27-28) called the “development of 
underdevelopment”. 
After the 1973 oil crisis, North-South negotiations within the 
framework of UNCTAD culminated in the establishment of the NIEO 
(Amin, 1980). Inspired by the changes in the balance of power brought 
about by the oil crisis (Dumas, 1976), countries of the South demanded 
for a framework that allowed an upward adjustment of raw material prices 
and the recovery of control over their resources. In this context, the 
approaches of dependence reached their peak (Gunder Frank, 1969; 
Marini, 1973; Sunkel, Peace, 1975; Wallerstein, 1979). Over the years, 
the American and British approaches of International Political Economy 
(Keohane and Nye, 1977; 1987; Cohen, 2009) on regionalism would put 
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power relations into North-South debates. Accordingly, among central 
concerns on the phenomenon of integration, together with ‘integration for 
what’, the question of ‘integration why’ appeared (Krauss, 1972). Later, 
the rise of open regionalism in the 1980s would strengthen the vision of 
South-South and North-South as a form of “pre-adhesion to globalisation” 
(Frikha, 2002). Be as it may, it stems from such analyses that, since the 
1950s, the core defining characteristics of regional projects have been 
discussed in terms of the participants’ hemisphere. 
Statement of the problem. The coalescence of these three arguments 
in the Mediterranean has attracted for decades the attention of scholars 
and institutions. Although the Ecuador does not cross the area, few would 
define Euro-Mediterranean relations as North-North ones. In this regard, 
whereas European integration appears as the epitome of the virtuous 
circle of integration, Euro-Mediterranean relations are often put as the 
example of its opposite. Indeed, the Euro-Mediterranean area is a 
prominent example in regional studies insofar as it holds the first position 
in the world North-South income gaps and South-South non-integration. 
Despite successive attempts to mitigate the prevalence of vertical trade 
flows and the scarce horizontal integration in this area, a structure of hub 
and spokes prevailed over the set overlapping initiatives undertaken since 
decolonisation at different levels and speeds. In areas like the Maghreb, a 
number of South-South initiatives have been implemented with the 
support of empirical evidence on the potential welfare effects of trade and 
the costs of non-integration. However, the high interest in these aspects 
contrasts with a limited effort to investigate the root causes of non-
integration. 
During the last decade, the EU has been particularly concerned with 
strengthening its hegemony beyond its borders. The promotion of its 
regional model is identified as its hallmark as a Normative Power, i.e. a 
power that is able “to shape conceptions of the normal” (Manners 2002, 
p.239) for others, which it exercises through a mechanism of rewards 
subject to conditionality. In 2003, the European Commission declared its 
commitment with “further regional and sub-regional cooperation and 
integration amongst the countries of the Southern Mediterranean” (EC, 
2003, p.10). The events of 2011 reawakened EU’s interest in this issue. 
According to the European Commission, “the Arab Spring has 
highlighted the political, economic and social challenges that can only be 
dealt effectively at regional level” (EC, 2012, p.22). Moreover, it 
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recognised the importance of supporting this process of sub-regional 
construction, by claiming that “the Maghreb as a sub-region could emerge 
as a front-runner in the Mediterranean area while maintaining consistency 
with wider approaches” (EC, 2012b, p.13). 
Among Maghreb countries, Morocco has for long remained as the 
closest partner of the EU. Its geographical location and longstanding 
commitment to strengthening ties with the Community has been 
traditionally rewarded with financial cooperation and political support by 
European countries, in particular from France and Spain. Together with 
Tunisia, it was the first Mediterranean country to sign an Association 
Agreement with the EEC (1969) and holds since 2008 an “Advanced 
Statute” that recognises its efforts to get closer to the European policy 
framework. Nevertheless, its declared engagement with North-South 
integration did not prevent the country to participate as a founding 
member in South-South agreements like the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) 
(1989), the Great Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) (1997), or the Agadir 
Agreement (2004). For a number of reasons, the most striking of these 
initiatives was the AMU. Since the blurring of post-colonial militancy in 
favour of a United Maghreb to that date, no political or economic move 
by Morocco had pointed in that direction. On the contrary, that was the 
period of Moroccan withdrawal from the Organisation of African Union 
(1984), its demand of accession to the European Community (1987) and, 
in 1994, the closure of terrestrial borders with Algeria. Similarly, the 
endorsement of the other South-South initiatives often reveals 
contradictory with the subsequent behaviour of its trade and capital flows. 
In a nutshell, regardless of its failure to meet the goal of regional 
integration, two unresolved questions remain that previous research has 
failed to address: 
a. How: The first one is related to the interplay between the 
promotion and endorsement of overlapping North-South and 
South-South agreements in the Euro-Mediterranean framework. 
b. Why / For What: The second one lies on the actual goals of the 
apparently contradictory Moroccan choices and behaviours in 
terms of economic integration. 
Objectives of this work. In the light of the above-mentioned 
considerations, this research has been held with the aim to seize the 
reasons and goals underlying the overlapping, contradictory and ill-
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
7 
performing South-South initiatives endorsed by Morocco within the 
broadest framework of its strong commitment to North-South relations 
with the EU. This overriding goal has been pursued through a number of 
specific interwoven objectives. 
The first one is to assess the links between the different theories of 
economic integration, their empirical assessment and the changing nature 
of regional processes. To do so, we will critically review the main 
orthodox and heterodox approaches to regional integration, their 
crosscutting debates and their relationship with the different regional 
processes in which they focus.  
The second one is to examine the role of the actors involved in the 
regulation and evaluation of specific schemes of integration. To this end, 
the critical analysis of the role of the International Economic 
Organisations (IEOs) in charge of trade and financial international 
relations will build on contributions from the disciplines of International 
Relations and International Political Economy to this issue. 
The third one is to grasp the options, choices and outcomes of the 
Moroccan path of economic integration since independence. Archival 
research on the negotiations of preferential agreements, together with the 
analysis of official documents concerning the regulatory changes implied 
by their endorsement will serve to reconstruct the evolution of Moroccan 
approach to foreign affairs and regional economic relations until our days. 
Finally, the fourth objective is to evaluate the interaction between 
North-South and South-South integration in the Euro-Mediterranean 
region. Accordingly, quantitative data on trade and capital flows, as well 
as the assessment of welfare indicators in the country are complemented 
with a particular focus on the qualitative changes implied by South-South 
agreements within the prevailing North-South structure in the area. The 
ultimate purpose of this exercise is not only to test the coincidence 
between the declared objectives of those arrangements and their actual 
results, but also to understand the reasons why they have been so actively 
supported by international actors despite the limited extent of their 
predicted outcomes and the low performance of their implementation. 
Research outline. Building on the links between the objectives 
described above, the structure of this study is articulated as follows: 
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The first chapter develops a critical review of the discipline of 
economic integration with particular attention to the links between its 
theoretical developments and the path of European integration since the 
end of WWII. By doing so, it offers an interpretation of the reasons why 
the major premises of the subject fit only certain cases, mainly located in 
the Northern hemisphere of the globe. In this regard, the chapter 
highlights the debatable applicability of conventional theory to integration 
processes for developing countries (North-South or South-South 
processes), as well as the limitations of its analytical tools, rooted on the 
distinction between static and dynamic effects conceived by and for 
developed countries (North-North processes). After that, an insight on 
missing debates is developed by analysing the IEOs that regulate, 
evaluate and promote economic integration around the globe.  
The second chapter presents a synthesis of the rationale and 
objectives of the main empirical contributions to integration and their 
relevance to the institutions that regulate the international economic 
order. Accordingly, it examines the means through which orthodox 
economics tried to quantify the phenomena described by theory and 
opposes this choice to heterodox efforts to underscore the structural, 
historical and material conditions of the regional economic order. Thus, 
the evolution of empirical assessments is reviewed together with the 
variables and methods used to evaluate the effects of integration. This 
exercise derives into a reflection on the role of trade in the assessment of 
integration that recalls the cross-cutting discussions analysed in chapter 
one.  
The third chapter examines the regional initiatives undertaken by 
Morocco since its independence by underscoring the role of economic 
integration as a foreign policy instrument. Following this reasoning, the 
first part deals with the historical, socio-political and economic context in 
which those processes took place. Supported by historical research on 
archive documents, it describes particularly the transition from French-
Spanish colonial rule to the current Euro-Mediterranean framework. The 
second part looks at the same process from the point of view of IEOs. A 
careful assessment of their functions in terms of the theories explained in 
previous chapters puts into question the neutrality of agents and hence 
their neglect by the discipline of economic integration. 
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The fourth chapter tests the consistency of the analyses and 
recommendations from IEOs about Moroccan integration by analysing 
trade, growth and welfare figures from a critical point of view. The 
evidence on ambivalent impact of integration on those variables nourishes 
the premise that regional processes are to be analysed in a case-by-case 
fashion. Therefore, the second part analyses the causes that led to the 
establishment of the AMU and of the Agadir Agreement taking into 
account the political aspects of the phenomena, the specific goals that 
spurred them and the nature of the relations set among the actors 
involved. 









1 THEORIES OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION:  
CORE TENETS AND MISSING DEBATES 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Halfway between protecting national interests and enhancing free-trade 
gains, economic integration theories emerged in the 1950s as a sui generis 
field of international trade. Supported by neoclassical theories and the 
regulatory margin given by the GATT, the emergence of regionalism 
allowed some countries, under rather specific conditions, to push away 
their economic borders without dismantle them. In this regard, few would 
be able to avoid mentioning the European Union, outstanding example of 
an almost perfect match between rules, theories and reality.  Nowadays, 
regionalism and multilateralism appear as two complementary pieces of the 
global puzzle.  
From an actor-centred approach, this chapter develops a critical review 
of the discipline of economic integration that pays particular attention to the 
circumstances in which it was set up. In particular, it links its theoretical 
developments to the roots and path of European integration since the end of 
WWII. By doing so, it offers an interpretation of the reasons why the major 
premises of the subject fit only certain cases, mainly located in the Northern 
hemisphere of the globe. In this regard, the chapter highlights the debatable 
applicability of conventional theory to the analysis of integration processes 
involving developing countries (North-South or South-South processes) and 
the limitations of conventional analysis designed from and for developed 
countries (North-North processes).  
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The first part of the chapter places the evolution of regional studies in 
their historical context and underscores the relationship between their core 
premises and the specific features of European integration. The second part 
reviews critically the major orthodox and heterodox approaches to 
regionalism. Particular attention is paid to the discussion between static and 
dynamic effects of integration, as well as to the longstanding North-South 
divide in the approaches to the phenomenon. After that, an insight on 
missing debates is developed by analysing the agents that currently regulate, 
evaluate and promote economic integration around the globe. The fourth and 
fifth parts concentrate on the means and goals that guide the role of 
International Economic Organisations (IEOs) in accomplishing such tasks.  
1.2 REGIONAL PROCESSES AND THEORIES OF 
INTEGRATION 
Since the second half of the XX century, Regionalism gained salience as 
a multidisciplinary field that deals with an intermediate level of analysis 
between national and global borders. In the context of the Cold War, theories 
of Economic Integration occupied the gap between the liberal principles of 
Neoclassical Economics and the geopolitical needs of European 
reconstruction (Machlup, 1977). For decades, its most significant success 
was to turn socio-political circumstances into universal laws of the discipline 
(Acharya, 2012). Accordingly, not only such premises built on the 
particularities of post-war Europe, but they also contradicted, without 
refuting them, the pro-liberal axioms of the Bretton Woods order. Therefore, 
since the 1950s, the interest of Neoclassical Economics in customs unions 
(CUs) remained closely linked to the process of European integration and to 
the will to present it as a step towards multilateral trade. 
Critics and promoters of Regional studies coincide in referring to the 
European Community as a starting point and a normative model of the 
current analyses that, from different fields of Social Sciences, determine 
the success or failure of the numerous projects undertaken since then. 
However, a number of them criticise the theorisation of regional 
phenomena on the basis of European peculiarities (see Figure 1.1 below). 
While various branches of Social Sciences are interested in socio-political 
and historical aspects of the construction of regional realities, the 
economic discourse is often restricted to the concepts, axioms and 
methods of the Neoclassical thinking. 




ain strands of regionalism





1.1.1 The role of European integration on regional theories 
The first economic document identified by Fritz Machlup (1977, p. 
10) in his inquire into the genealogy of integration had been handled by 
George F. Kennan when drafting the Marshall Plan. In 1947, he received 
from three economists the proposal of a “coordinate European Recovery 
Program” directed “toward a strong and economically integrated Europe”. 
In 1949, Paul Hoffman, administrator of the Economic Cooperation 
Administration (ECA), an American counterpart of the Organization for 
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), wrote:  
 
“The substance of such integration would be the formation 
of a single large market within which quantitative restrictions on 
the movements of goods, monetary barriers to the flow of 
payments and, eventually, all tariffs are permanently swept 
away” (Machlup, 1977, p. 11).  
 
At that time, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) 
(1947) had been implemented to consolidate multilateralism and avoid the 
return to protectionism that characterised the two post-war periods. 
Signed by 23 countries and debtor of the multilateralist spirit imposed by 
Bretton Woods, it soon turned out to be too ambitious for such a context, 
just like the International Monetary Fund did (IMF) (Du Bois, 2005, p. 
20). A widespread tendency to State intervention in monetary policy and 
growing rivalry with the Soviet Union (USSR) prompted Washington to 
consider its priorities. In 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall 
launched the plan to accelerate European growth, and with it, a regionalist 
perspective that relegated to a second place the “universalist aspirations 
of a world economy founded on a liberalised international cooperation” 
(Du Bois, 2005, p. 18). In the following years, the rhetoric of cooperation 
gave space to a discourse of integration that politics called for and 
academia would legitimise.  
Against this background, the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) was established in 1951. Supported by financial aid for 
reconstruction and building on the guidelines of the New International 
Economic Order (NIEO), it aimed to rebuild alliances and to guarantee 
that shared interests could prevent the proliferation of conflicts. It is in 
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this context that the academia begins to look at international trade from a 
regional angle, without yet referring to it as integration.  
The urge to reinforce the economic and political weight of post-war 
Europe led to push protectionist concerns to the supranational regional 
sphere (Machlup, 1977). Viner's influential work (1950) tried to elucidate 
the conditions under which CUs are not harmful to global output in a 
context where multilateralism is not feasible in the short term. The 
Customs Union Issue (Viner, 1950) gave rise to numerous publications 
that, throughout the decade, would build the theoretical corpus of the 
discipline by answering, completing, criticising or merely implementing 
the arguments presented by Viner. In this regard, although neither the 
European Community is the first regional project to exist nor neoclassical 
theories were the first to address this type of processes, both conformed 
the basis of orthodox regionalism: 
 
“Whether in the economic, social, political or security 
realm, regionalism in practice had always had a multiple, global 
heritage. Yet from the 1960s onwards, a narrow theoretical 
approach developed by a group of European and US scholars 
came to dominate international relations scholars’ idea of what 
regionalism means and how to study its origins, evolution and 
effectiveness. This paradigm of regionalism emerged with the 
establishment of the ECSC in 1951 and evolved through the 
creation and progress of the European Community. Although 
commonly known as regional integration theory, it would be 
more accurate, following Wiener and Díez, to call this body of 
work, including its main variants, federalism, neofunctionalism 
and transactionalism (also known as communications theory), 
European integration theory’” (Acharya, 2012, p. 7). 
 
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, Economics was not the only 
discipline concerned by the matter of Regionalism. Since the mid-1950s, 
the neofunctionalist school of International Relations (IR) and the 
neoclassical perspective of International Trade developed the concept of 
integration as an evolutionary process that aimed to achieve the most 
efficient point of political cooperation through market-based cooperation 
and its spillover effects (Hettne, 2006, p. 130). A few years later, the 
intergovernmental approach took hold with its theses on the centrality of 
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the nation-state in regional integration. As for the previous cases, this 
shift coincided in time and was coherent with a parallel institutional crisis 
in the EEC. Specifically, the intergovernmental approach gained 
momentum when disputes within the Council of European Ministers led 
to the “crisis of the empty chair” (1965) conducted by General De Gaulle, 
reluctant to share European hegemony with the United Kingdom (UK).  
In the same period, Article IV of the GATT was added in order to 
grant special treatment to developing countries, to which Article XXIV 
had previously applied without exception. Although it does not explicitly 
mention regional integration, its emphasis on the need to increase exports 
from developing countries and the introduction of “special measures” to 
promote trade and development opens for them the possibility to 
implement certain preferential agreements (Kuneralp, 1993, p. 115). At 
the same time, the European Community began to forge Association 
Agreements (AAs) and special treaties with its ex-colonies and 
neighbouring countries (Spain, Israel, Turkey, Greece) that standard 
theory tended to ignore. 
From the neofunctionalist point of view, not only political integration 
was to be preceded by economic integration, but the latter appeared as a 
natural phenomenon leading to the “political community” (Haas, 1958, 
1961). What Bela Balassa characterised as the evolutionary process of 
economic integration was adopted by Ernst Haas (1961) as a de facto 
reality to apply a complementary logic in the political field, whereby 
integration would derive from induced effects or spillovers (Perrotta, 
2013). To this regard, Bela Balassa published in 1961 the theory of 
economic integration that best reflected the conditions and objectives of 
the European Economic Community (EEC). In the same year, Ernst Haas 
(1961, p. 375), a central theorist at the neofunctionalist school of IR, 
stated that “integration proceeds most rapidly and drastically when it 
responds to socio-economic demands emanating from an industrial-urban 
environment, when it is an adaptation to cries for increasing welfare 
benefits and security born by the growth of a new type of society”. 
 
1.1.1.1 Stagnation and restoring of regional processes 
 In the 1970s, the Oil crisis, the phenomenon of stagflation and the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system would push international trade 
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towards protectionism. In the field of economic integration, the stagnation 
of the European process and the failure to implement similar schemes 
between countries of the South caused growing disappointment and a 
relative loss of interest (Bøås et al. 2003; Cohen, 2008; Perrotta, 2013). In 
1976, Haas wrote: 
 
“Theories of regional integration are becoming obsolescent 
because the core assumptions on which these theories have been 
based are becoming less and less relevant to the behaviour 
patterns actually displayed by governments active in regional 
organizations. (...) The explanation for the new trend is to be 
found in awareness of the various novel kinds and dimensions 
of interdependence between countries, issues, and objectives, 
particularly with reference to policies involving those aspects of 
highly industrial societies which do not respond readily to the 
incentives of a customs union” (Haas, 1976, p. 173). 
 
The challenges arising from growing economic interdependence, 
which added up to former relations of dependence reproduced in 
international trade flows (Cohen, 2008, p. 21) made it impossible to set 
politics aside. According to Benjamin Cohen (2008, p. 23), “the world 
economy would be depoliticised no longer”. On the 28 November 1979, 
the Enabling Clause on the “Differentiated and More Favourable Treaty, 
Reciprocity and Greater Participation of Developing Countries” was 
introduced into GATT, which allowed for the ratification of preferential 
agreements for trade in goods between developing countries. 
In any event, such a circumstance stimulated contributions from other 
disciplines like Political Science or Sociology. As a consequence, some 
authors in the field of IR opened a debate on the “separatist comfort of 
specialisation” (Strange, 1996) among social disciplines, referring 
especially to the economic and political sides of IR. The weaknesses 
revealed by the rationalist architecture of Economics to explain regional 
trends in Europe and elsewhere rekindled interest in the “reciprocal and 
dynamic interaction in IR of the pursuit of wealth and the pursuit of 
power” (Gilping, 1975, p. 43). In this context, Robert Keohane and 
Joseph Nye (1977, 1987) published Power and Interdependence, which 
some authors describe as the work marking the return of the International 
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Political Economy (IPE). Based on the tradition of classical 19th-century 
Political Economy, the IPE sought to bridge the gap between Political 
Science and International Economics. 
The 1980s would be marked in the North by the expansion of 
Neoliberalism and, in the South, by strong economic crises tackled 
through Structural Adjustment Plans (SAPs) that aligned their 
macroeconomic structure with the prerogatives of the Washington 
Consensus (1989). In the field of economic integration, the acceleration 
of the European process and the proliferation of open regional schemes in 
the Global South rekindled interest in the issue. At the same time, 
growing concerns for the political nature of the phenomenon led to the 
concept of Regionalism taking hold alongside the term “economic 
integration”. The signature of the Single European Act (1986) represents 
for many authors (Schiff, Winters, 2003; Majluf, 2004) a milestone in the 
architecture of regional integration whose implications would become 
central to the debate on the phenomenon in subsequent years. The 
awakening of the European process and the prevailing ideology of the 
geopolitical context favoured the reinsertion of the neoclassical rhetoric in 
the rationale of reforms proposed by the IMF or the World Bank (WB).  
Having overcome the “dark years of the community” (Keohane, 
Hoffman, 1991; Moravcsik, 1998), Regionalism regained strength with a 
new name for old premises. The fall of the Soviet bloc reawakened trust 
in the markets and favoured the rescue of neofunctionalism and 
neoclassical postulates in academia. Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996, p. 
24-25) speak of a new or “second” regionalism and the “dynamic time-
path question”, in opposition to the static question of Viner’s analysis. 
Whereas the latter had emerged together with the creation of the 
European Community, the so-called Second Regionalism would stem 
from “US conversion to preferential trade agreements” (PTAs) as a means 
of achieving global free trade after its failed attempt to open a GATT 
round of negotiations in 1982.   
 
Panagariya (1999, p. 7) sums up the process as follows: 
 
“Proposals were made during the 1960s for a North 
Atlantic Free Trade Area but received no attention from the US. 
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All this changed, however, when, at the GATT Ministerial in 
November 1982, the US began efforts to start the eighth round 
of multilateral trade negotiations. Unable to persuade the 
European Community to go along, she felt obliged to abandon 
her long-standing opposition to regional arrangements. 
Recognizing that PTAs were the only means left for keeping the 
process of trade liberalisation afloat, the US went on to 
conclude a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Israel in 1985 
and Canada in 1989. Though the Uruguay Round was launched 
in the meantime, because the European Community remained a 
reluctant player at the negotiating table, the US moved ahead 
with yet another Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), this time 
jointly with Mexico and Canada. Side by side, the European 
Community continued its expansion, adding Greece in 1981, 
Portugal and Spain in 1986 and Austria, Finland and Sweden in 
1995.” 
1.1.1.2 The rise of open regionalism 
The relative failure of what came to be called Old Regionalism 
(Hettne and Inotai, 1994, p. 1) to offer sound explanations and predictions 
about international integration, together with the rapid advance of 
globalisation, opened two avenues for the transformation of the discipline 
under the title of New Regionalism since the mid-decade. The most 
conservative, linked to the subject of European Studies, tried to solve the 
weaknesses of the orthodox stream from a post-positivist approach. 
Against this backdrop, within the realm of IPE attempts were made to 
overcome the limits of the neoclassical and Eurocentric frameworks that 
had dominated the discipline hitherto. Along the decade, authors like Cox 
(1981, p. 144-146) criticise the submission of national policies to the 
demands of the global economy. In this regard, they interpret 
Regionalism as a tool for states to implement offensive strategies (by 
supporting competitive industries) or defensive ones (by protecting weak 
sectors) in the field of international trade. The increasing global mobility 
of capital (Gill, Law, 1988), as a critical feature of the globalisation 
process, will be reflected in a large part of the critical contributions to 
Regionalism. Cox’s (1993, p. 261) assertions about the growing influence 
of the transnational managerial class, or what Susan Strange (1995, 1996, 
1998) called “international business civilisation” will spark interest 
among critical perspectives on the structure of the global economy. 
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After the fall of the Berlin Wall, it looked like the road towards 
multilateralism would be definitely reopened. Notwithstanding, far from 
disappearing, integration processes awakened an unprecedented interest 
in Social Sciences. Since 1994, Regionalism has been regulated by the 
renewed Article XXIV of GATT, Article V of the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) and the Enabling Clause. In 1996, the World 
Trade Organization (WTO, formerly GATT) appointed a Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements to manage the limits and possibilities of a 
supra-state configuration that moved ahead towards globalisation 
(Panagariya, 1999). In the academy, the metaphor of the ‘spaghetti bowl’ 
popularised by Baghwati (1995) became an icon of the proliferation of 
preferential treaties.  
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the 
Mediterranean policy of the EU consolidated a structure of hub-and-
spokes that helped them strengthening their bargaining power in global 
economic relations. At the same time, significant South-South initiatives 
encouraged the reformulation of South-South integration from positions 
more open to global market conditions than in the Seventies. Among 
them, the Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur) (1995), the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) (1992), the Association of 
South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1992) or the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Conference (APEC) (1989) took part in this process. In the 
neoclassical economy, the new theories of endogenous growth and other 
contributions that introduced certain ‘non-economic’ phenomena 
penetrated the mainstream discourse of integration. Authors like Krugman 
(1991b) and Frankel (1996) made substantial progress in the analysis of 
transport costs and spatial effects of integration. In this vein, another key 
concept of the period would be that of “natural blocks”, proposed by 
Wonnacott and Lutz (1989) and supported by others such as Krugman 
(1993). For Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996), on the contrary, transport 
costs do not have any specific characteristics distinguishing them from 
any other costs. Moreover, at this stage, CUs as the main subject of 
analysis lost relevance face to trade blocs that do not necessarily fall 
within the limits of one single preferential treaty. In a synthesis of the 
neoclassical theory of integration since the 1950s, Baldwin and Venables 
(1995, p. 1638) underscored as follows the main grey areas of the 
discipline in that period:  
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“Perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn is 
that –despite theoretical ambiguities– regional integration 
agreements (RIAs) seem to have generated welfare gains for 
the participants, with small, but possibly negative spillovers 
onto the rest of the world. (...) The study of RIAs should 
remain an important research topic for economists, and our 
survey has identified many areas where research is still 
needed. What determines the cross-market interaction 
between firms, and what is meant by a ‘single market’? What 
are the effects of RIAs on long-run growth? Will RIAs serve 
to promote convergence or divergence of members’ income 
levels? Above all, better empirical evaluations are needed.” 
 
In addition to ‘inward-looking’ perspectives, other approaches 
nourished the debate on the relationship between regionalism and 
multilateralism (Freund, 1998; Ethier, 1998). In this regard, inspired by 
NAFTA and by the latest steps of European integration, Wilfred Ethier 
(1998) summed up the six characteristics that broadly defined 
Regionalism in the 1990s:  
a. One or more small countries are bound to a large country 
b. Small countries have implemented significant unilateral reforms 
c. The degree of intraregional liberalisation is relatively modest, so 
the Vinerian paradigm is not a “natural starting point”  
d. Liberalisation is achieved first by small countries, not by large 
ones: the agreements are one-sided 
e. Regional agreements often involve “deep” integration measures 
harmonising or adjusting other economic policies 
f. Regional agreements are geographically based: countries are 
neighbours 
From this characterisation, Ethier (1998, p. 1161) concluded that 
“new regionalism reflects the success of multilateralisation - not its 
failure”. According to him, regionalism was the “means by which new 
countries seeking to enter the multilateral system (and small countries that 
are already part of it) compete among themselves for the direct 
investment necessary for their participation in such system” (1998, p. 
1160). For Ethier, regionalism in the context of globalization “plays a key 
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role in expanding and preserving the liberal order of trade”. Baldwin 
(1997, p. 886) offers a similar interpretation: “Regionalism is part of the 
trade liberalisation ‘wheel’ that has been rolling towards global free trade 
since 1958”. 
1.1.1.3 Bloc-to-bloc multilateralism  
The proliferation of preferential treaties relatively neutralised the 
regional exception to the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause and, 
together with stronger inter-regional exchanges, led to a situation of de 
facto multilateralism (Baldwin, Freund, 2011). Against this background, 
among mainstream theories, the assessment of dynamic effects of 
integration became increasingly sophisticated. Within this framework, 
some authors tried to solve the shortcomings in the study of dynamic 
effects on competitiveness, investment flows, economies of scale or 
productivity (De Melo, Panagariya, 1993; Fernández, 1997; Lawrence, 
1997). In fact, guided by the consideration of capital as the only factor 
with actual mobility, dynamic effects for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
attracted great attention (Baldwin et al., 1995; Dunning, Robson, 1998; 
Schiff, Winters, 1998, 2003).  
Out of the realm of orthodox regionalism, the influence of other 
disciplines of Social Sciences and critical approaches of IPE enlarged the 
debate on the relationship between regionalism and globalisation 
(Mittleman, 2000). Discussions on the best circumstances for the 
implementation of regional agreements were replaced by debates on their 
role in the global era (Söderbaum, 2004). A number of scholars reflected 
on regionalism as a ‘stumbling block’ or ‘stepping stone’ for 
multilateralism (Lawrence, 1996; Söderbaum, 2004; Hettne, 2006; Mann, 
Liu, 2009).  
In this regard, Bjorn Hettne (1994, p. 1-2) highlighted three major 
transitions in the shift from ‘old’ to ‘new’ regionalism:  
(1) from the bipolar order of the Cold War to a multipolar 
context;  
(2) from externally and top-down regionalism to a ‘more 
spontaneous process from within and from below’; and  
(3) from specific objectives to a broader, multidimensional 
process.   
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From those premises, the so-called Political Economy of New 
Regionalism focused on the constructed (Wendt, 1999) and changing 
features of regions, as well as on the weight of identity and ideas in 
shaping them (Söderbaum, 2003; Gamble, Payne, 2003). Thus, beyond 
relations between the market and the State, IPE adopted some aspects of 
Sociology and Social Anthropology (Murphy, Tooze, 1991; Cox, Sinclair, 
1996). Furthermore, Cox’s precept “theory is always for someone, and for 
some purpose” (Cox, 1981, p. 128) took hold in that period as flagship of 
reflectivist contributions to regional phenomena, especially for the 
scholars of the World Order Approach (WOA). Among them, Gamble 
and Payne (1996) underscored the unequal relations that regional blocs 
tend to deepen and perpetuate when disparities are not taken into account 
a priori. For their part, Hook and Kearns (1999) saw the new wave of 
regionalism as an attempt by global elites to promote neoliberal policies 
in a relatively veiled manner.  
During the 1990s, Hettne’s theories would gradually move closer to 
what would eventually be called the New Regionalism Approach (NRA), 
which was to gain salience in the first ten years of the 21st century. 
Unlike the WOA, this approach focuses on the role of civil society in 
building bottom-up regional processes from a more optimistic view on the 
role of regionalism in the global era (Hettne, Inotai, 1994; Söderbaum, 
2004, p. 32). Gary P. Sampson (2003) characterised the global landscape 
as follows:  
 
“In the space of one decade, the world has witnessed both 
the successful conclusion of the most ambitious round of 
multilateral trade negotiations in the history of humankind and 
the launching of another. At the same time, the world has seen a 
proliferation of regional trading arrangements unprecedented at 
any period in history. To say the least, these parallel 
developments appear to be paradoxical: on the one hand, non-
discrimination is the pillar of the multilateral trading system; on 
the other, all but 2 of the 140-plus members of the WTO are 
parties to at least one – and some as many as 26 – preferential 




Along the years, New Regionalism put greater emphasis on the 
political dimensions of regional schemes, defined as market-driven and 
outward looking (Hettne, 2006, p. 135) and inserted into the rules and 
dynamics of globalisation. Cable and Henderson (1994) defined “open 
regionalism” as a “negotiating framework consistent with and 
complementary to GATT” (Hettne, 2006, p. 135). For Pia Riggirozzi 
(2010, p. 3), it was the simultaneity of the processes of regionalisation 
and globalisation that brought about a new regionalism characterised by 
“a new porosity to the global rules”, in a context in which the 
phenomenon of integration no longer responds to post-war protectionism.   
Together with the strengthening of inter-regional relations and so-
called “bloc-to-bloc agreements” (Majluf, 2004), the consolidation of 
hub-and-spokes models triggered by the NAFTA and the Euro-
Mediterranean Association evolved over the years as another central 
debate on the regional issue from the international point of view. The 
economic crisis of 2008 and the rejection of the European Constitution in 
2009 stimulated the discussion. In political circles, the concept of 
sovereignty grew increasingly sensitive. In the academic context, 
disagreement on the benefits of regional integration rose from within 
orthodox and heterodox perspectives. In any case, both heterodox and 
mainstream visions share, to some extent, that nowadays "the region is 
not only an arena, but can also be seen as an actor" (Hettne, 2006, p. 141). 
In this regard, a renewed interest on the role of international institutions 
and hegemonic actors emerged. As Maljuf (2004, p. 7) puts it: 
 
“For developed countries, and also for the multilateral 
financial institutions, it seems that the only true 
developmental content of this feature of the new regionalism 
is the possibility of locking in reforms through legally binding 
rule-based commitments which the developed partner(s) can 
use to enforce the terms of the agreements. Market logic, it 
seems, will do the rest. Some developing countries’ 
governments have also participated in trade negotiations with 
this objective in mind, anchoring structural reforms to avoid 
possible reversal by future Governments (Mexico is one such 
example)”. 
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Therefore, during the last three decades, the rise of critical 
perspectives from different disciplines has consolidated opposing visions 
of regionalism. Beyond the orthodox proposal, the NRA (Söderbaum, 
Shaw, 2003; Hettne, 2006) denounced the normativity of Western 
regionalism under the hegemony of the European project. In this regard, a 
number of authors argue that EU acts a hegemonic regional power that 
uses its economic and normative weight to build a series of asymmetric 
bilateral relations to transfer of its norms and values (Haukkala, 2011). 
According to this reasoning, EU’s strategy that does not allow a 
significant participation of its partners in the agenda-setting: the goals and 
means are non-negotiable and the sole moment when partners could be 
consulted is when individual action plans are negotiated under clear 
benchmarks (Haukkala, 2011, p. 56). In this sense, they note in EU’s 
behaviour the will to “replicate itself by encouraging regional integration 
around the world” (Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002). However, they point out 
that it often fails to recognise that what is being promoted “is not the EU 
as such, but an EU-topia” (Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002). 
In opposition to this, these new approaches stand for non-hegemonic 
frameworks that seek to fit better the economic and political needs of 
Southern countries (Riggirozzi, Tussie, 2012). From different angles, this 
strand aims to “challenge the core rationalist and problem-solving 
features, such as the separation of subject and object, fact and value, state-
centric ontology and rationalist epistemology” (Söderbaum, 2004, p. 28). 
These proposals not only question the ‘economicist’ neoclassical vision of 
the previous theories of integration, but also analyse the links between the 
local and the regional from a structuralist perspective. Moreover, these 
approaches assign a prominent role to civil society (Söderbaum, 2004) in 
regional processes built from below, as opposed to the top-down orthodox 
model based on political decisions or the influence of large corporations. 
In recent years, New Regionalism as a concept has lost its 
singularities. Employed both in the field of European studies, comparative 
politics, international economics, IR and IPE (Hettne, 2006, p. 129), it 
seems to generate the sole consensus that regionalism is a wavering 
concept. Thus, while Hettne (2006, p. 128) states from the NRA that 
“regionalism means different things to different people”, Jovanovic 




To conclude, international institutions (including the EU in its role of 
normative actor) have become a central element of the analyses that study 
the relationship between regionalism and globalisation. Among them, 
perspectives inherited from structuralist theories, the theories of 
dependence and the WOA (Gamble and Payne, 2003; Wallerstein, 2004; 
Amin, 2014) focus on the effects of hegemonic regionalism on centre-
periphery relations and on its effects on the expansion of neoliberal 
postulates. On another vein, scholars of the NRA (Hettne, 2005,2006; 
Söderbaum, Sbragia, 2010), research on the structural determinants of the 
‘normative power’ of the EU. Apart from that, they take into account non-
conventional actors and regional projects that challenge the limits and 
prerogatives of the nation-state. Within this framework, considerable 
efforts to create a specific and rigorous theoretical corpus, capable of 
offering the disciplinary tools that are necessary to compare different 
levels of “regionality” (Hettne, Söderbaum, 2000).  
1.1.2 Main definitions and typologies of integration: Neoclassical 
approaches and Europe as a model  
From the review of the definitions and typologies provided by the 
most prominent theories of economic integration, two major features 
arise. On the one hand, neoclassical approaches prevail over institutional 
or heterodox ones. On the other hand, the historical and socio-political 
dimensions that distinguish regional projects have been largely neglected 
in conventional theories. These two elements favoured what Whitman 
(2011) calls the ‘normative power’ of the EU. 
Ten years after Viner’s contribution to the analysis of Customs 
Unions (CUs), the first great attempt to give a solid theoretical body to 
the neoclassical view on CUs was Balassa’s Theory of Economic 
Integration (1961), where he incorporated, criticised and developed the 
elements of Viner’s analysis. Balassa also defined integration as a state 
and as a process and, focusing on the latter, described its standard phases.  
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Figure 1.2. Standard phases of economic integration 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Jovanovic (2006).   
 
The book develops a carefully selected network of past theoretical 
contributions from economic theory whereby regional integration is not 
contradictory with free-market, and links them to the rationale behind the 
process of European integration. Balassa conceived integration as a 
process involving “measures aimed at abolishing discrimination between 
economic units belonging to different countries” (1961, p. 1). It also 
defined integration as opposed to cooperation, which would reduce such 
discrimination without removing it completely (Balassa, 1961, p. 2). 
From that moment onwards, the modalities of integration gradually built 
on a number of his assumptions and followed the path of the European 
process. 
Among the first sources of disciplinary dissent, discussions were held 
on the level of preference needed to talk about integration and on the 
reasons behind the choice to set up a regional agreement. In this vein, 
while the definitions provided by authors like Meade (1955), Lipsey 
(1960), Baldwin and Venables (1995) or Lahiri (1998) do not necessarily 
imply the removal of all kinds of barriers between member countries, 
Balassa’s distinction between integration and cooperation explicitly 
sought to exclude from the debate any agreement or preference that did 
not completely eliminate them. For its part, Krauss (1972, p. 427) 
suggests that, in some instances, preferential agreements may be a form of 
protectionism rather than an instrument of trade liberalisation. Tinbergen 
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(1954, p. 122) goes beyond purely commercial considerations and 
distinguishes between negative integration - i.e. elimination of barriers to 
trade- and positive integration - i.e. establishment of institutions and 
policies with coercive powers. Other divergences had to do with the 
importance given to factor mobility (Holzman, 1976; Machlup, 1979; El-
Agraa, 1985), to coordination mechanisms (Maksimova, 1976; El-Agraa, 
1988), or to the relative cession of economic sovereignty (Anderson, 
Blackhurst, 1993) that integration entailed. At the end of the 1970s, 
Machlup (1977) published a compendium of the discipline from the 
perspective of the history of economic thought in which he emphasised 
the scant clarity of the definition and the limited consensus on the object 
of study, methodology or purposes (1977, p. 18). Notwithstanding, he 
identified three essential elements that gathered consensus.  
 
“A wide consensus exists on three issues: one, that 
economic integration refers basically to division of labor; two, 
that it involves mobility of goods or factors or both; and three, 
that it is related to discrimination or nondiscrimination in the 
treatment of goods and factors (for example, with regard to 
origin or destination). This consensus does not imply 
agreement on a definition” (Machlup, 1977, p. 18).  
 
In a way, it could be affirmed that, over the last half-century, the 
theory of integration has sophisticated its architecture by softening its 
underlying assumptions without abandoning its neoclassical foundations. 
The need to adapt the changing reality to the orthodox precepts of 
equilibrium and welfare (Bhagwati, 1971) led to widening the margins of 
definition until tautology.  
 
 
The following statement by Jovanovic (2006, p. 20) in one of the 
best-known manuals of economic integration is a good example:   
 
“Integration means different things in different countries 
and at different times. In the developed market economies, 
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integration is taken to be a way of introducing the most 
profitable technologies (often linked with economies of scale), 
allocate them in the most efficient way and foster free and fair 
competition; during the period of central planning in Central 
and Eastern Europe it meant the planning of the development of 
certain industrial activities; while in developing countries, 
integration was one of the tools of economic development. At 
the time of the German Zollverein the grouping of countries 
meant the development of economic interdependence, nation 
building and self-reliance. Today, international economic 
integration refers to an increase in the level of welfare.”  
1.2 MAIN DEBATES ON ECONOMIC INTEGRATION  
The recent history of the discipline of economic integration has 
witnessed the development of the theory around two major cross-cutting 
axes. The first derives from Viner's analytical distinctions and centres on 
the debate between static and dynamic effects. The second builds on the 
differences between North-developed countries and South-developing 
ones. In its orthodox version, it mitigates some of the assumptions and 
conclusions of static and dynamic analyses to adapt them to the 
conditions and assumed goals of developing countries. The heterodox 
approaches to this subject, arising from the divergences between Western 
regional models (especially the EEC and NAFTA) and those of the rest of 
the world and often articulated around North-South dialectics, puts into 
question the alleged universality of a discipline conceived by and for the 
hegemonic actors of global geopolitics.  
1.2.1 Static and dynamic effects for trade 
If Viner is considered the founding father of the theory of economic 
integration, Balassa (1961) appears as its chief architect. Perhaps the only 
element of this influential work that is more often cited than the phases of 
integration is its distinction between static and dynamic effects and the 
emphasis on the latter. The main difference between the two is that the 
analysis of the former requires the assumption of perfectly competitive 
markets and constant returns, while the latter concentrates on the effects 
for which such assumptions are not met. 
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It would be difficult to find a handbook on Integration Economics 
that does not distinguish between static and dynamic effects of trade 
liberalisation (Balassa, 1961; Baldwin, Venables, 1995; Jovanovic, 2006; 
Baldwin, Wyplosz, 2012). The idea is that, through changes in the volume 
of trade and factor allocation among a certain number of countries, 
economic integration produces ambivalent effects on welfare. Such 
effects are analysed by looking at the variation in the possibilities of 
consumption or production deriving from foreign trade. Notwithstanding, 
despite the success of these approaches both among scholars and IOs, a 
number of authors criticise that the increasing sophistication of theories 
occurs at the expense of reality. According to Combes et al. (2008, p. 35): 
 
“To a large extent, the modelling constraints have quite 
spontaneously led economists to concentrate—probably for too 
long— on the combination involving constant returns and 
perfect competition, which is easier to handle. Exaggerating a 
little, it can be concluded that the elegance of the neoclassical 
model and, especially, the absence of alternative models have 
generated a lock-in effect that economists had a lot of trouble 
escaping.”  
 
Through different perspectives on static and dynamic effects, the 
economy of integration managed to offer scientific support for political 
purposes that it considered devoid of “economic rationality” (Krauss, 
1972). 
1.2.1.1 Static effects 
The most widely analysed effects are trade creation (TC) or trade 
diversion (TD) and, at least in in some periods and schools, the issue of 
terms of trade. They are classified as static effects for allocation, which 
are considered to appear in the short-term (Baldwin, Venables, 1995; 
Jovanovic, 2006). Without altering the production–possibility frontier 
(PPF), the possibilities of consumption increase due to a reallocation of 
factors (productive specialisation) and to an improvement in terms of 
trade. Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996, p. 3) see trade creation and 
diversion as “two possibilities that define the second-best character of the 
static analyses of PTAs”. Based on a Ricardian model, this distinction 
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helped Viner to justify his scepticism about the contribution of Customs 
Unions (CU) to global welfare which, according to his approach, was 
directly linked to the level of openness of international trade. The idea is 
that, by granting preferential treatment to a specific group of countries, 
any of the following processes might happen:  
 TC: trade increases because the countries that endorse the agreement 
stop producing certain goods to import them from relatively more 
efficient member countries. That is, a trend of specialisation arises 
within the region. 
 TD: trade with the rest of the world (RoW) is diverted towards 
relatively less efficient member countries whose prices become more 
competitive in the absence of tariff barriers to trade. In this case, 
global welfare does not increase because this specialisation occurs to 
the detriment of imports from relatively more efficient non-member 
countries. Also, domestic consumers acquire goods at a higher price. 
Figure 1.3. Static effects of integration 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Balassa (1961). 
 
As shown in Figure 1.3, the rationale of the theory is the following: 
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In a context of equilibrium, the Home Country (H) has a curve of 
demand (D) and supply (S) whereby it produces (Q2) and imports (Q2Q1) 
a certain product from the rest of the world (W) at a lower Price (Pw) than 
from Other Country (O). If: 
A. The Home Country applies a general tariff (t) on imports: 
domestic production increases (Q4) and imports decrease (Q4-
Q3). In that case, a welfare decrease will occur that is represented 
by the area  (a c e) and (f i j). So, the decrease in consumer 
surplus would be higher than the increase in producers’ surplus 
plus the government revenue.  
B. The Home Country and Country O establish a CU (or FTA) 
whereby they remove the general tariff (t) between them and keep 
it with the rest of the world (W): domestic production decreases 
(Q6), while H imports increase (Q6Q5) and come from the higher 
cost country, which has become relatively more competitive due 
to the difference between its Price (Po) and Pw(t). Compared to 
situation A, the quantities (Q4-Q6) and (Q3-Q5) represent trade 
creation, while (Q3-Q4) corresponds to trade diversion.  The net 
effect for welfare would result from the sum of the positive 
effects from trade creation (b c d + f h g) and the negative effect 
of trade diversion (d g e i).  
According to this logic, participating in a CU can reduce inefficient 
domestic production by assigning to each country the production of goods 
in which it has a comparative advantage, improving the allocation of 
resources through intensified interindustrial trade (Riveiro, 2005, p. 4). 
Such outcome would occur in an environment where the exchange of 
goods takes place between different industries in a framework of perfect 
competition. However, CUs’ overall effects can be detrimental if 
diversion exceeds trade creation.  
In this regard, R. G. Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster’s theorem of 
Second Best (1956) would help to determine the conditions under which 
regional agreements are desirable in the context of multilateral trade. In 
particular, the theorem specified when is it desirable a sub-optimal 
situation in which not all the Pareto conditions are fulfilled. According to 
it, on certain occasions, if an obstacle prevents the fulfilment of all of the 
conditions, it is not desirable that the other conditions be fulfilled. 
Translated into the area of economic integration, this theorem questioned 
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the conception of regional integration as a progressive path towards 
multilateral trade, and suggested that, if certain distortions to market 
equilibrium (tariffs, subsidies, monopolies, etc.) cannot be eliminated, the 
removal of others does not necessarily imply an improvement in welfare.  
Two relevant contributions complemented Viner’s in the 1950s. The 
first significant amendment to his work criticised the assessment of 
welfare effects through a partial equilibrium model that only takes into 
account the supply side (Lipsey, 1957, p. 41). The second reformulation 
concerns the assumption of perfect competition and constant returns 
(Lipsey, 1960). Such amendments would result in numerous ramifications 
that put the focus on the relevance and applicability of Viner’s theory, 
rather than on the reasons or means whereby regional phenomena as such 
occurred (Krauss, 1972, p. 417). 
According to James E. Meade (1955), Viner’s analysis is only correct 
under inelastic demand conditions and perfectly elastic supply (Hosny, 
2013, p. 136). In the same vein, Sheer (1981, p. 44, op. cit. Hosny, 2013, 
p. 136) considered that the major weakness of Viner’s model was the 
assumption that consumption is independent of relative price changes due 
to the reduction of tariff barriers. Starting from a general equilibrium 
model, Meade (1955) reinterprets the effects of trade diversion, taking 
into account the elasticity of demand and allowing the possibility of a 
‘trade expansion’ effect. This would consist of an increase in the volume 
of trade - with a consequent increase in welfare, according to the model’s 
premises - despite the existence of trade diversion.  
In a similar logic, authors like Corden (1965) concentrated on the 
analysis of economies of scale. According to them, Viner considered the 
effects on the location of production as “the only source of variation of 
welfare”. As a consequence, they argued, the Vinerian theory ignored the 
effects for welfare derived from the reduction in production costs of 
existing resources, without these involving the transfer of production to 
more efficient units. In this regard, Melvyn B. Krauss (1972, p. 414), a 
firm supporter of Viner’s contribution and its formal architecture, stressed 
that the mistake was to consider Viner’s analysis as an attempt to create 
an a priori law that approached reality as much as possible. For him, he 
just aimed at “focusing attention on a particular aspect of the problem of 
CU that he considered important”. In fact, according to Krauss, this 
interpretation of the theory as a universal law had resulted in “the birth of 
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the non-problem of trade diversion CU resulting in welfare 
improvements” (1972, p. 414). 
Contrary to the usual conception of economies of scale within 
dynamic effects for allocation (Balassa, 1961, Baldwin and Venables, 
1995; Jovanovic, 2006), both Corden and Krauss consider them as part of 
static effects (Corden, 1965; Krauss, 1972). However, where Corden 
(1965) resolves his objections to the Vinerian model by including 
economies of scale in what he calls “cost reduction effect” and “trade 
suppression effect”, Krauss (1972, p. 420) argues: “once Viner’s 
assumptions are discarded it is inappropriate to refer to the creation and 
diversion of trade in the orthodox sense”. In any case, according to 
Krauss, “scale effects should be accommodated by broadening the 
definitions of trade creation and diversion rather than supplementing 
them” (1972, p. 420).  
With a view to resolving such inconsistencies, a number of 
publications tried in subsequent years to abandon the assumptions of 
perfect competition and constant returns. Literature on economic 
integration started to analyse from various angles the potential effects of 
integration in a context of economies of scale or taking into account 
unbalances in terms of trade (Arndt, 1968,1969; Kemp, Wan, 1976; 
Lipsey, 1970; Melvin, 1969; Vanek, 1965). Works such as those of 
Corden (1972), Ethier and Horn (1984), Venables (1987) or Haaland and 
Wooton (1992) concluded that the welfare effects of RIAs might be much 
stronger if industries are imperfectly competitive (Baldwin, Venables, 
1995, p. 1606). 
As for the terms of trade, Viner’s model is composed of small 
countries that are unable to influence international prices. On the 
contrary, these authors showed that by eliminating this assumption, the 
possibility appears that the participation of large countries in certain RIAs 
modifies the terms of trade in their favour both within the region and 
towards the RoW. Given this effect, Meade (1955) had already suggested 
in the mid-fifties that a regional agreement could change the capacity of 
member countries to negotiate in their favour the conditions of 
international trade. Pearce (1970), for his part, argued that the goal of 
CUs is a redistribution of global welfare to the benefit of the country or 
countries that take the initiative in this policy (Krauss, 1972, p. 421).   
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Other debates about Viner’s contributions concerned the nature of the 
goods exchanged and the structure of regional markets. Authors such as 
Meyer (1956) focused on the typology of goods, arguing that 
complementary markets were most likely to lead to a rise in welfare 
through trade. He suggested that this type of trade would be more 
beneficial as it would allow to import complementary goods with 
domestic ones and to export those considered competitive. On the 
contrary, Meade (1955, op. cit. Hosny, 2013, p. 137) argued that a CU 
could improve welfare if member countries are indeed competitive, but 
potentially complementary. 
Regarding the structure of regional markets, several economists 
questioned the conclusions derived from the theory of specialization 
based on the comparative advantage used by Viner (Hosny, 2013). 
Disagreements over effects on the relative endowment of factors or on per 
capita income gave rise to vast research which, being closely linked to the 
dynamic effects of integration and North-South relations, will be 
discussed in greater depth in the following sections. In any case, although 
the analysis of static effects for trade is often discredited by its excessive 
restrictions and the impossibility of endogenising relevant variables, 
many authors deduce from it the factors that turn a RIA susceptible of 
increasing welfare (Jovanovic, 2006, p. 61-62). 
 The lower the relative weight of goods imported from non-member 
countries in the country’s overall consumption previous to integration 
 The more competitive (less complementary) are the productive 
structures of the countries involved 
 The greater the difference in production costs for similar goods is 
 The higher the tariffs with future partners and the lower the tariffs 
with future non-members, as well as the lower the Common External 
Tariff to be established after the union are 
 The larger the CU’s size in terms of area and number of members 
 The smaller the countries that join the regional area 
 The closer the countries are to each other and the lower the transport 
costs are 
 The more inelastic the demand of countries that remain outside the 
integrated region is 
 The greatest the number of small companies in the same sector in the 
countries that integrate 
FÁTIMA FERNÁNDEZ FERNÁNDEZ
36 
 The less developed the economies are before integration, as they have 
greater potential opportunities for specialisation 
Nevertheless, the performance of these theoretical models is bound to 
a few restrictive assumptions like perfect competition, constant returns, 
etc., which constitute both their greatest weakness and strength. Certainly, 
such assumptions imply an important gap between theory and reality. 
However, the relative simplicity of the theoretical exercise and the clarity 
of the concepts at stake make it a quite appealing tool of analysis. 
1.2.1.2 Dynamic effects 
Regarding dynamic effects, which are rather related to the medium-
long term, they appear to be the most relevant for growth and structural 
change. They have to do with conditions of imperfect competition, non-
equilibrium market situations, foreign investment or technology transfer 
(Baldwin, Venables, 1995). Dynamic effects may alter the PPF through 
the exploitation of economies of scale, increased competition, greater 
differentiation of products and incentives to R+D+i, further expanding the 
possibilities of consumption. However, although there is broad consensus 
on the significance of such effects, many authors of the neoclassical 
school underscore the persistence of difficulties to endogenise variables 
and to explain integration in terms of structural change (Baldwin, 
Venables, 1995; Jovanovic, 2006; Combes et al., 2008). As Combes, 
Mayer and Thisse (2008, p. 31-32) point out:  
 
“Increasing returns and imperfect competition must be 
combined for a relevant integration of space into economic 
theory. Combining these two elements within a fully fledged 
general-equilibrium model has so far been out of reach and this 
probably explains why space has been put aside for so long.” 
 
A vast scientific production has tried to solve the theoretical setbacks 
by trying to lighten those assumptions. However, their relevance for 
modelling performance continuously imposes a trade-off between 
robustness and realism of the premises in which the latter tends to be 
sacrificed. 
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The central dynamic effects to Balassa (1961) were related to the 
relative size of the markets and Marshallian externalities linked to 
location. Assumptions like imperfect competition, sectors or countries 
with the capacity to influence prices, or incentives to agglomeration for 
firms in a sector, were necessary to anticipate the medium and long-term 
effects of economic integration. Moreover, only by incorporating them, 
certain trends could be grasped that contradicted the assumptions of 
models based on the principle of comparative advantage. Furthermore, the 
results of Cooper and Massell’s work (1965) questioned resource 
allocation as the main driving force behind the formation of CUs. Other 
types of analyses were needed that could explain the effects of integration 
in terms of the goals actually pursued (Krauss, 1972; Hosny, 2013). 
Likewise, increasing awareness that the trend towards market equilibrium 
predicted by the postulates of comparative advantage was far to be 
fulfilled (Sheer, 1981) made it necessary to reformulate the causes 
underlying regional phenomena. 
In their review of the theory of integration, Baldwin and Venables 
(1995) distinguish between  
 ‘resource allocation effects’, which include static analysis of the 
changes in terms of trade and economies of scale generated by the 
relative size of two markets and imperfect competition 
mechanisms;  
 ‘cumulative effects’ of productive factors, which would include 
consequences for medium- and long-term growth; and  
 spatial ‘localisation effects’, which are particularly relevant to 
economic geography  
The New Trade Theories (NTT) justify the gains of free trade 
between similar or identical countries in terms of preferences, factor 
endowment and technology when they exchange differentiated goods 
belonging to the same industry, whose production is subject to economies 
of scale in a context of imperfect competition (Riveiro, 2005, p. 4). Intra-
industrial flows are expected to have positive effects arising from 
competition and the use of economies of scale, as well as increased 
productivity of products in this area without sacrificing their diversity. 
Venables and others (2003) show that trade of this type will be more 
likely the more similar countries are regarding factor endowment and per 
capita income. Pro-competitive effects, increased technology transfer and 
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incentives for innovation are expected as well. Baldwin and Venables 
(1995) argued that the success of an integration process will depend on 
the “cumulative effects”, i. e. structural change resulting from interlinked 
effects on investment, growth rate and other variables they consider 
relevant to welfare.  
Inspired by the models of Krugman (1979,1981), Lancaster (1980) 
and Helpman (1981), these theories concentrate on the trade of 
horizontally differentiated goods through models of monopolistic 
competition (Dixit, Stiglitz, 1977). In this type of trade, the consumer 
chooses between practically identical goods concerning quality belonging 
to the same industry and where each variety is produced under increasing 
returns. In the case of vertical product differentiation, it is assumed that 
the analysis does not require the use of models of imperfect competition 
since trade would meet the conventional criterion of comparative 
advantage (Riveiro, 2005, p. 5). However, authors like Combes et al. 
(2008, p. 376) stress the growing importance of competitive dynamics in 
terms of quality in large metropolitan areas that trigger the “selection of 
agents: only (more) innovative companies and (highly) skilled workers 
can be placed in such spaces”. This type of externalities for local 
development that fall outside the dynamics of orthodox models are the 
focus of many studies on regional integration from the perspective of 
economic geography, for which “competition in space is inherently 
oligopolistic and its analysis must be placed in a framework that allows 
strategic decision-making” (2008, p. 34).  
 
“The spatial impossibility theorem tells us something 
really new and important: whenever agents are mobile, there 
is no competitive equilibrium (hence the term “impossibility” 
in the name of the theorem) such that regions trade goods. In 
other words, factor mobility and interregional trade are 
incompatible in a neoclassical world. This result is especially 
meaningful insofar as it is internal to the theory itself.” 
(Combes et al. 2008, p. 39) 
Among other issues, the integration economy neglected, to a certain 
extent, the interdependencies between the labour market and the product 
market (Krugman, 1991a, 1991b). Those are derived mainly from the 
differences arising when capital and workers are remunerated in places 
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other than their places of origin. While capital owners have incentives to 
repatriate their profits to where they are better remunerated, wage earners 
invest a greater amount of their remuneration in the place where they 
produce. According to Combes et al. (2008, p. 131), “workers migration 
is governed by the difference between nominal wages as well as by the 
difference between costs of living, while capital mobility is driven by the 
difference in nominal rates of return”. However, the same authors admit 
that, despite the discipline’s attempts to solve the multiple problems of 
economic theory to capture regional phenomena, the solution still appears 
to be distant.   
 
“Building a full-fledged general equilibrium model that 
combines imperfect competition with increasing returns to 
scale is a formidable task, which is still beyond our reach. 
Meanwhile, a research strategy that involves different 
examples may be considered reasonable” (Combes et al., 
2008, p. 374). 
 
1.2.2 North-South relations 
The end of World War II (WWII) implied major geostrategic 
transformations in both Western countries and the Global South. The 
forced decolonisation of the African and Asian continents in the context 
of the NIEO had a significant impact on the academic field. The rhetoric 
of development emerged as an intellectual compromise that avoided 
threatening the hegemony of Western countries and opened ways for 
Southern countries to improve their global position. In the golden age of 
Third Worldism, the consolidation of regional alliances in the South was 
not a secondary issue for either of the two Cold War blocs. Even less for a 
Europe that had just been dispossessed of its overseas properties. In this 
context, inspired by the academic and socio-political backdrop, the 
orthodox literature on integration became increasingly interested in the 
peculiarities of the subject when it comes to the Global South. 
According to Salif Koné (2012, p. 387), the proliferation of 
contributions advocating differentiated analyses for developed and 
developing countries led to the consolidation of two branches of 
international integration:  
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 The universalist vision, for which it is possible to determine general 
conditions for improving welfare and applicable to any type of 
integration. 
 The differentiated vision, for which the type of analysis will depend 
on the level of development of member countries, given the 
weaknesses and rigidities of their economic structures. Within the 
latter, Koné distinguishes between  
o a trend that asserts the “complete inefficiency” of South-South 
integration and proposes instead North-South models (De 
Melo et al., 1993b; Venables, 1999); and  
o a second one arguing that potential long-term gains justify 
integration between countries of the South as a means to 
reduce such weaknesses and rigidities.  
For Koné, this distinction highlights the “reductive character of 
standard economic analyses of economic integration” (2012, p. 388). 
According to him, they fail to take into account the multidimensional - 
economic, political, social, cultural, historical - nature of integration, 
which he reckons is a standard feature to all regional phenomena. 
1.2.2.1 Southern specificities within orthodox theory 
Focusing on the static effects of integration, many economists paid 
attention to welfare outcomes depending on the relative level of 
development  (Linder, 1961; Sakamoto, 1969; Bhagwati, 1971) or on the 
size (Kreinin, 1964) of participating economies. They questioned the 
purely negative view of trade diversion for welfare in less industrialised 
countries (Bhambri, 1962; Sakamoto, 1969). In this sense, Cooper and 
Massell (1965) pointed out that for Southern countries, a CU can be 
understood as an efficient protectionist policy, rather than a step forward 
towards free trade. Within this logic, their model brings them to the 
following conclusions: 
 
“Economic integration may enable two or more economies 
to protect a given amount of industry at a real lower cost. 
Whether or not this result is effected depends on the preferences 
of the participants and, much more important, on the degree to 
which they co-operate. In many cases detailed cooperative 
effort will be needed if one country is not to lose more in the 
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industry dimension than it gains in the income dimension or, 
worse still, to lose in both dimensions. A CU may make it 
technically possible for both countries to gain; a CU combined 
with subsidization or comparable policies will guarantee a 
potential gain. But neither set of policies will insure that the 
gains are realized” (1965, p. 476). 
 
Other issues raised in the theory of integration for developing 
countries concerned expected effects for employment and productivity 
(Jaber, 1971), as well as the distribution of income or attraction of foreign 
investment (Sloan, 1971).  
Thus, the progressive intensification of trade between the Northern 
regions during the 1960s and the weak trade relations between countries 
of the South led some economists to speak about ‘developmental 
regionalism’:  
 
“Developmental regionalism refers to the joint policies of 
economic cooperation, coordination, and integration among 
underdeveloped countries designed to accelerate the rate of 
development of both the member-states and the geographical 
region. The policy is based upon the assumption that nations 
which share a regional identity (i.e. Latin American, Central 
American, African, Middle Eastern) may be capable of helping 
one another to develop more rapidly than if each country 
pursued a solely nationalistic course. This cooperation may 
range from a bilateral agreement to build a transnational bridge 
to the creation of a customs union through an elaborate set of 
international institutions” (Sloan, 1971, p. 142). 
 
Another primary objection to conventional theory concerned the 
interpretation of static effects for trade. Economists such as Bhambri 
(1962), Demas (1965), Linder (1966) or Sakamoto (1969) argued that 
integration between Least Developed Countries (LDCs) may be desirable 
even when it results in a net diversion of trade. The reason is that it 
would, in any event, allow for market expansion, economies of scale and 
increasing consumption capacity through lower import prices. In this 
regard, Cooper and Massell (1965, p. 462) reformulated the Vinerian 
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proposals for LDCs, for which an overarching objective would be “to 
foster industrial development and to guide such development along more 
economic lines”. So, this approach adds a “possible preference for 
industry” and understands tariff policy as a policy instrument rather than 
an exogenous variable (1965, p. 475). As a consequence, the gains of a 
CU will depend on its effects on both income and industrial output, which 
in turn are contingent on the level of protection of the common external 
tariff. 
 
Figure 1.4. Main axes of debate in orthodox regionalism 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Jovanovic (2005) 
 
1.2.2.2 Heterodox perspectives on integration for the South 
Orthodox contributions were not the first to address the issue of 
integration among countries of the South. Contrary to the theories that 
advocated development models guided by export liberalisation, Prebisch 
(1951) and Singer’s (1950) theories on Industrialisation by Import 
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Substitution (ISI) attached great importance to Regionalism (Grunwald, 
J., Salazar, J., 1972). The simultaneous emergence of the theory of 
dependence in the two poles of the globe would constitute a significant 
counterpoint to Vinerian arguments. At the time Viner published his 
theory on CU, Raúl Prebisch (1951) from Latin America and Hans Singer 
(1950) from Germany came to similar conclusions: the progressive 
deterioration in terms of trade for resource-exporting countries revealed 
that the tenets of comparative advantage did not work for the Global 
South.  
The issue of the terms of trade would also be addressed by 
neoclassical authors with high mathematical accuracy, but with diverging 
results. Viner, despite his harsh criticism on Singer's work, would 
nonetheless admit the evidence of the terms of trade issue, in 
contradiction with the postulates of his theories (Viner, 1952). For him, 
however, by no means this changed the core of his contribution. The 
feature of the terms of trade underscored the more oppressive nature of 
the process for Southern countries, given the characteristics of the 
economies under discussion. Several authors (Hirschman, 1945; Perroux, 
1954; Myrdal, 1957,1958) also criticised the excessive optimism of 
integration theories and their scant adaptability to the problems of the 
South (Amin, 2013). In the years to come, much of the critical thought 
regarding the hegemonic impositions of the North in contradiction with 
the interests and needs of the newly decolonised countries will be built on 
the legacy of these authors. 
Prebisch and Singer’s contributions would not only have a major 
influence on regional projects in the South over the decade that followed, 
but would also bolster significant shifts within international institutions. 
With a particular focus on the asymmetries highlighted by these works, 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
would be launched in 1964. For its part, the Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, 1948) would adopt a good 
number of their contributions in its modernization approach to 
development. In sum, the rise of the theories of dependence and 
development economics were a reflection, to some extent, of the 
prevailing political landscape.  
Regional projects were undertaken mainly between countries with 
similar levels of development and from a rather “inward-looking” 
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approach (Jovanovic, 2002) than in subsequent periods. The aim to 
reverse the structure of the international division of labour inherited from 
European colonialism was at the centre of numerous contributions on 
South-South regionalism. At the same time, ECLAC’s supported the ISI 
model as a policy to alleviate peripheral countries’ dependence on global 
trade. Against this background, contributions in this field saw RIAs 
among Southern countries as a means to enhance their self-sufficiency 
and bargaining capacity in international trade (Baer, 1972). However, the 
relative failure of the ECLAC-type approach to development accentuated 
the critique from mainstream scholars and reinforced their arguments in 
favour of liberal types of regionalism. In this regard, Balassa and 
Stoutjesdijk (1975, p. 39) affirmed:  
 
“Exports of manufactured goods may be oriented towards 
the markets of countries in the same region, to developing 
countries in other regions, or to developed nations. Providing 
incentives to exports would benefit sales in all foreign 
markets; regional integration would boost exports to countries 
in the same geographical area: and preferential schemes 
extending to other regions would stimulate exports to 
developing countries in those regions. But, as with import 
substitution, export promotion can be carried too far; this will 
be the case if excessive incentives are provided. Accordingly, 
an appropriate objective of development strategy may be seen 
in providing for the establishment of efficient export and 
import-substituting activities. Participation in the international 
division of labour through similar incentives to exports and 
import substitution and avoiding overly high protection of 
manufacturing industries can contribute to this goal”. 
 
 
North-South debates reached their peak of influence in the Sixties, 
which were baptised in the United Nations (UN) as the “Decade of 
Development”. In the field of orthodox economics, W. W. Rostow (1960) 
published the book that some consider a foundational work of 
development economics under the title The stages of economic growth. A 
non-communist manifesto. His analysis outlined a straight and 
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unidirectional line of progress whose ultimate step was at the doorstep of 
the US of America.    
While mainstream economics was concerned about how to steer 
Southern countries towards the path of growth within global capitalism, 
numerous authors (Meier, 1960; Allen, 1961; Bhambri, 1962; Mikesell, 
1963; Balassa, 1965; Cooper, Massell, 1965) argued that the orthodox 
analysis of economic integration was designed by and for industrialiSed 
countries and hence was of little applicability in LDCs. For the latter, the 
incoherence of the analysis began from its actual goals. Where the 
orthodox economy was wondering about the effects of discriminatory 
trade preferences on global welfare, the question for the South was how to 
undertake the path of progress without deepening into structural 
dependence from the North.  
Theories of dependence criticised the rhetoric of development as an 
instrument to conceal the perpetuation of colonial power relations, 
through the means of what André Gunder Frank (1966, p. 27-28) called 
the “development of underdevelopment”:  
 
“Most studies of development and underdevelopment fail 
to take into account of the economic and other relations 
between the metropolis and its economic colonies throughout 
the history of the worldwide expansion and development of the 
mercantilist and capitalist system. Consequently, most of our 
theory fails to explain the structure and development of the 
capitalist system as a whole and to account for its simultaneous 
generation of underdevelopment in some of its parts and of 
economic development in others. It is generally held that 
economic development occurs in a succession of capitalist 
stages and that today’s underdeveloped countries are still in a 
stage, sometimes depicted as an original stage, of history 
through which the now developed countries passed long ago. 
(...) Yet historical research demonstrates that contemporary 
underdevelopment is in large part the historical product of past 
and continuing economic and other metropolitan countries. 
Furthermore, these relations are an essential part of the structure 





The various developmental theories in that period where highly 
influenced by the political sensitivities and geostrategic trends of the time. 
Although the international division of labour was the starting point for all 
the scholars dealing with economic integration, it was treated from 
opposing views. Whereas orthodox theories presented it as a source of 
global wealth and welfare, heterodox approaches would see it as the most 
visible and pernicious mechanism of the contemporary capitalist system. 
In the 1970s, however, the defeat of Third World movements within 
international institutions will be felt also in the heterodox literature about 
regionalism. 
In the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis, North-South negotiations 
within the framework of UNCTAD culminated in the establishment of the 
NIEO (Amin, 1980). Inspired by the changes in the balance of power 
brought about by the oil crisis (Dumas, 1976), countries of the South 
demanded for a framework that allowed an upward adjustment of raw 
material prices and the recovery of control over their resources. 
Notwithstanding, these requests were reduced to a minimum price 
guarantee programme for specific raw materials, the negotiations of 
which were postponed for years and the establishment of a Common 
Stabilisation Fund (1980, p. 45). In addition, the international division of 
labour inherited from colonialism, the volatility of commodity prices and 
growing external indebtedness anchored the countries of the South to the 
periphery of the capitalist development model. In this context, the 
approaches of dependence reached their peak (Gunder Frank, 1969; 
Marini, 1973; Sunkel, Peace, 1975; Wallerstein, 1979). 
Contemporarily, in the US and UK, the analysis of integration 
concerning economic and political relations splits into two broad strands. 
On the one hand, the so-called American school, which includes R. 
Keohane and J. Nye (1977; 1987), tackled interdependence from the 
liberal postulates and quantitative methods of neoclassical economics. In 
this respect, the rationalist and positivistic axioms of economics prevail 
over contributions from political sciences (Cohen, 2014). Nevertheless, it 
was political scientists who most nurtured interest in this new discipline, 
while economists progressively relegated it to an area of “peripheral 
interest” (Cohen, 2008, p. 37). Against this trend, the British school built 
on Marxist traditions a constructivist perspective that was interested in 
power structures underlying relations and tried to offer alternatives for 
transforming them (Cox, 2009, p. 119). Progressively, among the central 
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concerns of studies on the phenomenon of integration, together with 
‘integration for what’, the question of ‘integration why’ appeared (Krauss, 
1972). 
1.3 THEORY AND REALITY: NEGLECTED ISSUES IN THE 
ANALYSIS OF INTEGRATION 
Beyond theories and debates, regions do exist as real entities that 
fulfil a specific set of characteristics. Nevertheless, the extent to which 
regions enjoy the legitimacy to set a discriminatory framework for their 
economic relations does not depend merely on their physical, 
geographical or socioeconomic features. Their choice has to be validated 
at some supranational level and according to some rules and agreed 
purposes. Who does so and how is it done, matters. The following 
sections will analyse the discourses and actors directly involved in the 
shape and scope of standard theories. The insertion of such elements aims 
at opening a discussion on the neutrality of their neglect that will be 
further developed along the next chapters of this work.    
1.3.1 The architecture of orthodox analyses  
As mentioned before, theoretical approaches to economic integration 
have been built over a trade-off between reality and simplicity. The 
capacity to assess the performance of regional phenomena depends on the 
ability to make its features fit into a manageable quantitative exercise. To 
do so, choices and behaviours have to be restrained to their simplest 
expression.  
The concept of Nation of the conventional international economy is 
based on the logic of individual agents maximising their utility by 
exchanging scarce resources among themselves. What distinguishes them 
are merely their resources, that is, their factor endowment (capital and 
labour), which are completely mobile within countries, but immobile 
among them. Thus, conventional theories of international trade are based 
on general equilibrium models whose functioning is analogous to that of 
two individuals exchanging resources (Fine and Dimakou, 2016, p. 160): 
 
“Within mainstream international economics, as already 
apparent from Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory, the notion of 
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Nation is extremely reduced, in parallel with the reduced 
notion of the State within macroeconomic theory more 
generally (as an individual agent with special powers directly 
in relation to supply and demand through fiscal policy and 
indirectly through monetary policy). Further, as far as 
international macroeconomic theory is concerned, it primarily 
depends upon simple extensions of the Keynesian/monetarism 
divide from the closed to the international economy. As a 
result, developments within closed macroeconomics have 
tended to drive developments within its international 
counterpart, at least until the era of flexible exchange rates”.  
 
In this regard, the growing reliance of Economics in Maths since the 
Fifties’ (Fine, 2016) helped a gradual transmission of its universal 
postulates to the political realm. Colander and Freedman (2011) attribute 
the growing dogmatic character of orthodox economics, exemplified by 
the evolution of the Chicago school, to the “post-war counterrevolution”, 
or to the progressive abandonment of the classical liberal perspective. In 
the early part of the century, they argue, “economists, acting as scientists, 
were unable to draw any specific political conclusions from their 
scientific theories,” lacking the other “non-economic” elements that make 
a policy desirable for a “statesman”. On the contrary, the application of 
the formalist method (Fine, 2016) brought its adherents to “draw policy 
conclusions directly from theoretical economic models” (2011, p. 4). 
In the conventional literature of integration, the three features that 
Aspernger and Varoufakis (2006) identify as being key to the “discursive 
success” and “theoretical failure” of neoclassical economics arise: 
methodological individualism, methodological instrumentalism, and what 
they call methodological equilibrium. The first of these, which refers to 
“the idea that the socioeconomic explanation should be viewed at the 
level of the individual agent” (2006, p. 8), imposes a clearcut separation 
between agent and structure, the latter merely being the sum of the acts of 
individuals. In this vein, the net improvement in overall welfare that is 
mentioned as the central goal of economic integration is understood in 
terms of the increased utility of individuals (and of the economy as the 
sum of them) with a shift in the curve of possibilities of consumption.  
Fine (2016, p. 5) refers to this as a “special type” of methodological 
individualism consisting in maximising utility, to the detriment of broader 
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considerations about other behavioural or motivational determinants. The 
characteristics of what he calls utilitarian individualism are directly linked 
to what Arnsperger and Varoufakis (2006, p. 8) call methodological 
instrumentalism. This label identifies the axiom whereby “all behaviour is 
preference-driven” or, more precisely, should be understood as a means 
of maximising satisfaction. Preferences are taken as “given, current, fully 
determining, and strictly separate from belief (which simply helps the 
agent predict uncertain future outcomes) and from the means employed” 
(2006, p. 8). In this sense, Arnsperger and Varoufakis (2006, p. 9) 
perceive neoclassical theory as “a reduced version of consequentialism in 
which the only consequence that matters is the extent to which a 
homogeneous index of preference-satisfaction is maximised”. And, 
although preferences were endogenised in the new theories of trade, the 
deterministic character of methodological instrumentalism remains 
significant.  
Finally, they criticise the “axiomatic imposition of equilibrium” and 
its extension to macroeconomics as a means to enhance its predictive 
capacity. In the words of Arnsperger and Varoufakis (2006, p. 10): 
 
“The point here is that, even after methodological 
individualism turned into methodological instrumentalism, 
prediction at the macro (or social) level was seldom 
forthcoming. Determinacy required something more: it 
required that agents’ instrumental behaviour is coordinated in 
a manner that aggregate behaviour becomes sufficiently 
regular to give rise to solid predictions. Thus, neoclassical 
theoretical exercises begin by postulating the agents’ utility 
functions, specifying their constraints, and stating their 
‘information’ or ‘belief’. Then, and here is the crux, they pose 
the standard question: “What behaviour should we expect in 
equilibrium?” The question of whether an equilibrium is 
likely, let alone probable, or how it might materialise, is 
treated as an optional extra; one that is never central to the 
neoclassical project.” 
 
With regard to the predictive capacity of the models, for Ben Fine 
and Ourania Dimakou (2016), the transfer of the general equilibrium onto 
macroeconomics added further contradictions to the orthodox theory by 
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adding confusion to the distinction between the short and the long-term. 
In this sense, while Keynesian macroeconomics concentrated essentially 
on short-term deviations in employment and output, the introduction of 
Walrasian general equilibrium favoured an ambiguous view of the long-
term that is rarely made explicit. Thus, the long-term in macroeconomics 
can simply be a marker of the passage of time, a hierarchical convention 
of expected dynamic effects - according to which output would change in 
the short term, employment in the medium term and capital in the long 
term - or a synonym of equilibrium in which variables are assumed to 
change, but not in the short term (2016, p. 7-8).   
1.3.2 Regulation and assessment in the analysis of integration  
As shown previously in this chapter, there is no consensus in the 
definition of economic integration, its potential effects or the variables 
and methods most suitable for its assessment. Notwithstanding, it is a fact 
that economic regions are specific legal entities whose status meets 
certain conditions and gives them certain possibilities and particular 
obligations. Since this status implies, by definition, more than one 
country, it is a matter of course that its regulation and monitoring will fall 
to intergovernmental or supra-state institutions. It is therefore relevant to 
consider who determines and analyses the criteria under which a group of 
countries can become a regional area, who evaluates their functioning, by 
which assumptions, for what purposes and with what outcomes. In this 
regard, contributions from IR and IPE will be central for this analysis. 
In addition to the interests nurtured by scholars on the issue, the 
identification and evaluation of regional integration emanate mostly from 
international and regional organisations that regulate international 
economic relations (Seabrooke, 2010). In this vein, both the conventional 
literature of integration and critical approaches coincide in pointing out 
the central role of the GATT/WTO and Bretton Woods institutions in 
embedding regional schemes in the multilateral logics of the post-WWII 
global order (El-Agraa, 1999; Jovanovic, 2006; Martin, 2008; Amin, 
2014b). The same authors underscore the growing importance of regional 
organisations themselves (Higgott, 2008). However, as in the case of 
trade, judgements about the potential and actual contribution of IEOs to 
the formation, analysis and functioning of regional projects varies among 
schools. 
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Figure 1.5. The role of IOs in the global governance of regional integration 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
In mainstream economics, transaction cost theories (Coase, 1937) 
first and institutionalist contributions (North, 1990) highlighted the role 
and influences of institutions on economic relations. In their analysis 
institutions appeared as both mechanisms to reduce uncertainty and also 
as boundaries to economic interaction through incentives and sanctions to 
certain behaviours. According to this view, institutions would be the 
‘rules of the game’ and organisations would be tangible expressions of 
these. Their interests and incentives would also lead to dynamic 
interactions and, eventually, institutional changes (North, 1990). Such 
considerations contributed to relax neoclassical notions of equilibrium 
and rationality and to impress the trace of history on standard economics. 
Among them, the concept of path dependency (1990) became widespread 
and evolved substantially along the years by adding considerations about 
learning, beliefs or politics as crucial elements in institution-building 





“This essay is about institutions and time.  It does not 
provide a theory of economic dynamics comparable to general 
equilibrium theory.  We do not have such a theory.  Rather it 
provides the initial scaffolding of an analytical framework 
capable of increasing our understanding of the historical 
evolution of economies and a necessarily crude guide to 
policy in the ongoing task of improving the economic 
performance of economies.  The analytical framework is a 
modification of neoclassical theory.  What it retains is the 
fundamental assumption of scarcity and hence competition 
and the analytical tools of microeconomic theory.  What it 
modifies is the rationality assumption.  What it adds is the 
dimension of time.” 
 
Against this linear and microeconomic-based view of institutions in 
history, different approaches to Political Economy and IR see IEOs as the 
codification of social relationships that shape the macro foundations of 
the hegemonic system (Boyer, 2003; Cox, 2004; Martin, 2008; Amin, 
2014b). In any case, both coincide in pointing out the growing role of 
international institutions in the era of globalisation (Kahler, 1995; Amin, 
2014b) and the end of WWII as a turning point in the systemic order of 
the 20th century (Kahler, 1995; Martin, 2008; Higgot, 2008; Amin, 
2014b). Regarding the features and functions of IEOs, some authors 
highlight their means of coercion (North, 1990; Seabrooke, 2010), 
representation (Higgott, 2008) and collective legitimacy (Claude, 1966, 
Avant et al., 2010).  
The above characteristics reveal the dual nature of international and 
regional organisations as part and parcel of the regional-multilateral 
framework of international exchanges. On the one hand, the UN, the 
Bretton Woods organizations, GATT and the European Community 
defined, in the context of the second post-war period, the guidelines and 
boundaries of what regionalism would mean in the framework devised for 
future coexistence (Chase, 2006; Jovanovic, 2006; Higgott, 2008; Martin, 
2008; Amin, 2014). On the other hand, the same organisations have the 
authority and means to intervene into national decisions, goals and 
strategies (Finnemore, 1996; Avant et al., 2010). Finally, the evaluation 
and diagnosis of the projects put in place will depend largely on them. 
This might occur not only by way of direct case-assessments following 
THEORIES OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION:  CORE TENETS AND MISSING DEBATES 
53 
the terms of the institutional discourse, but also because of their crucial 
role in the retrieving, standardisation and provision of data in support of 
such diagnoses (Wallerstein, 1997; Amin, 2009). That is way the study of 
the interactions between the different economic contributions to 
Regionalism and their use in the political sphere appears meaningful here. 
Again, the relationship is not one-way. 
1.4 THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN 
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION  
In the Sixties, Inis Claude (1966) referred to the role of institutions 
for “collective legitimation”. According to him, beyond their stated 
objectives, IOs, as promoters of certain rules perceived as universal and 
guarantors of their compliance, are perceived by certain social actors as 
an instrument for legitimising their interests. In Claude’s words (1966, p. 
367): 
 
“The world organization has come to be regarded, and 
used, as a dispenser of politically significant approval and 
disapproval of the claims, policies, and actions of states, 
including, but going far beyond, their claims to status as 
independent members of the international system. (...) The urge 
for formally declared and generally acknowledged legitimacy 
approaches the status of a constant feature of political life. This 
urge requires that power be converted into authority, 
competence be supported by jurisdiction, and possession be 
validated as ownership”. 
 
In this regard, one of the essential features of IOs, is the contextual 
and specific nature of proposals that are presented as universal. Again 
Claude (1966, p. 369-370): 
 
“Like most fashions, fashions in legitimisation change 
from time to time, and the crucial periods in political history are 
those transitional years of conflict between old and new 
concepts of legitimacy, the historical interstices between the 
initial challenge to the established concept and the general 
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acceptance of its replacement. (...) At any given time the 
operative significance of the dominant principle of legitimacy 
tends to be less than that of the agency of legitimisation. This 
means that the crucial question is not what principle is 
acknowledged but who is accepted as the authoritative 
interpreter of the principle or, to put it in institutional terms, 
how the process of legitimization works. There is, of course, a 
correlation between the nature of the legitimizing principle and 
the identity of its applicator.” 
 
Many contributions (Perroux, 1955; Claude, 1966; Veblen, 1990) 
dealt with the challenges of globalisation and with the role of institutions 
from different points of view before the 1980s. However, the analysis of 
IOs has received particular attention since then in the field of IR. For 
Higgott (2008), “international organization is about rules agreed amongst 
independent political communities” which, to different extents, have the 
means to influence international relations. Several authors agree that the 
globalisation of economic, political and social affairs in the second half of 
the 20th century made it necessary to articulate a system that reflected the 
need for collective decision-making. However, this is not to say that they 
had not previously been important: the British Commonwealth or the so-
called Francophonie are also IOs, and their history reflects the attempt to 
manage systemic changes from within. Many authors from institutional, 
realist or neomarxist schools emphasize this feature. They also pay 
attention to the different ways in which economic and political actors 
place themselves within historically situated frameworks undergoing 
continuous change. 
In the field of political science, a distinction must be made between 
rationalist approaches, according to which states engage in institutions 
from which they benefit, and constructive approach, which analyse the 
role of norms and behaviours as a result of social interaction. This 
division responds somehow to the one already mentioned about the 
American and British schools in International Political Economy. The 
definition of Robert Keohane (1989), one of the exponents of the 
American school, approaches those of North by underscoring IOs 
capability to modulate and limit, formally and informally, actors' 
behaviours. In contrast to this, the neoMarxist proposal of Samir Amin 
(2014b), in line with the theories of dependence and the tenets of the 
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WOA, sees international institutions as a mechanism for expanding or 
adapting the prevailing mode of production to certain material conditions 
and to face the rise of social conflicts. For this author, the 
“regionalisation” of international relations would be a response to the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system. In a way, he reckons, it could be 
interpreted as a sign of “impossible globalisation” (2014b, p. 39). 
 
“There are indeed indicators pointing in this direction: the 
creation of the NAFTA in North America (…); the fact that the 
European Community already carries out two thirds of its trade 
through its internal exchange, and that this internal exchange is 
increasing, while the Community’s exports to the outside world 
have been declining since 1985 (but will this last?); the fact 
that, even without any formal common institution, the countries 
of eastern Asia (Japan, Korea, China, South-East Asia) carry 
out two thirds of their trade through internal exchange (…).” 
 
Another author who paid particular attention to this from a neorealist 
point of view was Miles Kahler (1995, p. 5). For him, “Bretton Woods 
and San Francisco were exemplars of international constitution making: 
cooperation was confirmed in intergovernmental formal institutions 
founded in contractual agreements”. Concerning the role of these 
institutions in the expansion of the interests of the great powers, he states: 
 
“The history of international institutions since 1945 
demonstrates a record of great-power plurilateralism, even 
when embedded in regimes of large membership. The agenda 
produced by intensified economic integration will only surface 
among particular groups of states, often although not always 
geographically proximate. However, as larger numbers of 
economies are brought into the global capitalist order (as they 
have been for the past decade), free riding by those outside the 
rules of established institutions has become less acceptable to 
the most powerful members. Their concern over costly free 
riding predicts greater reliance on global institutions that will 
constrain the larger number of governments engaged in the 




A glance at the leading institutions that promote and evaluate 
regionalism is then necessary to grasp the complexity of relations 
between the national, regional and global. Most importantly, in the 
context of our work, this snapshot is central to understand the reasons 
why the political nature of integration processes is relevant to the 
economic analysis of their causes and effects. 
 
1.4.1 The World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) 
When it comes to talking about integration, it is inevitable to refer to 
the role of GATT/WTO in shaping an increasingly regionalised exchange 
system on the basis of a multilateral project (Baldwin, Low, 2009; Amin, 
2014b). The tension between the incentives to protect domestic 
production and promote its free circulation has turned borders into an 
essential element for this organisation. Building on the analysis conducted 
by Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger (1999) on the “bargaining problem” 
within the GATT/WTO, Lisa Martin (2008) argues that its structure was 
conceived as a voluntary project committed to the progressive 
liberalisation of trade without modifying the terms of exchange. If a 
change would occur regarding the latter, at least one part would disagree.  
Martin (2008) affirms that the preservation of the terms of exchange 
requires an “excluding” structure of bargaining whereby the most 
prominent producers and consumers of certain goods enjoy a preferential 
role in achieving their interests. Besides, the author underlines that the 
WTO particularly encourages exporters -who are the most immediate 
beneficiaries of free trade- to exert pressure on their governments. 
Her contributions pay great attention to WTO’s bias in favour of 
biggest countries, which are also those with most capacity to influence 
relative prices. To this extent, she wonders whether the multilateral 
character of the institution truly favours liberalisation and respect for 
small and LDCs’ interests. Supported by the empirical work of Richard 
Steinberg (2002) and Christina Davis (2003), the author highlights, on the 
one hand, the power of the US and the EU in influencing the liberalisation 
agenda and the limited evidence that the GATT/WTO structure supports 
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LDCs’ interests. On the other hand, she questions its role in commercial 
quarrels.  
The agricultural sector has been widely analysed in this terms, 
especially with regard to the relationship between the EU, the US and 
Japan when it comes to make step forwards in trade liberalisation. Some 
authors highlight the dominance of these countries by putting the focus on 
the appeal to dispute resolution mechanisms (Read, 2007). In spite of the 
attempts to establish more inclusive procedures, such mechanism appears 
to be substantially more used by rich countries than by poor ones (Kahler, 
1995; Reindhardt, 2001; Busch, Reinhardt, 2003). Regarding WTO’s 
mechanisms of incitement and preservation of free trade, an econometric 
study by Andrew K. Rose (2004) suggested that GATT/WTO did not 
influence significantly trade patterns, even if the developing countries that 
participated in the Generalized System of Preferences experienced an 
increase in trade. In a similar vein, Kahler (1995, p. 28) argued: 
 
“Although GATT was the centre of the global trade 
regime, the scape of its trade globalisation efforts was 
limited primarily to trade in manufactured goods. 
Agricultural trade and trade-related agricultural policies 
remained largely outside the GATT regime. Some categories 
of manufactures (textiles and apparel) were incorporated in 
managed trade regimes embedded loosely in the GATT 
framework.” 
 
Against this background, Samir Amin denies that liberal principles 
drive the functioning of GATT/WTO, as suggested by the frustrated 
request of a NIEO by the G77 and the Non-Aligned Movement in 1975. 
The G77 called for opening markets in the North to industrial exports 
from the South and requested an improvement in the terms of trade for 
tropical and mining products, access to international financing and better 
conditions for technology transfer. According to Amin (2014b, p.24) the 
reply by Northern countries consisted in excluding textile products, 
ignoring the second request, liberalising financial sector -draining 
resources from the South to the North, he says- and “reinforcing 
monopolies in the name of the so-called ‘intellectual’ property”.  
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For him, the frictions between great powers -namely the US, EU and 
Japan- within the organisation has less relative importance if compared to 
the gap between the North and the South (2014b, p. 30). In the same vein, 
Amin (2014b) and Kahler (1995, p. 33) point to the direct influence of the 
US on the outcomes of the Uruguay Round. Its launch is attributed to 
dissatisfaction with the exclusion of sectors that were competitive in the 
US, such as agriculture. The service sector, instead, was protected by the 
EEC, Canada and Japan. Kahler refers also to an “aggressive 
unilateralism” strategy against any protectionist policy or “free riding” 
attitude adopted developing countries (1995, p. 34). 
1.4.2 The Bretton Woods institutions 
The establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions after WWII 
responded to two main scopes: maintaining the stability of the 
international monetary system and financing the reconstruction and 
development of countries with difficult access to credit, which were 
geographically located in the confines of Soviet influence.  
 The IMF maintained a secondary role in safeguarding stability during 
the years of the economic boom up to the 1970s. However, its 
renewed role in the application of SAPs to debt crises would place it 
at the centre of international economic relations in the 1980s (Kahler, 
1995, p. 62; Martin, 2008; Amin, 2014b, p. 18).  
 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 
which would later become the WB by associating itself with the 
International Development Association (IDA): its role was certainly 
secondary to that of UN agencies performing the political and 
ideological functions of relations with Third World countries (Amin, 
2014): ECLAC and UNCTAD would channel Southern claims for 
NOEI development at that time. 
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the systemic crisis of 
the 1970s disrupted the foundations of the monetary and financial global 
organisation. This shift would also influence the configuration of regional 
structures and integration processes. Since then, the IMF and the WB 
focused mainly on financing and supervising adjustment programmes in 
Southern countries. In a way, their goal became the supervision of 
compliance with conditionality mechanisms on trade regime, public 
sector, subsidies or price policies (Kahler, 1995, p. 92). In addition, they 
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increasingly promoted fiscal and monetary measures for improving 
competitiveness and attracting investment. In this regard, Kahler (1995, p. 
45) notes: “wielding the instrument of conditionality, the Bretton Woods 
institutions have served as a means of integrating poorer and newer 
members of the capitalist economy (wider integration) rather than dealing 
with the coordination of economic policies among the industrialised 
countries”. In the 1980s, this strategy was further complemented by the 
“systemic transformation facility” addressed to ex-Soviet economies. 
As for the WB’s anti-poverty programs, Kahler (1995) and Amin 
(2014b) coincide in pointing out that they date only from the 1980s 
onwards. For them, WB’s real constant is to ensure a complementary role 
to that of the IMF in implementing and legitimising the G-7 guidelines in 
general, and of Washington in particular (Kahler, 1995; Amin, 2014b). In 
this regard, Lisa Martins (2008) notes that “over time the specific types of 
programs funded by the IMF and Bank have tended to converge”. For his 
part, Kahler (1995, p. 62) underscores their increasing intervention into 
issues like national budgets, military spending or political considerations 
such as democratization or human rights. 
 
“In the case of the IMF and WB, and to a degree GATT, 
the role delegated to the global institutions by the major 
economic powers is one of wider integration: liberalizing 
trade regimes, ending price controls, and reforming public 
sector enterprises may include a certain degree of policy 
harmonization, but they only set the stage for further 
economic integration. Most contemporary clients of the 
Bretton Woods organisations, however, confront 
marginalisation in world markets, not intensified integration” 
(Kahler, 1995, p. 63). 
 
As for the multilateral nature of these organisations, scepticism is 
strong in this respect. Although the IMF was provided with a weighted 
voting system that conferred a dominant position to industrialised 
countries, they are said to collaborate in monetary matters outside the 
institution (Kahler, 1995, p. 52). Kahler (1995) and Amin (2014b) share 
the view that the system was managed in practice by the US in 
cooperation with other G-7 members. As a proof of such imbalance, 
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Amin (2014b) points out that the IMF could never constrain great powers 
- and especially the US - to adjust their deficits or surpluses or to 
implement as severe SAPs as those imposed on countries of the South. 
For Kahler (1995, p. 52), these features appear also as a result of the 
growing participation of developing countries within the institution. This, 
he says, spurred the will for more explicit coordination among Northern 
economies whose markets were increasingly integrated. In the case of the 
WB, Samir Amin (2014b) states that it has always appeared as “an agent 
whose task is to support capital's penetration of the Third World through 
the transnationals. The projects that it has helped fund have opened up 
large markets to equipment supplier” (2014b, p. 24). 
1.4.3 The institutions of the United Nations for Trade and 
Development 
For Samir Amin (2014b), the insertion of Southern countries in the 
global arena in the mid-XX century was guided by the UN Division for 
Latin America (ECLAC) and the UNCTAD. The first of these, led by 
Raúl Prebisch, was until the mid-1970s the central promoter of the 
ideology of development, while UNCTAD played a major role in the 
Bandung project and the struggle for a NIEO (2014b, p. 23). According to 
Branislav Gosovic (2016, p. 733), the ECLAC was the first IO to place 
South-South cooperation at the centre of the debate. Two conference 
sessions were held in the 1960s (1964, 1968) to discuss and implement 
various South-South cooperation projects and to tackle the growing 
dependence from trade relations with Northern countries (UNCTAD, 
1985, p. 182). In 1968, UNCTAD launched a programme for the 
promotion of Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries 
(ECDC) that sought to enhance industrialisation and development in 
small countries. Moreover, face to the signs of failure of the ISI model, it 
sought to improve their collective bargaining capacity (UNCTAD, 1985, 
p. 183-184). 
In the Joint Statement (23-II) (UNCTAD, 1968, p. 55), the signatory 
countries agreed to a declaration of intent and the establishment of a 
division within UNCTAD’s General Secretariat known as the “Special 
Programme on Trade Expansion and Economic Integration among 
Developing Countries”. It was meant to provide technical assistance to 
ongoing integration processes and to promote new ones. Such programme 
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was implemented by UNCTAD before it became part of the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (UNCTAD, 1985, p. 184). 
As mentioned before, the requests of the G-77 for the establishment 
of a Committee on ECDC that was rejected by developed countries, 
which were supposed to remain outside the work programme. Apart from 
the issues mentioned ut supra, they called for a say in UNCTAD’s new 
direction, prioritising the creation of a global system of trade preferences 
among developing countries, the promotion of cooperation between State 
Trading Organisations (STOs) and the establishment of Multinational 
Marketing Enterprises (MMEs) (UNCTAD, 1985, p. 186). By then, a 
number of factors stimulated a change of course in cooperation goals for 
Southern countries, which had become “the most dynamic segment of the 
world economy, albeit at the cost of increasing indebtedness” (UNCTAD, 
1985, p. 186). Among such factors, scholars often emphasise: 
 the relative disappointment with the results of the integration 
schemes implemented by the EEC,  
 the results obtained by the Organisation of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) in its international bargaining, and  
 the awareness that the NOEI would not change relations with 
Northern countries 
The request for an exclusive forum on ECDC for developing 
countries resulted in a compromise: although developed countries would 
participate, developing countries would be allowed to hold three 
preparatory meetings at which the UNCTAD General Secretariat would 
provide technical assistance. 
For Amin (2014b) and Gosovic (2016), South-South cooperation and 
the patronage of UN divisions over it declined in the 1970s and ceased 
with the SAPs. The failure of the NOEI negotiations and the frustrated 
efforts of those agencies became evident with the 1980s crisis and the 
following Washington Consensus. In the 1990s, the so-called South 
Commission, formed by 28 countries of the South, released The 
Challenge to the South (1990). It reviewed the successes and challenges 
of Southern countries hitherto, with special attention to the 1980s crisis 
and its effects on development and cooperation among LDCs. In 
particular, the Commission linked the peak of the North-South crisis with 
the progressive impoverishment of multilateralism in the UN system and 
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with the growing empowerment of Northern countries in tackling the 
problems of the South: 
 
“Especially serious was the sustained attack on 
multilateralism, and in particular on the more democratic 
institutions of the UN system, which took place during the 1980s. 
This attack was primarily prompted by changes in political 
direction in some powerful countries of the North and the 
reassertion of the philosophy that ‘might is right'. (...) Forced by 
the increasing complexity and interdependence of their national 
economies, the major industrialised countries of the North 
accepted the need for a degree of institutionalised co-ordination 
of their separate policies –hence the annual group of Seven 
meetings. The evolution of this summit Group and its supporting 
structures further encouraged these countries to see themselves as 
the custodians of the world economy and to disregard the basic 
principles of multilateral discourse and decision-making 
embodied in the UN Charter” (South Commission, 1990, p. 72). 
 
According to Gosovic (2016, p. 734), the 1981 North-South summit 
in Cancun marks the “unilateral interruption of dialogue on development 
by the North”. South-South cooperation projects declined sharply during 
the crisis and so did the division of EDCD, dismantled in 1992 as part of 
the “restructuring” approved at UNCTAD III. Gosovic (2016, p. 735) 
adds: 
 
“The repeated G77 demands for a UN conference on 
South-South cooperation were blocked by the North year after 
year on the spurious grounds that too many UN conferences 
were being held. Significantly, following the Uruguay Round 
and the weakening of GATT Part IV, the WTO emerged as an 
additional dampener on potential integration efforts in the 
South, inter alia, on account of the latter’s possible ‘trade 
diversion’ effects.” 
 
According to the same author, the rebound of South-South projects in 
recent years, attributed to political changes in Latin America, to the rise 
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of BRICS and, especially, to cooperation frameworks promoted by China, 
stimulated changes in the position of developed countries concerning this 
type of scheme. For Gosovic, this shift was soon felt in the approach of 
international institutions: 
 
“Indicative of the change and of SSC gaining 
‘legitimacy’ and becoming the ‘flavour of the month’ have 
been the (re)establishment of the Unit for Economic 
Integration and Cooperation among Developing Countries in 
UNCTAD; the renaming and upgrading of the UNDP’s TCDC 
Unit into the UN Special Unit for South–South Cooperation, 
with higher funding at its disposal; the UN General Assembly 
decision to hold the 2009 UN High Level Conference on 
South–South Cooperation; and the participation of the WB in 
organising some of the UNDP South–South events” (Gosovic, 
2016, p. 736). 
 
Notwithstanding, Gosovic (2016) underscores the persistence of an 
unbalanced system favouring the North basing on the following facts:  
 The absence of institutions that represent Southern interests and act as 
think-tanks with a similar role to the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the North 
 The lack of explicit UN commitment to the constitution of a South-
South Commission  
 The marginal part played by UNCTAD in the current world economic 
order 
In this regard, although UNCTAD continues to exist, it has been 
progressively deprived of its power on critical issues such as trade, 
monetary and financial policy, intellectual property, technology transfer 
or transnational corporations (2016, p. 740). Even so, the emergence of 
institutions such as the UN University for Comparative and Regional 
Studies (UNU-CRIS) fostered research on a varied set of regional 
approaches and on the resulting transformations in geopolitics and global 
governance. Nevertheless, despite its international projection under the 
leadership of the UN, both its headquarters and its main branches in the 
field of research and training are concentrated in the EU. 
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1.4.4 Regional organisations 
Numerous authors agree in pointing out the growing political and 
economic importance of regional institutions (Fawcett, 1995; Söderbaum, 
2004; Higgott, 2008; Martin, 2008; Söderbaum, Sbragia, 2010). Although 
diverse regional frameworks existed throughout history (McCarthy, 
2006), the constitution of political and economic blocs immediately after 
the Second World War (WWII) is considered a milestone in the current 
global regional order (Fawcett, 1995; El-Agraa, 1999; Jovanovic, 2006; 
Gamble, 2007; Telò, 2007). From different approaches, critics and 
advocates of regionalism consider it a fundamental system of cross-border 
cooperation today. Face to the growing overlapping of regional 
agreements as a consequence of the upsurge of ‘open regionalism’ 
(Bergsten, 1997), some emphasise the multilateral nature of current 
regionalism by following the strand opened by the metaphor of the 
‘spaghetti bowl’ (Baldwin, 2006). Others, instead, underscore the 
contradictory essence of a world system built on “a (relatively) united 
economy and a (relatively) fragmented policy” (Gamble, 2007, p 22). 
Although to different extents, many of the regional institutions, as 
well as the funding or technical agencies that collaborate explicitly in 
their management and promotion (ECLAC in the case of Latin America, 
the African Development Bank (AfDB) for Africa, etc.), monitor and 
evaluate the regional projects on a regular basis. Among them, the EU 
stands out as a model to follow and a authoritative partner.  The role of 
European integration in world regionalism has been the object of so many 
economic and political works that European Studies have emerged as a 
distinct disciplinary field in this realm. Outside of it, the European 
regional path is closely regarded both by critics and supporters. A brief 
sample of these approaches is sufficient to understand the variety of 
interpretations about its influence on the current regional panorama. Some 
assume this process as the core standard of integration (Jovanovic, 2005). 
Others look critically at what they call its normative power (Whitman, 
2011; Haukkala, 2011). In a similar vein, certain scholars speak of “soft 
imperialism” (Hettne, Soderbaum, 2005), “new medievalism” (Gamble, 
2007), or reflect on the dominance of Eurocentrism (Amin, 1989) over 
regional studies and, more in general, over social sciences. 
In recent years, EU’s relationship with Eastern and Southern 
countries has received increasing attention (Schimmelfenning, 2010; 
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Haukkala, 2011; Zardo, 2017). Moreover, in the case of the 
Mediterranean, building on a close relationship with former colonies, the 
EU has tried in recent decades to implement a succession of regional and 
bilateral networks that will be the subject of a detailed analysis later in 
this work. In any case, many authors believe that, far from being a neutral 
actor, the EU is a significant institution in international relations that has 
been trying to fill its economic union with political content by bolstering 
democracy, social provisions and universal values as part of its foreign 
policy. Whitman (2011) interprets this as an attempt to legitimise itself as 
a “universal force for good”, which helps, according to Haukkala (2011), 
the consolidation of asymmetrical bilateral relations that guarantee its 
hegemony and the imposition of its agenda. 
1.5 IR APPROACHES ON THE ROLE OF IOs IN A REGIONAL-
MULTILATERAL ORDER 
According to Jean-Marc Coicaud (2002, p. 519), IOs were 
established by states “to enhance and regulate the public dimension of 
international realm”. These would thus be conceived as forums for 
negotiating matters that fall outside the individual authority of states, but 
whose legitimacy derives directly from them (2002, p. 523). From very 
different perspectives, the authors already mentioned in this work agree 
that IOs are key elements of economic integration (Kahler, 1995; Martin, 
2008; Higgott, 2008; Amin, 2014b). In fact, they play a key role in 
regulating the phenomenon that distinguishes this field of analysis from 
other contributions to international trade: the discriminatory character that 
distinguishes regional integration (Baldwin, Wyplosz, 2012) in a scenario 
where economic relations are globalised while political relations remain 
fragmented in nation-states (Amin, 2014b, p. 32). The logic is the 
following: since giving priority to relations between a group of countries 
in a globalised economy has consequences on those who are left out, 
international and regional institutions hold the power and legitimacy to 
decide the “conditions under which states can ‘legally’ evade trade rules, 
at least on a temporary basis” (Martins, 2008, p. 11). Martins (2008, p. 
12) summarises the importance of analysing the actors that regulate trade: 
 
“In many ways, the design and functioning of these 
institutions reflects the basic strategic dilemmas of international 
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trade. Promoting beneficial exchanges requires that institutions 
structure bargaining, monitor compliance with commitments, 
and provide enforcement mechanisms. We also see that the 
ongoing struggle between rule-based interaction and the 
exercise of power plays out continually in these trade regimes. 
While rules attempt to constrain the processes of bargaining and 
dispute resolution, the best empirical studies confirm that the 
actual functioning of these institutions reflect continuing 
realities of power politics.” 
 
There are different views on why IOs should remain at the centre of 
the analyses concerned with the close links between politics and 
international economics:  
 Because of their role in mediating between the “global constraints” of 
the capitalist accumulation regime and the local decisions of agents 
with partial knowledge of the system (Boyer, 2003, p. 91);  
 Because of their capacity to expand or adapt the accumulation system 
to certain historical circumstances (Amin, 2014b);  
 Because of their role as “international constitution-making” (Kahler, 
1995, p. 4), “norm brokers” (Finnemore, 1996b) or “enforcers” 
(Higgott, 2008, p. 8); 
 Because of their ability to centralise and autonomously manage 
transnational issues (Abbott and Snidal, 1998). 
As recognised authorities in matters that call for collective decision-
making, their attributed neutrality and legitimacy has a strong influence 
on how countries behave face to them and among each other. Martin 
(2008) argues that small countries tend to approach them in search of 
support for their low individual bargaining power, while large countries 
appear to intervene in their design and promotion (Martin, 2008). For this 
reason, Avant et al. (2010) defend the importance of taking into 
consideration the agents that shape institutions. For these authors, the key 
is not merely to question the relevance or efficiency of IOs in general, but 
rather their relative effects “for whom” and “for what purpose” (2010, p. 
365). In this regard, the contribution of Avant et al. (2010) to the field of 
global governance would be based on the question “why are you in 
charge?” (2010, p. 360). From the inclusion of power relations in the 
interpretation of IEOs arise functions that transcend the neoclassical 
THEORIES OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION:  CORE TENETS AND MISSING DEBATES 
67 
conception of relations between utilitarian and rational agents in a 
scenario of equilibrium (Howse, 2002, p. 395). 
1.5.1 Legitimacy 
The capability of an IO to intervene in national, regional and global 
affairs lies primarily in the recognition of its authority over states 
(Coicaud, 2002, p. 523). However, such an entitlement does not imply 
that IOs or their tasks are perceived as legitimate. Suchman (1995, p. 574) 
defined legitimacy as the “generalised perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions”. 
Therefore, moral considerations lie at the basis of legitimacy. In a similar 
vein, Claude (1966) alluded to the intersection between law and morality 
as the pillar of legitimacy and Kahler (1995) referred to a system of rules 
and reputation. Boyer (2003), instead, used the notion of habitus coined 
by Bourdieu (Christoforou and Lainé, 2014) to characterize the subjective 
component inherent in this concept. Therefore, legitimacy goes beyond 
authority and implies citizen recognition (Seabrooke, 2006; March, Olsen, 
1998). This feature makes legitimacy a fluctuating and circumstantial 
factor, which plays a central role in the construction of authority (Avant et 
al. 2010, p. 360) and in the management of power relations over time. As 
Coicaud (2002, p. 530) puts it: 
 
“Plurality, historicity, and the unequal distribution of 
international power are three key factors with which 
international life must cope. The dimension of plurality can be 
seen in the various forces acting on the international plane. The 
sense of historicity is the key to the evolution of international 
plurality. The unequal distribution of international power is 
largely the product of international plurality historically 
unfolding and eventually creating hierarchies.” 
 
According to Claude (1966, p. 368) “power and legitimacy are not 
antithetical, but complementary. The obverse of the legitimacy of power 
is the power of legitimacy; rulers seek legitimisation not only to satisfy 
their consciences but also to buttress their positions.” Moreover, the 
malleability of IOs according to the socio-political context implies also a 
FÁTIMA FERNÁNDEZ FERNÁNDEZ
68 
descriptive and a normative dimension. Whereas the former “reflects the 
reality of the international landscape at a given time, including values and 
ideals”, the latter “contributes to the projection of an international ethic” 
(Coicaud, 2001, p. 579). Thus, their legitimacy is closely linked to the 
notion of hegemony developed by authors of IPE on the basis of 
Gramsci’s contributions, which understand hegemony as a type of 
consensual and accepted authority (Cox and Sinclair, 1996). According to 
it, the dialectic between the ruling classes and citizenship through 
mechanisms of coercion and consent contributes to the consolidation of 
certain ideas as part of “common sense”. In Harvey’s words (2005, p. 39): 
 
“What Gramsci calls ‘common sense’ (defined as ‘the 
sense held in common’) typically grounds consent. Common 
sense is constructed out of long-standing practices of cultural 
socialisation often rooted deep in regional or national traditions. 
It is not the same as the ‘good sense’ that can be constructed out 
of critical engagement with the issues of the day. Common 
sense can, therefore, be profoundly misleading, obfuscating or 
disguising real problems under cultural prejudices.” 
 
The links between hegemony and legitimacy in Clark (2011, p. 21) 
are interpreted in similar terms: “hegemonic legitimacy is a construct of 
the power, and the ruled are somehow seduced into the belief that their 
interests are thereby served”. Similarly, the notion of legitimacy is central 
to Amin’s work (2014b) concerning not only IOs, but also the use of the 
orthodox economy in their support: 
 
“In Economics, the prevailing obsession with management 
has imposed an agenda of specific issues, a selective approach 
to significant data, and a tunnel vision of reality focused 
narrowly on management goals. True, such options sometimes 
enhance efficiency. But then the so-called science of economics 
implies a latent ideological option that legitimises the kind of 
management involved, and by extension the social system it 
perpetuates, namely the capitalist system. For that reason the 
discipline of Economics sidesteps more basic issues related to 
social change and historical development, assigning them to the 
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free play of imaginative thinking, a process it considers 
unscientific” (2014b, p. 140). 
 
In short, the notion of legitimacy implies the acceptance of the 
authority of a certain entity over issues that transcend state borders on the 
basis of consensual principles. In this regard, power relations within them 
are vital in determining their nature and scope. By examining the 
organizations previously described under this focus, several authors 
(Kahler, 1995; Coicaud, 2002; Howse, 2002; Avant et al., 2010; Amin, 
2014b) highlight how their functioning lies on asymmetrical and 
unbalanced decision-making and intervention mechanisms in favour of 
the interests of Western countries and, in particular, the US. 
1.5.2 Normative and constitutional power 
As mentioned above, the establishment of international agreements 
and organisations requires at least some degree of consensus on specific 
principles concerning values and modalities of action (Coicaud, 2002). 
These would not be immovable or perennial concepts, but would have a 
historical and contextual nature. Then, a fundamental role of IOs would 
lie in their ability to dictate certain norms or rules of the game based on a 
series of ‘ethical principles’. These, “by providing axiological 
foundations, aid in setting the framework and the horizon of social 
validity and the meaning of the international system” (2002, p. 537). This 
framework reveals, according to Coicaud (2002), the normative 
architecture of the international system: 
 
“Through these qualities, the international principles that 
govern IR give a strong sense of normative determinacy to the 
international system. Normative determinacy is illustrated and 
engineered by the paths that principles recommend and those 
that they reject; by the norms, standards, rules, and regulations 
of the international system; and by the deliberations, decisions, 
and actions that are triggered by those principles. This is so 
because normative determinacy is at work in the compatibility 
of content and practical prescriptions among international 




Consequently, the legitimacy of an organisation or some international 
agreement relies on the “inherent capacity of a rule to encourage states to 
comply” (Gupta, 2002, p. 505). In this regard, a considerable amount of 
literature has been produced in recent years on the normative character 
(Sayigh, 1991; Coicaud, 2002; Chase, 2006; Martin, 2008; Seabrooke, 
2010; Whitman, 2011; Falk, 2015) of the goals of such organizations, as 
well as their mechanisms for the management of international affairs, 
more based on their persuasive than on their coercive power (Barnett, 
1995; Payne, 2001; Manners, 2002). The concept of “normative power” 
was applied with particular emphasis to EU’s role in shaping the current 
idea of regionalism and its cross-border scope, whereby it promotes and 
requires the regional rules and standards best suited to its own recipe 
(Manners, 2002; Bicchi, 2006; Whitman, 2011). 
Following a similar interpretation, several authors speak of 
constitutionalisation (Hurrell, 2007; Brown, 2012) or constitutionalism as 
a present trend or forward-looking purpose of IOs in regulating global 
society (Coicaud, 2002; Howse, 2002; Cass, 2005; Cutler, 2015). In the 
words of Allott (2002, p. 70): 
 
“The defining characteristic of constitutionalism as a 
theory is that society makes an idea of its own self-constituting 
into an ideal of its self-constituting, and incorporates that ideal 
into the theory of its self-constituting. The idea is projected 
from the actual to form an ideal and, as an ideal, is reintroduced 
into the actual. For a society which adopts constitutionalism as 
its theory, constitutionalism enables and requires the society to 
organize and direct its own self-constituting in accordance with 
its transcendental idea of itself.” 
 
Thus, the idea is that in recent decades, “most changes in 
international law have occurred within the framework of IOs” (Alvarez, 
2002, p. 138). According to Álvarez (2002, p. 138): 
 
“Since 1945, thanks in significant part to the ways IO 
charters have been (flexibly) interpreted, most changes in 
international law have occurred within the framework of IOs. 
IOs have radically transformed the most traditional sources of 
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international law-treaties. They have also contributed to steady 
innovation in alternative ‘rule’-making techniques, 
characterised, unlike the traditional sources of international law, 
by a continuum of binding authority.” 
 
Contributions on the constitutionalisation of IOs were especially 
applied to institutions such as the WTO and its transformation from 
GATT into an institution with an autonomous dispute settlement 
mechanism (Howse, 2002; Read, 2007; Peters, 2015). In any case, these 
approaches to the role of IOs in regulating issues like international trade 
and economic integration based on shared principles show that their 
postulates are neither neutral nor have a minor role in the domestic 
decisions of states. 
 
1.5.3 Community representation, clientelism and agenda setting 
Since IOs have the legitimacy and power to dictate rules on the basis 
of certain principles, it seems appropriate to wonder who gave them their 
current shape and for what. Abbott and Snidal (1998, p. 24) asserted that 
the boom of IOs in the post-WWII period responded to the idea that they 
should act “as a representative or embodiment of a community of states”. 
According to the context, they could appear as multilateral forums of 
international policy (e.g. the UN General Assembly), as a body 
representing major powers (e. g. the Security Council), or as independent 
and neutral entities responsible for ensuring the common interest (e. g. the 
International Court of Justice). In this sense, it appeared that the internal 
composition of these institutions and their representation mechanisms 
determined, to a large extent, the type of interests they represented. To 
this matter, a number of authors (Abbot and Snidal, 1998; Steinberg, 
2002; Busch and Reinhardt, 2003; Martin, 2008; Avant et al., 2010) have 
focused since then on enquiring on the specific interests behind the 
current structure of IOs. 
For Coicaud (2002, p. 525), the “client-based culture” of IOs, 
dependent on the states that design, finance and legitimise their functions, 
also determines the principles that will govern them and the focus of their 
actions. This is clearer in institutions where selective veto is reserved to 
the countries that finance them, such as the IMF, the WB or the UN 
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Security Council. Coicaud (2002, p. 526) defines this as “a nearly 
proprietary territory of the most developed and powerful nations, one that 
all too often caters primary to their needs.” This inherent feature of the 
functioning of IOs undermines their alleged multilateral vocation: 
 
“Instead of ensuring the universalisation and conjunction 
of particular interests, the clientelist inclination contributes to 
the particularisation of universal interests. In undermining the 
claim to universalism of generalist IOs, this inclination 
undermines a crucial piece of their legitimacy. (…) 
Furthermore, this is a failure that is likely to generate further 
normative, political, and institutional disenchantment and 
unravelling. It is difficult to reverse, since it has a penchant for 
feeding on itself. A clientele, by definition, is not really 
concerned with integration and inclusiveness, with possible 
benefits attached to long-term investments involving the 
commitment to the public good. Rather, its prime objective 
tends to be the fulfilment of its exclusive and immediate 
interests” (Coicaud, 2002, p. 526). 
 
The other key feature of IOs, which is of particular benefit to 
stakeholder groups that prevail within them, is agenda-setting 
(Rocherfort, Cobb, 1994; Coicaud, 2002; Cass, 2005; Martin, 2008; 
Avant et al. 2010). This entails the issues that deserve attention and, to a 
large extent, the way in which they are dealt with. As Avant et al. (2010, 
p. 16) put it, “frequently agenda setting is about not only putting an issue 
on the agenda but identifying who should govern in an issue area and 
why.” For example, Howse (2002) argues that the “bureaucratic” or 
“technocratic” power of the WTO consists primarily in its ability to 
determine the agenda of trade negotiations, to provide technical advice 
and to generate reports on strategic issues in international economic 
relations. 
Numerous authors associate the contribution of IOs to regional 
integration with the interests of the North, especially those of the US and 
Western European countries (Kahler, 1995; Howse, 2002; Chase, 2006; 
Martin, 2008). In this regard, there is abundant literature on the role of the 
EU and the US (Mann, 2013) both in the institutional changes of the 
WTO (Kahler, 1995; Howse, 2002; Cass, 2005; Chase, 2006; Read, 2007; 
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Amin, 2014b), Bretton Woods (Martin, 2008) and regional organisations 
(Bicchi, 2006; Zielonka, 2008; Whitman, 2011). Also, regarding their 
effects on economic and political changes in the South (Stiglitz, 2002; 
Amin, 2014b; Gosovic, 2016) some authors highlight the progressive 
substitution of the role of the UN institutions for Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD, ECLAC) by those of the WB and the IMF in the management 
of Southern macroeconomic policies. For them, this shift profoundly 
marked the outlines and goals of regional integration in favour of the 
neoliberal visions that gained salience since the 1980s in the international 
political arena (Amin, 2014b; Gosovic, 2016). 
 
1.5.4 Implementation and enforcement 
At different levels, IOs can sanction behaviours that are somehow 
outside the guidelines agreed in multilateral frameworks. Avant et al. 
(2010, p. 357) call “global governors” those agents with authority to 
“exercise power across borders for purposes of affecting policy ‘through 
their’ expertise, morality, competence and other sources that are 
independent of the state.” This enforcement capacity was studied by 
different authors from different perspectives. Whereas some centred on its 
consequences under international law (Howse, 2002; Cass, 2005; Cutler, 
2015), others paid attention to the capacity of public or private state actors 
to influence such mechanisms, as well as their effects over other countries 
(Kerr, 2007, p. 521): 
 
“In IR, the use of restrictions on trade is not confined to 
trade matters purely. Trade restrictions, in the form of sanctions, 
are also recognized as one of the mechanisms available to 
countries attempting to induce other countries to change their 
behaviour. Trade sanctions lie along a continuum that has 
diplomacy (termed moral suasion by economists) at one 
extreme and military force at the other. By imposing trade 
sanctions, it is hoped that the economic costs suffered by the 
country engaging in the behaviour judged unacceptable by its 
trading partners will be sufficient to induce it to alter its 
behaviour. Trade sanctions have been applied by the UN against 
some countries – Apartheid era South Africa, Iraq, Serbia, and 
so on – and unilaterally – by the US against Cuba.” 
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Thus, numerous analyses of international trade deal with the role of 
Northern countries in regulating agricultural exchanges (Kerr, 2004), 
trade in services, intellectual property and environmental issues (Kerr, 
2002). In this regard, most agree that restrictions and sanction 
mechanisms applicable at the international level have less to do with 
economic efficiency than with political reasons or with maintaining the 
“market imperfections” that allow them to master the market. As Kerr 
(2007, p. 525) notes, “trade sanctions have had a limited role in trade 
policy, although they have had a well-recognised role in international 
political relations.” Avant et al. (2010, p. 329) underscore the importance 
of overcoming the surface of IOs when assessing the mechanisms for 
implementing and sanctioning international standards, since the interests 
of different public and private actors are at stake within them. In addition 
to governments and “state bureaucracies”, the influence of multinational 
corporations in the shape and scope of IOs has been under study since the 
1970s: 
 
“Firms making capital investments and firms or consumers 
making purchasing decisions can provide ‘enforcement’ if they 
demand compliance of a product with certain standards and 
refrain from purchasing it (or demand a lower price) if the 
product fails to comply. (…) Notice that the key actors here are 
again actors – mostly firms other than those whose products and 
actions are directly targeted by the standards – who have played 
no significant role at prior stages of the governance sequence.” 
(Avant et al., 2010, p. 329) 
 
In fact, the internal composition of IOs and power imbalances within 
them largely influence the degree of strictness with which those rules and 
sanctions are implemented and the transformations of such mechanisms 
over the years. This characteristic makes them what Higgott (2008) calls 
“norm brokers” and “enforcers”: beyond the reduction of transaction costs 
or information asymmetries, the interest of states in IOs resides in the 
latter's’ ability to create information, ideas, norms and expectations, as 
well as to legitimize or delegitimize certain collective and individual 
actions (Abbott; Snidal, 1998).   
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1.5.5 Monitoring, advising and power relations 
Two central axes pervade critical approaches to orthodox integration 
theories and their empirical assessment by economists and IOs:  
 their seemingly neutral nature and  
 their epicentre in the Western countries of the Northern hemisphere.  
As mentioned above, this work builds on the premise that neither 
theoretical approaches, nor empirical assessments, nor the IOs are neutral. 
In this regard, two core realms of current international economic relations 
remain at the crossroads among all of them: policy monitoring (Martin, 
2008) and policy advising (Howse, 2002). The first appears as one of the 
most well known roles of IOs nowadays (Howse, 2002; Coicaud, 2002; 
Avant et al. 2010), while policy advising is a complementary activity that 
holds growing space in private and public economic activity. 
The historical debate between the different schools of economic and 
political thought on regionalism reveals the existence of different types of 
regional integration and various reasons for doing so. However, in its 
translation into IEOs, the meaning of regionalism is often limited to one 
of these various options. As an example, Hirakawa (2005, p. 200) 
highlights the main lines of this definition for the WTO: 
 
“On the homepage of the WTO there is an explanation of 
regionalism. It cites a definition of regionalism given in the 
Dictionary of Trade Policy Terms as ‘the actions by 
governments to liberalise or facilitate trade on a regional basis’. 
In the context of the WTO, regionalism corresponds to regional 
trade agreements (RTA) suche as FTA or CU. These are more 
general concepts than those given in the dictionary, since they 
include agreements across regions. However, RTA are 
considered peculiar in that they have to be consistent with WTO 
terms. At the same time, the WTO also shows wariness: ‘RTAs 
can complement the multilateral trading system, help to build 
and strengthen it. But by their very nature RTAs are 
discriminatory: they are a departure from the MFN principle, a 




In this regard, Grabel (1999) reflects on the interdependence between 
the neoclassical economy and the prescription and monitoring of 
neoliberal policies. In his critique of the credibility theory as an alibi for 
the imposition of the Washington Consensus and for the justification of 
its failure, Grabel underscores its underlying tautology: “The credibility 
argument, then, depends on a kind of circular logic: economic policies are 
deemed effective only if they are credible to private agents; but policies 
are deemed credible only if they are seen to be effective.” In this regard, 
from the conjunction of the theoretical postulates of economics and the 
political reasoning of institutions based on economic theory emerges the 
dilemma of the fake choice: 
 
“There are essentially two choices: one could shade policy 
toward existing popular sentiments; or one could implement 
‘correct’ policy, policy that respects the economic fundamentals 
of new-classical theory. The former option is ruled out of court 
on the simple grounds that ‘incorrect’ policy could not possibly 
retain credibility in the wake of the disruptions that would 
inevitably attend it. The latter, on the other hand, would induce 
credibility as it proved itself uniquely capable of promoting 
development and economic growth, even if it were to be 
unpopular in the short run. A correctly specified policy would, 
therefore, impel rational agents to act ‘properly’, at once 
achieving growth and stability and the credibility necessary to 
sustain itself.” (Grabel, 1999, p. 4) 
 
Another essential point of Grabel’s criticism is the exogenous 
character of credibility, which will determine the success or failure of an 
economic policy according to the principle of rational expectations of 
individuals. Thus, any consideration of class conflicts, income 
distribution, and disparities in wealth or political power is absent from the 
analysis. Similarly, a massive flight or inflow of capital would always be 
considered as an economic proof of the efficiency of a given policy, 
rather than a political sanction by public or private interest groups with 
the capacity to distort markets (Grabel, 1999). Also the “import of foreign 
experts” would have performative effects: “the act of ‘signalling 
credibility’ should be understood to produce the effect of credibility 
rather than merely to reveal something that was already there, latent in the 
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regime itself” (1999, p. 16). About the role of experts in domestic 
decision-making, Sayigh (1991, p. 77) shares a similar view that criticises 
the role of international economic organisations as an instrument for 
guiding and orienting the economic policies of these countries and as a 
mechanism for increasing their dependence on the world economic 
centres. 
Such considerations can be applied to economic integration and to 
the actors that currently manage regional processes. The ideological 
component underlying this discipline is evident in its treatment by 
international institutions over time, both regarding its goals and in the 
weight granted to the various communities of interest (Amin, 2014b). 
From the review of the theory of integration, its empirical analysis and the 
role of the IOs that watch over its implementation, we can draw 
conclusions that suggest that these trends were not parallel, but 
interdependent. As Avant et al. (2010, p. 370): 
 
“Who is harmed by and who benefits from particular 
distributions is context specific, however. Assessments of 
success, failure, benefit, loss, or dysfunction depend upon the 
context as well as what the actors themselves were hoping or 
trying to accomplish. (…) Instead of asking about the public 
good, it allows us to ask ‘good for whom?’ Governing must be 
understood politically: who governs, what they govern, how 
they govern, and whom they govern are contentious issues 
reflecting power, access, mobilisation, and agency.” 
 
The purpose of placing actors at the centre of the analysis would 
ultimately be to question their status as what Avant et al. (2010, p. 162) 
call “social facts”, that is, as actors who are seen as objective, stable and 
neutral facts, not dependent on the context or the perception that is 
created of them. 
1.6 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter proposes a critical review of the main theoretical 
approaches to economic integration by taking into consideration the 
historical backdrop in which they evolved. The examination of orthodox 
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and heterodox insights on this issue from the fields of economics and 
political sciences reveal their intrinsic relationship with European 
integration since the end of WWII. In this regard, the unparalleled 
correspondence between the core tenets of orthodox theories of economic 
integration and the European case appears to be rooted  in the geopolitical 
circumstances in which both emerged. In this vein, the international 
institutions currently in charge of the regulation and evaluation of such 
processes are taken into consideration as central agents of this process. 
Therefore, the first part of the chapter unravels the historical turning 
points that accompanied the contemporary history of economic 
integration. Four different phases are identified: 
 1950s-1960s: the launching of the EEC in a context of post-war 
recovery and Cold War hegemonic struggles, bolstered great interest 
among authors of IR and International Trade. For the latter, economic 
integration appeared as a second-best solution whenever multilateral 
trade is not possible and certain conditions are fulfilled. The concepts 
of trade creation and trade diversion put forward by Viner (1950) 
became central concepts to predict whether the establishment of a CU 
would result in a net increase of welfare through a better allocation of 
resources and hence an increase in global output. One decade after, 
Balassa (1961) would distinguish between static and dynamic effects 
of integration and provide a description of the degrees of economic 
integration as an evolutionary process going from PTAs to complete 
integration. 
 1970s: the relative stagnation of European integration during the so-
called ‘dark-years’ of the Community (Keohane and Hoffman, 1991) 
provoked a certain decline in the academic contributions to the field 
of integration.  
 1980s-1990s: the upsurge of neoliberalism and the proliferation of 
PTAs spurred a renewed interest in economic integration among both 
scholars and politicians. The New Theories of Trade (Krugman, 
1991), a growing literature on the spatial effects of integration, among 
others, helped sophisticating the analysis of the dynamic effects of 
such processes. North-South regionalism gained salience in this 
period, and the birth of the NAFTA (1994) would consolidate the 
advance of ‘open regionalism’. The pervasiveness of preferential and 
free-trade arrangement, which Bagwati (1995) would call the 
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‘spaghetti bowl’ effect, fostered debates on the relationship between 
regionalism and multilateralism.  
 2000s-2010s: the debate on regionalism as a ‘stumbling block’ or a 
‘stepping stone’ for multilateralism gained salience together with the 
rise of New Regionalism (Hettne, 1994) and the New Regional 
Approach (Soderbaum, 2004). Other scholars added up to the debate 
by analysing the ‘normative power’ (Manners, 2002) exercised by 
regional entities, namely the EU.  
Following this review, the second part of the chapter focuses on the 
cross-cutting debates that have accompanied the theoretical developments 
of integration since the Fifties. To this extent, the discussion on static and 
dynamic effects appears to have remained as a key axis of research 
hitherto. Among the reasons behind this, a number of authors point to the 
fact that, although dynamic effects have more impact on welfare, their 
empirical assessment is far more complex than in the case of static 
effects. The second major distinction responds to North-South divisions. 
Whereas orthodox economic theories mitigate some of their assumptions 
and conclusions (e.g. regarding the welfare effects of trade diversion), 
heterodox approaches see in mainstream regionalism a hegemonic 
structure that reproduces the unbalanced nature of international economic 
relations. They also criticise the Eurocentric perspective of mainstream 
academic disciplines on the issue and propose other formulas that often 
prioritise the strengthening of South-South cooperation and the softening 
of the international regulation of trade relations. 
In view of these considerations, the third part of the chapter enquires 
on the aspects that are often missing in debates about regional integration. 
On the one hand, the gap between theory and reality mentioned by some 
scholars (Combes et al., 2008; Amin, 2014b) finds an explanation in the 
very architecture of international economics (Fine, 2016; Fine, Dimakou, 
2016). Grounded on the tenets of neoclassical thought, the theory of 
integration largely relies on the strict assumptions like methodological 
individualism or general equilibrium. This imposes restrictive conditions 
on the features that are susceptible to be analysed and largely influences 
the theoretical outcomes. On the other hand, the conception of economic 
integration as a process held by countries that voluntarily decide to share 
preferential economic relations from an ‘inward-looking’ perspective 
neglects the role of actors that remain outside. In these aspects, the agents 
in charge of the regulation of economic integration, which are at the same 
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directly involved in its promotion and assessment, are supposed to play a 
relevant role. 
The fourth and fifth parts of the chapter build directly on the previous 
one. By exploring insights from the field of IR, namely from IPE, they 
offer a description of the main IEOs concerned by regional integration 
and an explanation of the roles they deploy in this regard. The main 
finding of this last part, which will be further developed in this work, is 
that they play an ideological role that ought not to be overlooked. Their 
duty to ensure compliance goes along with their capacity to influence the 
agenda of regional integration or to act in a ‘clientelist’ manner with 
certain countries that directly support their survival and/or hold a 







2 FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: THE 




As for theory, the empirical analysis of international integration split 
in the second half of the twentieth century into two main strands. On the 
one hand, orthodox economics tried to quantify the phenomena described 
by economic theory. On the other hand, heterodox approaches enquired 
on the structural, historical and material conditions of the regional 
economic order. For the former, the evidence of a net increase in the 
volume of international trade through trade agreements -in the absence or 
in anticipation of a multilateral scenario- revealed a relative improvement 
in global welfare derived from productive specialization enhancing 
capacity of consumption. For the latter, the circuits of international trade 
were part of the expropriation system set forth from the centres of 
capitalism. As a consequence, cooperation among peripheral countries 
appeared a valuable alternative to dissociate themselves from such 
dependence.  
While neoclassical economics saw the liberalisation of trade among 
developing countries as a step forward to catch-up with the North, the 
theoreticians of dependence interpreted export industrialization in the 
South as deepening the position of dependency to which they had been 
subjected since the beginning of mercantilism. And, whereas orthodox 
empirical analyses attempted to demonstrate the micro-economic 
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foundations of integration-related phenomena in terms of individualism 
and utility, their heterodox counterpart will seek the structural and 
power-related elements underlying regional phenomena. Again, as for 
theory, the axioms and methods of integration theories would link their 
evolution and credibility to those of the European Community and 
NAFTA. To this extent, neoclassical empirical contributions would soon 
prevail over the approaches underneath Latin American regionalism. 
Indeed, they will end up acquiring the capacity and legitimacy to 
evaluate those same projects in their own terms.  
This chapter presents a synthesis of the rationale and objectives of 
the main empirical contributions to integration and their relevance to the 
institutions that regulate the international economic order. The following 
sections focus on the rationale and evolution of empirical assessments, 
with a close review of the variables used to evaluate the effects of 
integration and the methodological frameworks employed in their 
evaluation. Section 3 critically examines the role of trade in assessing 
integration by recalling the cross-cutting discussions analysed in chapter 
one.  
2.2 RATIONALE AND EVOLUTION OF EMPIRICAL 
ASSESSMENTS OF INTEGRATION 
The first attempts to measure the economic impact of integration, 
understood as a voluntary process of removing tariff barriers to trade 
between several countries, took the European Community and European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA) as a major case of study. The aim was to 
assess the variation in overall welfare resulting from its establishment 
through its effects on certain key variables that were supposed to play a 
role in different directions. However, the ‘second best’ nature of regional 
arrangements required identifying when the endorsement of that kind of 
agreement would not prove more pernicious than their non-existence. 
According to authors like El-Agraa (1999, p. 388), empirical analyses 
should clarify whether and to what extent the endorsement of a CU or 
FTA generates changes at different levels of the productive structure: 
i. enhanced efficiency in production through increased 
specialisation in accordance with the law of comparative 
advantage;  
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ii. increased production levels due to better exploitation of 
economies of scale made possible by the increased size of the 
market; 
iii. an improved international bargaining position, made possible 
by the larger size, leading to better terms of trade; 
iv. changes in efficiency brought about by enhanced competition;   
v. changes affecting both the amount and quality of the factors 
of production due to technological advances, i.e. changes in 
the rate of growth; 
vi. factor mobility (in the case of a Common Market or an 
Economic Union); 
vii. the coordination of monetary and fiscal policies; and 
viii. the unification of targets for full employment, higher growth 
rates and better income distribution. 
 
However, the need arose to isolate changes in trade due to 
integration from those that derived from other factors. In this regard, 
empirical hypotheses would build on the question of what would have 
happened if such agreement had not been ratified. Thus, the development 
of ex-post predictions and estimates on the effects of a treaty among a 
group of countries, and between them and the rest of the world, imposed 
a “trade-off between theory and econometrics” (Baldwin, Venables, 
1995, p. 1625). That is, either the complexity of the phenomenon was 
sacrificed to focus on certain specific variables, or the statistical link 
between theory and reality was compromised. Therefore, the evaluation 
of the expected effects of integration was articulated around the 
construction of anti-worlds or counterfactual scenarios that depend, to a 
significant degree, on the researcher's subjectivity (El-Agraa, 1989,1999; 
Baldwin and Venables, 1995; Jovanovic, 2006; Grimwalde et al., 2011). 
On the empirical estimation of the effects of integration, Jovanovic 
(2006, p. 771) recalls the words of Mayes:  
 
“It is no strange thing in Economics to discover that 
the evolution of the theory on a particular topic and the 
development of empirical research and measurement of it 
have pursued rather different courses. It is difficult to 
imagine a better example of this divergence than the study 
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of the effects of international economic integration” 
(Mayes, 1988, p. 42, op. cit, 2006). 
 
As time went on, the respective empirical concerns of the two main 
epistemological options of integration were compounded by the changing 
geopolitical context. In the 1970s and 1980s, the junction of the 
following transformations led to a reconfiguration of the variables, 
methods and interpretations of both:  
 the regional and global crises that shook the Bretton Woods 
system,  
 the divergent directions of industrialization processes in the 
countries of the South, 
 the growing phenomenon of financialisation,  
 the road to knowledge economy and the progressive separation 
between innovation and manufacturing industries 
 
In the field of orthodox economics, the scant evidence on the 
dynamic effects of integration would lead static analyses to be perceived 
as obsolete. In the 1970s, the rise of NTT, economic geography, 
transaction costs and neoinstitutionalism would entail substantial 
transformations in the assessment of regional processes. 
Notwithstanding, static approaches would remain widespread. Jovanovic 
(2006, p. 781) explains the methodological resilience of the neoclassical 
current as follows: 
 
“We have virtually no hard evidence on how regional 
integration affects economic welfare in the rest of the world. 
The reasons are that, to date, we have largely failed to 
measure the effects that theory shows to matter, and that 
much of what we have measured hardly matters at all. The 
theoretical and empirical analyses of this important issue are 
far apart, and the practical difficulties of doing the latter 
correctly are formidable in terms of both finding data and 
extracting their message. Nonetheless, we should try.” 
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Two considerations can be grasped from such state of affairs. 
Certainly, the epistemological foundations common to the theories cited 
above contributed to widen the research on the dynamic effects of 
integration by alternative means. Nevertheless, the empirical 
contributions of the post-war tradition remained imprinted in the core 
tenets of the discipline. In this regard, as it will be argued in this chapter, 
their widespread use by international institutions has played a significant 
role.  
2.3 THE MAIN TENETS OF EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENTS 
In the passage from theory to practice, it is necessary to approximate 
goals to reality by means of evidence that permits inferring or deducing 
them from one another. In the case of the theory of integration, the 
empirical basis of its methodological assessment is founded on the 
observation of the contribution of integration to welfare. The latter, in 
neoclassical terms, is represented through an indirect utility function. In 
such a system, changes in welfare resulting from international trade for 
the representative consumer will depend on border prices, on the number 
of varieties available in their market and on their capacity for 
consumption expenditure. This, in turn, will be given by the sum of 
factors, income (salaries and income from capital), profits (composed of 
domestic output and the difference between domestic prices and average 
costs of each sector) and income received by trade barriers, minus 
investment resources (Baldwin, Venables, 1995). 
Baldwin and Venables (1995, p. 1601) base on this function their 
explanation of the changes in international trade for welfare through 
three types of effects: for the volume of trade (depending on changes in 
trade barriers), for the costs of trade (generated by non-tariff elements of 
trade costs) and for terms of trade. In addition, if increasing returns of 
scale and imperfect competition are allowed in the model, changes could 
also occur at both output (if the level of output changes in sectors where 
prices differ from average costs) and scale (change in average costs 
induced by changes in scale of enterprises). The verification of each of 
these phenomena will depend on the relative impact of a regional 
agreement (FTA or CU) on international exchanges. El-Agraa (1999, p. 
171) thus synthesizes the possible scenarios, which derive directly from 
Viner’s theory and its unfolding: 
FÁTIMA FERNÁNDEZ FERNÁNDEZ
86 
a. Trade creation: replacement of domestic production in one 
sector by relatively cheaper imports from the partner country. 
b. Trade diversion: replacement of initially cheaper imports from 
the rest of the world by cheaper imports from the partner country 
(which would be relatively more competitive than the RoW after 
the agreement, due to the reduction or elimination of tariff 
barriers). 
c. Creation of foreign trade: replacement of relatively expensive 
domestic production by cheaper imports from the RoW due to the 
reduction of external tariffs required in a CU. 
d. Supply-side diversion: substitution of exports to the rest of the 
world by exports to partners. 
e. Adjustments induced by the balance of payments due to i and 
iv: it has to be rebalanced after the changes in the foreign trade of 
the concerned country. 
 
The interaction between such changes and those occurred in the 
returns of capital would induce the so-called accumulation effects (long-
term growth or changes in FDI patterns) and location effects 
(agglomeration or dispersion of the productive structure) (Balwin, 
Venables 1995). Since the 1980s, evidence of the growing weight of 
these matters in the European integration process favoured their insertion 
into the analysis of integration through new theories of endogenous 
growth and economic geography. In any case, the goal of empirical 
demonstrations remains to measure the incidence of those potential 
effects on certain essential and quantifiable variables. From these are 
derived diagnoses on the contribution of specific agreements to global 
welfare, which is understood in the terms mentioned above.  
In order to appraise the effects of integration, it is useful to draw on 
the distinctions already used in the first chapter. Thus, the difference 
between static and dynamic analyses on the one hand, and between 
developed and developing countries on the other hand, are key in the use 
of certain variables and in the different interpretations derived from them. 
Building on the work of Mayes (1978), El-Agraa (1999, p. 249) proposed 
the following distinction between orthodox empirical insights:  
 Static analyses: those that study short-term effects whereby 
“changes in the impediments to trade lead to one-and-for-all 
changes in the composition and pattern of trade”. In this regard, 
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static studies analyse the impact of changes in relative prices 
resulting from integration on the volume and patterns of trade. 
 Dynamic analyses: those that concentrate on longer-term effects 
for which “regional integration over time leads to permanent 
changes in the rate of change of economic parameters”. They try 
to elucidate the impact of the induced effects on income and 
growth ratios, as well as on changes in public expenditure policies 
to balance the effects on the balance of payments.  
 
Any of them, following El-Agraa (1999, p. 259), “may be 
considerable, and either positive or negative”.  
For its part, the analytical distinction between developed and 
underdeveloped countries is based on two points of departure. The first 
one is built on the premise that the goals of integration among countries 
of the South differ from those of the North (El-Agraa, 1999). The second 
has more to do with empirical considerations. The exacerbated interest in 
the details of Northern integration processes (UK's accession to the EEC, 
the creation of NAFTA, etc.) and the alleged scarcity and unreliability of 
domestic data from Southern countries resulted in an unbalanced agenda 
that relies mainly in the characteristics and purposes of developed 
countries, namely in the case of the European Community. 
2.3.1 The core variables of integration 
Following the tradition of the Vinerian analysis, the main variables 
used for evaluating the effects of integration are trade patterns. Indeed, 
the first empirical assessments of -European- integration concentrated 
eminently on imports, trying to extract from them conclusions about the 
creation, diversion or external creation/destruction of trade through 








ployed in the analysis of integration 
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However, faced with the initial finding that the sole analysis of 
changes in the volume of imports from member countries failed to 
identify the incidence of other factors or random shocks of demand, 
Balassa (1974) introduced the estimation of income elasticity of demand 
for imports and price elasticity of demand for imports as dummy 
variables. Other studies measure the weight of imports in the domestic 
economy (represented by GDP or GNP), or in the apparent consumption 
(domestic production minus exports plus imports) (Grimwalde et al., 
2011, p. 267).  
As far as terms of trade are concerned, Petith (1977) proposed an 
empirical analysis in the context of European integration based on 
Mundell's theoretical work (1964). Notwithstanding, few authors have 
concentrated on them despite being identified among the most apparent 
effects of integration. Indeed, Balassa (1975) affirmed that, compared to 
other studies on trade creation in the EEC, “of the measurable effects of 
CU formation, the effects arising from changes in the terms of trade were 
by far the greatest” (El-Agraa, 1999, p. 351).  
2.3.2 Essential variables since the 1980s: dynamic effects 
In the 1980s, economic growth gained momentum in the empirical 
contributions to economic integration. Accordingly, supported by 
neoclassical theories of growth, old regionalism tried to test the potential 
effects of integration on gross domestic product (GDP). In this instance, 
studies like Cecchini’s (1988) examined the repercussions of the creation 
of the Single Market on the temporary increase in the level of output 
expansion, which would return to a regular trend as soon as the shock 
became embedded in the domestic economy. As a reaction, authors like 
Baldwin (1989) claimed that profits for trade were five times greater than 
those presented by Cecchini if the analysis of growth followed the terms 
of the new theories of growth. Based on Romer's assertion that the capital 
stock may increase indefinitely, Baldwin estimated that the increase in 
investment since 1992 would permanently increase the EU growth ratio 
by 0.25-0.75 percent, with a “growth bonus” of 9-29 per cent (El-Agraa, 
p. 103).  
The variable ‘investment’ is not only used in these terms, but also in 
terms of creation and diversion. Other variables focus on consumption 
and production capacity through concepts such as available income, a 
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term coined by Grinols (1984) to designate “the sum of money an 
individual would have to receive at a new set of prices that would leave 
her/him no worse off than before, using revealed preference to represent 
the system” (El-Agraa, 1999, p. 256). This, translated to the national 
level and detracting from the income that the country needs to produce 
the same in the new price system, determines the “payment” for adhering 
to the integration process, and makes it possible to verify whether 
citizens are not worse off than before. 
Other variables that are endogenised in dynamic analyses are 
productivity, efficiency or spillovers linked to knowledge economy such 
as the transfer of skills and technology, innovation, or the accumulation 
of resources dedicated to research and development. Empirical work on 
integration also focused on changes in the size of enterprises and price-
cost margins (Muller, Owen, 1985; Slewaegen, Yamaki, 1988), or even 
the effect on the stock market (Thompson, 1994). 
On another note, works such as those of Krugman (1991) and the 
growing discipline of economic geography (Combes et al, 2008) were 
interested in the impact of integration processes on the localization of the 
production system. Building on the new theories of trade and growth that 
reject the hypothesis of convergence through integration, empirical 
assessments progressively adopted a good number of these aspects 
(Baldwin, 2000). The importance of intra-industrial trade, the centrality 
of spillover effects and the change in the spatial dimension for production 
due to the fall in transport costs were introduced in dynamic models. In 
particular, NTT and economic geography brought the agglomeration-
dispersion variables or the centre-periphery dimensions into the 
assessment of the spatial effects of integration.  
In addition to these, the effects on international labour mobility and 
other migration flows are also present in certain analyses. Moreover, 
changes in the sectorial structure of domestic production linked to 
productive specialisation have attracted great interest in empirical works 
about integration. The transformations undergone by the structure of 
global economic relations since the 1980s led to a growing interest in the 
impact of the regional phenomenon on knowledge economy and on the 
growing weight of the tertiary sector. However, as for the rest of the 
dynamic effects, economists agree in stressing that the importance of 
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their role is somehow inversely proportional to the quantity and 
explanatory power of the works that try to evaluate it. 
2.3.3 Variables for Southern countries 
For conventional literature, the difference in the treatment of 
Southern countries is not so much a question of the specificity of 
variables as of divergence of objectives. Starting from the principles of 
orthodox development theory, it is argued that preconditions need to be 
built beforehand so that a process of integration enhances trade creation 
and the dynamic effects that are expected from it.  
In this vein, since integration is conceived as a tool for development, 
it is suggested that it should concentrate on bringing LDCs closer to the 
starting line from which the overall positive effects of integration can be 
expected. That is to say, just as theory relativises the potential effects of 
trade diversion on the grounds that in developing countries they can 
entail positive outcomes for welfare, empirical analyses imply that 
developing countries must seek primarily economies of scale in their 
integration processes (El-Agraa, 1999). Based on the reasoning of infant 
industry and on the importance of market size (Brown, 1961; Hazlewood, 
1967,1975; Metwally, 1979; Robson and Lury, 1969; Kahnert et al, 1969, 
Mikesell, 1960), neoclassical literature points out that the key variables 
to evaluate an integration process must be trade diversion in favor of 
members of the region, the exploitation of economies of scale and the 
increase of bargaining power against Northern countries by improving 
terms of trade. However, authors like Jovanovic (2006, p. 795) argue that 
although the increase in intrablock trade would be desirable, it has 
generally arisen to be negligible (Straubhaar, 1987).  
Another particular dimension in the treatment of developing 
countries concerns their relationship with transnational corporations 
(TNCs). In general, focusing on the attraction of FDI, on the 
Schumpeterian theory of technology transfer, on increased human capital 
and job creation, most scholars of economic integration strongly 
supported the opening up of developing countries to offshoring by TNCs 
(El-Agraa, 1999; Jovanovic, 2006). In this vein, several studies 
questioned the effect of “special and differential treatment” granted to 
southern countries by the EU and other international bodies (Panagariya, 




“Preferences offered to a group of developing 
countries might have been to the detriment of others. 
These favours could have reduced domestic demand for 
reform in the beneficiary countries. They felt less 
pressure for reform (because of the secure foreign 
market) than was the case in countries that did not have 
preferential trade deals.” 
 
Such considerations lead directly to another specificity of the 
analysis of integration in Southern countries: its efficiency is considered 
in terms of the ability to open protectionist markets, liberalise central 
planned economies, improve average incomes and reduce barriers to 
entry in sectors related to the extraction and transformation of raw 
materials. On a different note, the orthodox analyses attributed the failure 
of South-South integration projects of the 1960s to the absence of 
preconditions that were observed in cases like the European Community. 
They also attributed it to the alleged corruption and lack of preparation of 
the public and private sectors involved in the process. Accordingly, 
Jovanovic (2006) suggests that the insertion of developing countries in 
the liberal regional schemes that have prevailed since the 1980s may be a 
way of mitigating the use of subsidies and corrupt practices. In any case, 
it stands out that also in this context each hemisphere is situated on a 
different side of the assessment procedure: northern countries have set 
the standards and southern countries are evaluated through them. 
2.3.4 Non-economic variables 
Among the so-called non-economic variables are those linked to 
certain political issues over the last few decades. One of them is the study 
of the effects of integration for the environment (Riveiro, 2004), but there 
are also others such as the homogenization of the education system 
(Perrotta), intercultural understanding, democratic values or the so-called 
“universal values”, freedom of the press, freedom of expression and so 
on. In recent years, the concepts of transparency, accountability and 
governance have gained great prominence with the WB. Some authors 
also stressed the positive effects derived from the Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) exigencies for large corporations. Some examples 
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are the provision of services to outlying municipalities, the supply of 
employment to “certain categories of people for humanitarian reasons”, 
etc. (Bitros, 2002, p. 289). In addition, the influx and management of 
certain “non-economic” migration patterns, such as refugees or asylum 
seekers, are increasingly important in regional studies and, especially in 
recent years, in the Euro-Mediterranean context. Next to these, another 
major non-economic goal that the EU and others follow in their 
preferential relations with peripheral countries is security. 
On the other hand, the understanding of what is non-economic varies 
according to authors. El-Agraa (1999) defines the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) as a measure with “non-economic” purpose, as its 
protectionism is mainly based on arguments of self-sufficiency. Another 
example, according to El-Agraa, is the protection of industry behind the 
Latin American commitment to the ISI model, or the reduction of the 
power of multinationals to which Latin American regionalism aspired in 
the post-WWII. On a similar level, Baldwin captured certain elements of 
political economy in his explanation of the causes of regionalism and 
coined the term “domino effect” to explain the political circumstances 
that led to the accession of Austria and the Nordic countries to the Single 
Market. According to him, the purpose of that decision was to maintain 
their independence after the experiences that some of these countries 
shared during the period of the USSR (Baldwin, 1997, p. 881-882). For 
his part, Jovanovic (2006) argues that a further non-economic reason for 
the creation of regional frameworks is to avoid restrictive commitments 
with IOs (such as GATT/WTO accession) regarding subsidy policies or 
the MFN clause.  
2.3.5 Missing issues regarding the variables of economic 
integration 
It cannot be easily affirmed that the most analysed variables for the 
study of integration are the most important ones. Apart from those that 
are not susceptible of being quantified, some of them are also impopular 
and hence often neglected. El-Agraa (1999) says that Petith was surprised 
when his study of terms of trade in the European Community showed 
that these constituted an essential part of the gains of integration. For the 
latter, in the official justifications for the project, this type of gains had 
never been one of its primary objectives. Notwithstanding, it is one of the 
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main effects to which orthodox literature points. Faced with this paradox, 
Petith suggested two complementary explanations that El-Agraa (1999, 
p. 351-352) describes as follows: 
 
“The first was that Belgium, Netherlands, 
Luxembourg (Benelux), EFTA, and to a greater extent, the 
European Community, were all forced into extremely 
defensive positions by accusations that their creation had 
harmed their trading partners. He contended that under 
such circumstances, it was hardly surprising that appeal 
was made to the unobjectionable phenomena of TC and 
increasing returns to scale rather than to the double-edged 
sword of t/t [terms of trade] manipulation. The second 
explanation depended on the probability that the main 
participants were not fully aware of the ultimate 
consequences of their policies, i.e. they were ignorant of 
the conclusions of CU theory as then developed.” 
 
As a consequence, Petith concluded that “the gains from changes in 
the t/t, apart from being the best economic effect, were also one of the 
main objectives of Western European regional integration in trade in 
manufacturing products” (1999, p. 352). Regardless of the consistency of 
this assertion and the rigour of the study that supports it, this claim 
recalls attention to two important features:  
 The relationship between empirical analyses and the political 
foundations and objectives that underpin them.  
 The implications of the deductive and selective nature of a type of 
analysis that is presented as universal. 
The terms of trade were the main element with which the economy 
of dependence defended during the second half of the XX century how 
the centres of the capitalist system kept Southern countries in a peripheral 
and dependent position through the architecture of trade and the 
international division of labour. From a historical approach, these 
theories based on the structure of commodity to defend that the 
expropriation of resources and labour in the peripheries of capitalism 
were burdened with a racial and colonial component that had remained in 
force since the dawn of mercantilism and had not disappeared with 
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decolonisation (Prebisch, 1970; Amin, 2013,2014). Again, beyond the 
debate on the validity of such theses, the political impact of the variable 
of terms of trade remains quite evident. Indeed, it was also the main 
workhorse of the Southern countries in the negotiations of the frustrated 
NIEO (Amin, 1980). This notion, central to structuralist critiques of 
orthodox economy (and its development version) in the countries of the 
South, rejects the ahistorical and linear idea underlying the variables 
presented previously in this chapter (Wallerstein, 2004). Wallerstein 
(2004) argues that the objectives and variables considered “central” in 
the case of developing countries favour their insertion into a system in 
which the promise of catch-up appears to find little empirical and 
historical support. 
Finally, the fact that developing countries appear as exceptions to 
mainstream theories and empirical assessments gives good account of the 
unbalanced agenda of integration. The marginal space they occupy 
among the major contributions of the discipline (El-Agraa, 1989,1999; 
Grossman and Rogoff, 1995; Jovanovic, 2006; Grimwalde et al, 2011) 
makes it difficult to bear in mind that they represent the vast majority of 
world population and territory. Despite the international appeal of 
economic integration, the theoretical and practical study of the 
phenomenon is concentrated -and set by- the North.  
2.4 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO THE 
ASSESSMENT OF INTEGRATION 
Since integration is not the only factor behind changes in trade 
patterns, the main challenge of neoclassical analyses was, since the 
beginning, to isolate the changes that are only due to integration. The aim 
is to observe whether and to what extent integration improves welfare, 
since according to the second best theory, under certain circumstances 
regional agreements could be more harmful than their non-existence. 
For El-Agraa (1999, p. 174), a core condition for a rigorous 
interpretation is the distinction between price effects and income effects. 
Although the initial elimination of tariffs, quotas and other traditional 
barriers mainly affect relative prices, “all sources of possible economic 
gain incorporate income as well as price effects”, leading to “a complex 
set of interrelated income and substitution effects to be explained”. 
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According to his view, the direct examination of changes in relative 
prices without taking into account such distinction (according to which it 
would be necessary to estimate the tariff effects on relative prices, and 
only then the incidence of the latter on trade patterns) turns “almost 
impossible to obtain generally satisfactory results” (1999, p. 174) in the 
estimates of the effects of integration: 
 
“To measure the effects of integration one must decide 
what would have happened if integration had not occurred. 
Thus, if in the present instance any observed change in 
relative prices were assumed to be the result of the 
adjustment to tariff changes, all other sources of variation in 
prices would be ignored, which is clearly an exaggeration 
and could be subject to important biases if other factors were 
affecting trade at the same time.” 
 
Indeed, the empirical study of orthodox integration lies mainly in the 
construction of the so-called anti-worlds. That is, the establishment of 
counterfactuals to estimate what should have happened if a certain 
integration agreement had not been signed. In other words, what changes 
in the structure of trade are specifically due to a certain specific 
agreement (El-Agraa, 1989,1999; Baldwin and Venables, 1995; 
Jovanovic, 2006, Grimwalde et al., 2011). According to El-Agraa (1999, 
p. 173), “any sensible approach to the analysis of changes in trade shares 
following regional integration should have the following characteristics: 
i. it should be capable of being carried out at the appropriate level 
of disaggregation; 
ii. it should be able to distinguish between trade creation, trade 
diversion and external trade creation/destruction;  
iii. it should be capable of discerning the effects of economic growth 
on trade that would have taken place in the absence of regional 
integration;  
iv. it should be ‘analytic’, i.e. it should be capable of providing an 
economic explanation of the actual post-integration situation; and  
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v. it should be a general equilibrium approach capable of allowing 
for the effects of regional integration on an interdependent 
world.”  
 
In seeking such an approach, many of the studies that have been 
conducted since the 1960s, tried to approach an ideal method of 
assessment in which all the effects of integration and their interaction 
with key components of economics could be discerned. Baldwin and 
Venables (1995, p. 1625) explained the problem at hand: 
 
“François and Shiells (1994) classify these approaches 
by comparing them to an ideal evaluation, where one 
would specify a complete world model based on 
microeconomic theory, estimate all of the parameters 
simultaneously on internationally comparable data, and 
then use the estimated model to evaluate the RIA. In 
practise, computational and data limitations rule out such 
an ideal approach, thereby forcing a trade-off between 
theory and econometrics. The two major types of 
evaluations -involving econometric techniques and 
computable equilibrium (CE) methods- come down on 
opposite sides of this trade-off.” 
 
In this vein, methodological choices will depend heavily on the goals 
of the analysis, available data and the variables to be interpreted. El 
Agraa (1999) distinguishes between dynamic and static analyses and, 
within the latter, between residual and analytical models. In this respect, 
while the residual models would be strongly dependent “on their ability 
to quantify the situation in the absence of regional integration” (1999, p. 
249), the analytical ones would focus on  “provid[ing] economic 
rationale for the actual situation after integration has taken place”.  
Another central categorisation differentiates between ex-ante and ex-
post models. Jovanovic (2006, p. 772) defines the former as a “simple 
extrapolation of present or past trade trends” based on the assumption 
that future foreign trade flows are a function of income, output, relative 
prices, changes in trade barriers, as well as substitutability of imports and 
domestic production. Ex-post models, on the contrary, would attempt to 
measure a “hypothetical situation (the counterfactual world or anti-
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monde) which may represent what could have happened with trade in a 
situation without integration” (2006, p. 272). From the difference 
between the hypothetical scenario and the observed situation, the effects 
of a given agreement on trade would be derived. For El-Agraa (1999), 
ex-ante estimates are based on a priori knowledge of the pre-integration 
period (and are therefore structural models); whereas ex-post estimates 
would be based on assumptions based on the factual experience of 
economic integration (therefore residual-imputation models). 
In short, in addition to the choice between statistical analysis of 
extremely simplified econometric models, or the complex modelling of 
counterfactual models constructed on the basis of the subjectivity of the 
researcher and the theoretical axioms, a further choice has to be done 
between ex-ante or ex-post modelling, whose advantages and limits are 
often opposed. 
Figure 2.2 Methodological approaches to economic integration 
 
Source: own elaboration from various sources. 
2.4.1 Residual models 
Residual models flourished with the first attempts to assess the 
effects of European integration in the early decades of the post-WWII 
period. Their essential characteristic lies in the construction of an anti-
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world for the post-integration period with the aim to compare the trends 
that actually took place with those predicted by the counterfactual 
scenario (El-Agraa, 1999; Grimwalde et al., 2011). Many of them 
focused on the static variables presented in the previous sections and 
gradually increased in complexity as new results revealed unforeseen 
deficiencies. 
2.4.1.1 Imports and trade shares 
As advanced also by theory, the earliest models focused on the 
analysis of variables of the importing country. In the 1960s, several 
papers examined fluctuations in the demand for imports on the basis of 
the assumption that imports would have followed the patterns of the past 
in the absence of the agreement at issue. However, this perspective 
neglected other factors such as the cyclical nature of international trade, 
of changes in relative prices, or the impact of structural changes in the 
domestic economy that are likely to have consequences on the demand 
for imports. 
Some of these deficiencies were mitigated by the inclusion of 
exports, first (through the assessment of trade shares); and apparent 
consumption, later. Another attempt to further elaborate on the effects of 
integration on the domestic economy was made by Balassa (1974) with 
the introduction of income elasticity on demand for imports, which 
attempted to examine the propensity to changes in consumption as an 
effect of trade integration. An increase in this ratio of intra-regional 
import demand was interpreted as an upward trend in gross trade 
creation. This could result in the substitution of domestic production by 
imports from regional partners (which would indicate actual trade 
creation) or the diversion of trade from other sources. Finally, an increase 
in this ratio for extra-regional imports would indicate external trade 
creation (Grimwalde et al., 2011, p. 267). 
Some studies also included third countries in the construction of the 
anti-world as ‘control’ group or ‘normaliser’ (El. Agraa, 1999, p. 256; 
Grimwalde et al., 2011, p. 268) to strengthen the standardisation of the 
applied parameters and their underlying assumptions. For example, 
Kreinin (1972) employed the US as a normalising country in its study of 
European integration. However, the results of this work show the 
sensitivity of the exercise to the country chosen as the standardiser. 
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According to El-Agraa (1999, p. 256), “it is an illusion to believe that a 
control group can be found, particularly for such schemes of integration 
as the European Community and EFTA, since the control variables 
themselves are affected by the very experiment one is seeking to isolate”. 
2.4.1.2 The ‘physical’ determinants 
Other models incorporated parameters that sought to represent 
supply-side conditions, as trade would ultimately depend on them. The 
simplest were based on the principle that, “under normal circumstances, 
trade between any two countries would be purely a function of the total 
trade of each of the two countries” (El-Agraa, 1999, p. 132). Thus, 
bilateral trade would vary proportionally with total exports of the 
exporting country and total imports of the importing country (El-Agraa, 
1999, p. 253). However, such model did not allow trade creation to be 
estimated. Exceeding that ‘natural’ level and its eventual progression 
would indicate the entry into play of other factors such as adherence to a 
regional scheme (Grimwalde et al., 2011, p. 268). 
An advanced version of this model was the gravity model 
implemented by Tinbergen (1962) and developed by Pullianen (1963), 
Poyhonen (1963) and Linneman (1966) (cit. p. El-Agraa, 1999). Inspired 
by gravitational laws, the model assumes the existence of certain physical 
conditions that act as forces of attraction and resistance with 
consequences on international trade. The forces of attraction would be 
constituted by the GNP (or GDP) and population of the countries of 
concern, while distance would act as a force of resistance by negatively 
influencing trade flows. The estimation of the model was made using 
panel data. The economic impact of integration was inferred from the 
“unexplained residual” in regression, or from the inclusion of dummy 
variables that distinguished between participation or not in an integration 
agreement (Aitken, 1973; Aitken and Lowry, 1973). In order to better 
capture the specific consequences of integration, other dummies were 
progressively introduced which took into account the incidence of other 
potential pull factors such as language sharing, intercountry adjacency or 
cultural affinity. In some models, dummy variables captured the 
insularity or continentality of one country, or whether one of them had 
been a colony of the other. 
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However, these analyses were criticised for their scarce theoretical 
robustness and, in particular, for their high sensitivity to changes in 
parameters due to economic cycles or factors linked to trade 
liberalisation, which were not adequately captured due to the omission of 
relative prices (Mayes, 1978). Verdoorn and Schwartz (1972) tried to 
solve such deficiency by combining the advantages of the gravitational 
method with the effects of prices on import demand and substitution 
between imports from different origins (El-Agraa, 1999, p. 254).  In any 
case, the discrediting of these models for their theoretical weaknesses 
was mitigated by the popularisation of the Dixit-Stiglitz model of 
monopolistic competition and by the rise of economic geography, which 
sustained and nurtured their arguments on the spatial relations of trade 
(Combes et al., 2008). 
2.4.2 Analytical Models 
By constructing anti-worlds, residual models provide estimates on 
the effects of integration that can only be judged in terms of 
“plausibility” (Mayers, 1978, p. 15), but do not provide explanations of 
trade flows themselves or their changes. Against them, El-Agraa (1999, 
p. 257) refers to analytical methods as those that provide an economic 
reasoning of the post-integration factual situation. These models, used 
especially in the ex-ante prediction of expected changes in bilateral flows 
as a result of this process, include variables whose absence is criticised in 
the residual models, such as relative prices or real exchange rates. 
However, the complexity of the prediction leads these methods to a high 
level of simplification that is usually concentrated in the economic 
behaviour of the importing country (El-Agraa, 1999). 
Thus, these models are built on the assumption that total annual 
imports depend mainly on the level of economic activity and on the 
relative prices of domestic products in comparison to imports. The 
relationship between production, relative prices and imports is given by 
the elasticity of income and relative prices regarding demand for 
products in international trade. Regarding the latter, it will be necessary 
to distinguish between total, intra-area and extra-area imports. The 
differences between the two will depend on the elasticity of import 
substitution depending on changes in relative prices between member and 
non-member countries of the agreement. 
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The main weakness attributed to this method is the assumption that 
the effects of integration occur through changes in relative prices, which 
would be a direct consequence of changes in tariffs. However, several 
studies have shown that only a fraction of these are passed on at relative 
prices. In addition, the import prices of many products appear to be 
mainly dependent on the prices of concurrent domestic products. 
Changes in imports may also be related to the anticipation of tariff 
changes by importers (El-Agraa, 1999, p. 257) or to the potential 
“promotional effects” induced by increased information flows, by the 
direct investment of firms in sales and distribution outlets and by the 
relative reduction of risk and uncertainty (Balassa, 1974).  
To solve that shortcoming, some models included separate variables 
for tariff changes (Grimwalde et al., 2011, p. 273). Once the model has 
been developed, the coefficients in the equation are estimated for a given 
period of time in order to determine what would have happened if the 
agreement had not taken place. Thus, ‘real’ trade flows would be 
compared with those predicted by the model. Generally, it is considered 
that the residual would be the effect of integration. In this case, the 
counterfactual scenario would be based on de facto estimates of the 
impact of income and relative prices on trade flows over the period under 
study (Grimwalde et al., 2011). Grimwalde et al. (2011) and El-Agraa 
(1999) point out that studies of this kind on the impact of European 
integration on manufacturing trade provide more modest results than 
other analyses on the same field, “with trade diversion actually exceeding 
trade creation” (2011, p. 274). In any case, El-Agraa endorses Mayes' 
(1978, p. 18) impressions of the results of these methods. According to 
this, there is “much more to be explained which is not covered by the 
analytic models and cannot be covered by the residual ones”.  
2.4.3 Computable General Equilibrium Models: CGE 
The most sophisticated attempt to adapt the analytical principles 
described above to the complexity of the interaction between domestic 
economies and integration processes was the Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) model. Since the early 1980s, the use of these models 
for the assessment of macroeconomic policies and the observation of 
transformations in the productive structure has gained increasing 
popularity in many areas of economics. CGE models are simulations that 
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combine the Walrasian general equilibrium structure formalized by 
Arrow and Debrew with real economic data to provide quantitative 
support to the theory in terms of supply, demand and equilibrium price 
levels in a specific market or markets (Sue Wing, 2004). Several authors 
(Baldwin and Venables, 1995; Combes et al., 2008) refer to it as “theory 
with numbers”. 
According to Baldwin and Venables (1995, p. 1635), CGE modeling 
works with models that represent neoclassical theory with relative 
accuracy and allow to infer interactions among endogenous variables 
based on theory. Nevertheless, he warns, they force the researcher to 
choose parameters using ad hoc methods. The most common method is 
the “calibration technique”, in which the researcher's criterion plays a 
key role in choosing certain parameters that have already been estimated, 
deciding the values of others for which there are no estimates available, 
and making the model match the data available for a given year.  
With regard to the economies under study, Computable General 
Equilibrium Models (CGEMs) may be multiregional (GTAP, 
MEGABARE, WorldScan) or concentrated in individual countries 
(PRCGEM, ORANI, etc.). In this regard, its greatest appeal lies in its 
explanatory character, both for understanding the theoretical interactions 
between certain variables and for policy analysis exercises ( Baldwin and 
Venables, 1995; Grimwalde et al., 2011). Indeed, the proponents of this 
model highlight its usefulness in inferring the indirect or induced effects 
of certain policies. These include the economy as a whole or the sectoral 
structure of output, trade, demand, employment or prices. Devarajan and 
Robinson (2002) thus explain their role as a bridge between academia 
and politics: 
 
“The CGE models used in policy work vary widely in 
size, complexity, and domain of applicability—but all are 
designed to analyse the links between policy choices and 
economic outcomes. The questions driving the policy 
debate also must drive the models. What an academic 
researcher considers to be the “relevant” questions may 
differ greatly from the questions considered important in 
the political arena. Furthermore, academics and policy 
analysts may have different time horizons, with the latter 
having to deliver advice that is timely. Finally, the 
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policymaker is more concerned about getting consensus 
results from different analytical tools than with polishing 
and sharpening any one particular tool. Given the 
overriding need for relevance and timeliness in policy 
debates, it is hardly surprising that much of the work 
developing and using CGE models for policy analysis 
takes place in government agencies or research institutes.” 
 
Baldwin and Venables (1995) distinguish three generations of 
CGEMs that coincide with their classification of trade effects on welfare 
described earlier. The first models analysed static variables and assumed 
perfect competence, constant returns to scale, fixed endowment of factors 
and homogeneous goods. The difficulties of these in explaining intra-
industrial trade led to the ad hoc introduction of assumptions about 
preferences that presumed perfect substitutability between the goods of 
each sector produced in the same economy, and imperfect substitutability 
if they were produced in different economies. The second generation 
allowed for the consideration of increasing returns to scale and models of 
imperfect competition in some industrial sectors, introducing product 
differentiation and monopolistic competition schemes. In doing so, they 
could produce estimates on output, scale or variety effects. However, its 
results were highly sensitive to the form of competition that was assumed 
and the price dynamics that such a choice implied. More recently, this 
kind of models also incorporated the assessment of some accumulation 
effects that allow to estimate endogenous and dynamic medium-term 
variables (investment creation or deviation, among others). 
For the same authors, the fundamental problem of these methods is 
that "there is no satisfactory way to subjecting the model to tests that 
could determine its validity" (1995, p. 163-34). The sensitivity of the 
results to the choice of parameters and the microeconomic foundations of 
the models, in addition to their high complexity, often pushes researchers 
and institutions to present only the results and key equations of the 
model, fuelling criticism about their appearance of “black boxes” 
(Baldwin and Venables, 1995; Devarajan and Robinson, 2002; 
Jovanovic, 2006). Regarding the divergent results on the effects of 
European integration, Jovanovic (2006, p. 784) argues: “this puzzle 
reveals that there does not yet exist a full understanding of the 
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determinants of trade and production patterns in the EU and that the 
analyses of integration will remain speculative”.  
2.4.4 Interregional Input-Output analysis 
Compared to macroeconomic and short-term assessments of trade 
volume fluctuations, Input-output (I-O) analyses offer a medium-long-
term mesoeconomic perspective focusing on the structure of production 
and sectoral changes. Conceived by Leontief in the 1930s to study the 
interdependence between the sectors of an economy (Miller, Blair, 2009), 
the I-O tables are based on the theoretical postulates of Walras’ static 
general equilibrium. They build on the premise that the output of a given 
sector comes as a result from the consumption of inputs, which in turn 
are outputs of other industries. Ten Raa and Mohnen (1994, p. 135) 
explain as follows the main divergences between this kind of approach 
and neoclassical analyses: 
 
“The two schools differ in terms of subject as well 
as method. Neoclassical economists address the question 
of value (including allocation) and relate it to the 
endowments and technology of an economy by the 
concept of marginal productivity. I-O economists address 
the question of transmission of effects (due to shocks, for 
example) and relate it to the structure of an economy by 
the concept of technical coefficient. Marginal analysis of 
value seems particularly relevant in the short to medium 
run, while structural analysis of transmissions seems 
relevant in the medium to long run.” 
 
In their examination of the interconnections between productive 
sectors in a territory (local, regional, national or in a block of countries), 
I-O tables provide an overview of the economy as a whole at a specific 
moment in time. They offer estimates for a good number of economic 
aggregates (production, demand components, added value and trade 
flows) and give an idea of the interdependence between these sectors, 
and between them and the rest of the world (Sergeant, 2009). In addition, 
the tables serve as a database for the construction of models to evaluate 
the incidence of exogenous changes in final demand (Miller, 1998). 
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According to I-O scholars, the so-called ‘black box’ of trade flows is not 
sufficient to discern the changes and continuities in output production 
and distribution among the factors involved (Leontief, 1953).  However, 
the consolidation of their use in national accounting and the connotations 
of its regular utilisation in economic planning caused the method to lose 
visibility in favour of the above-mentioned contributions. 
Notwithstanding, the profound economic transformations from the 1980s 
onwards revived interest in this type of analysis. According to Wixted et 
al. (2006, p. 34): 
 
“We know from previous input-output analyses that 
input structures remain relatively stable for some time so 
that with periodic updates to international input-output 
datasets it is possible to monitor the structural pattern of 
change in consumption, trade and production. Specifically, 
for example, although there is much discussion of 
‘globalisation’, without I-O researchers would use trade 
volume information. However, that tells us surprisingly 
little about the structure of interdependencies between 
countries”. 
 
The growing weight of clusters, outsourcing, offshoring, so-called 
Value Chains or the complete delocalisation of certain labour-intensive 
and low value-added sectors, stimulated interest in the analysis of 
changes in trade patterns, technology flows and the environmental impact 
of economic activity that overcome foreign trade aggregates (Wixted et 
al., 2006). Also, the extensions of the model in line with the 
endogenisation of components of final demand, the generalization of 
production functions and the dynamic aspects of the model, encouraged a 
rapprochement between the proposals of Tinbergen and Leontief, 
consolidating microeconomics as the theoretical foundation of both 
(Fontela and Pulido, 2006). In addition, the growing presence of linear 
programming, econometrics and CGEs created a new link between the 
two strands. 
Between the 1970s and 1990s, Leontief worked on the 
implementation of the ‘UN World Economic Model’ with I-O tables for 
fifteen regions. Since then, other authors (Wixted, 2005; Duchin and 
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Steenge, 2007) and institutions like the OECD have continued to work on 
model disaggregation techniques, database improvement, etc. (Wixted et 
al., 2006). This type of assessment starts from the conception of models 
with different countries in which national and import accounting tables 
are collected and made compatible. Subsequently, a database is built with 
the trade flows, which will be transformed into ratios, and those ratios are 
applied to the import data collected in the model. Finally, data on the 
domestic economy and trade will be included in the same transaction 
matrix. The basic structure of an I-O table would be divided into five 
sections, where rows would correspond to suppliers and columns to 
users:  
a. The first section would correspond to transactions of intermediate 
goods at basic or purchase prices between domestic producers of 
a good, or domestic industries consuming goods produced outside 
the country or region under study. 
b. The second section would show the adjustments needed to derive 
the total intermediate inputs used in production at purchase price. 
These would include imports of intermediate goods and services, 
net taxes on intermediate products (net of subsidies), VAT or 
duties paid on intermediate products. 
c. The third section comprises the rows that make up value added (at 
basic prices), such as wages and salaries and gross operating 
surplus. 
d. The fourth includes the provision of goods that are not consumed 
by domestic industry, like final consumption (by households and 
the government), gross capital formation (investment), and 
exports. 
e. Finally, it includes imported goods for final use and the 
associated taxes and subsidies. 
 
Therefore, the main appeal of this method lies in its potential to 
construct and analyse systems of dependencies and interdependencies 
between sectors and territories. It also stands out for its relative capacity 
of disaggregation, its ability to discern changes in the composition of 
trade and production over the long term and, in short, for its overall view 
of the economic structure. Furthermore, I-O models allow for the 
analysis of certain economic and non-economic variables of increasing 
importance in discussions about globalisation: environmental issues, 
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productivity, added value, distributive aspects of income, etc. According 
to Ana Lucia Sargento (2009, p. 7), the different regional I-O models 
proposed since the 1950s can be distinguished according to the following 
criteria: 
 The number of regions taken into account 
 The recognition or not of interregional linkages 
 The degree of detail implicit in inter-regional trade flows (which 
has to do with the specificity of the I-O data) 
 The type of hypothesis assumed to estimate trade ratios 
 
Indeed, most of the criticisms of the I-O perspective relate to the 
complexity and quantity of the data needed for a consistent analysis. Few 
national statistical agencies collect import data in terms of user-producer 
system (Wixted et al., 2006). The first logical implication is the 
obligation to choose between adapting the model to existing data, or 
estimating (or collecting) non-existent data (Sergeant, 2009), which 
raises the same reservations as previous contributions. The second is the 
widespread perception of the time lag in data. In general, the most 
current data available date back five years before the design of the model. 
Nevertheless, face to this criticism, it is argued that the essential value of 
this contribution lies in long-term interpretations and that the sectorial 
structure of the economy is relatively stable (Wixted et al., 2006). 
On the other hand, there are inherent deficiencies to the modelling 
assumptions. Among them, given that the data used in this analysis focus 
on the use of inputs in the creation of added value, this type of approach 
will interpret cases where the entire production process is relocated as a 
drop (or a minor rise) in cross-border integration. This would leave out 
certain key phenomena of globalisation, among which the delocalisation 
of labour-intensive sectors such as textiles, footwear, etc. (Wixted et al., 
2006).   
2.5 THE ROLE OF TRADE 
Although research on integration shows that commerce is only a part 
of it, trade flows are a crucial aspect of all the perspectives mentioned in 
these two chapters. Indeed, neoclassical contributions to integration are 
based on the conventional theory of international trade. The study of its 
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impact is hence based on the idea of comparative advantage and on the 
conception trade as a substitute for factor mobility. 
According to its postulates, international trade would favour the 
specialization of each territory in goods in which it is more competitive 
thanks to higher relative labour productivity (Krugman et al., 2012). 
Further developments in the classical theory -which only considered land 
and labour factors- would result in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson 
theorem (Krugman et al., 2012, p. 91). According to the latter, 
specialisation will depend on the relative endowment of factors. 
However, the explanatory capacity of this theorem was questioned by 
empirical assessments that underscored the importance of intra-industrial 
trade among Northern countries (Duchin, 2004). Since the 1980s, the 
NTT, together with new approaches on growth and economic cycles, 
broke with certain fundamental axioms of Ricardian theories through 
perspectives that relativise some of the previous postulates on trade 
gains, on the consequences of state intervention, as well as on trade 
policies (Krugman, 1979; Lancaster, 1980; Helpman, 1981; Helpman, 
Krugman, 1985). In any case, the growing importance of dynamic effects 
made the analysis more complex, but trade did not lose its relevance. 
Similarly, critical responses to this framework were also formulated 
through trade-related effects. Some of the most influential until the 1980s 
were ECLAC’s theories of development, theories of dependency and 
third-worldist claims about the relations of domination underlying the 
international division of labour. They all shared among their central 
concerns the historical dynamics of unequal exchange between countries 
of the North and the South, arguing that the secular domination of 
capitalist countries had placed the latter in a position of dependence. 
However, the reasoning deriving from such arguments varied 
significantly among schools. Economists like Prebisch (1951) inferred 
from those premises the need to create the conditions for seizing the path 
of development traced by Northern countries. Others like Cardoso and 
Faletto (1969) or Gunder Frank (1967) understood underdevelopment not 
as a surmountable stage, but as an inherent condition of the system and a 
fundamental component of a system that ensured the success and 
perpetuation of capitalism. In the same period, the liberation movements 
of Africa and Asia in the framework of the Cold War stimulated the rise 
of Neo-Marxist third-world contributions such as those of Samir Amin 
(2013). He proposed the organization of economic systems based on 
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criteria of value “with national base and popular content” (Amin, 2013, 
p. 118), as opposed to the structure of center and peripheries of the world 
capitalist system. Similar approaches to the global structure of the 
capitalist system that gained strength from the 1970s are today classified 
under the umbrella of so-called World System Theories (Wallerstein, 
2004). In them, trade appears as the transmission belt of an international 
division of labour based on dynamics of racial division and colonial 
roots. 
Thus, the understanding of the mechanisms through which the 
welfare effects of trade are to be assessed ought to be based on a proper 
interpretation of how they are articulated. To that end, the classification 
used in the discussion of the theory and practice of integration in the 
previous chapter will be recalled in this part. 
2.5.1 Trade in static analyses 
The examination of the static effects of integration assesses changes 
in welfare resulting from the reduction or elimination of tariff barriers to 
trade. Hence, the influence of integration in this perspective is considered 
to be short-term. The reduction in export prices between two or more 
countries among which it is assumed that there is no factor mobility will 
have two types of consequences: on the one hand, a change in relative 
prices will take place; on the other hand, the reallocation of factors to 
sectors where they are relatively more productive will be stimulated 
(Baldwin and Venables, 1995; El-Agraa, 1999; Grimwalde et al., 2011). 
That is, not only will consumers have access to cheaper products, but the 
economy will specialise in goods where its exports are more competitive. 
However, once the economy absorbs the external shock of a trade 
agreement, hence placing prices at a new point in the indifference curve, 
the intensity of flows will stabilise. 
In those analyses, the discriminatory nature that distinguishes 
regional integration from multilateral trade is key to elucidating the net 
welfare effects. As this is perceived as a second best situation, it is 
necessary to grasp whether the improvement of welfare among the 
integrated countries arises at the expense of the worsening situation of 
the countries remaining outside. In this regard, it is assumed that an 
integration agreement should not be implemented if there is no net trade 
creation. The theoretical argument supporting this statement is that, 
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although trade diversion may occur and, consequently, certain countries 
in the rest of the world may see their situation worsen compared to the 
period prior to integration, global welfare increases. In other words, the 
relative worsening of income, prices or terms of trade in one or more 
territories as a result of integration would be offset by increased trade 
volumes, lower prices for consumers and improved productive efficiency 
resulting from specialisation within the region.  
At this point, it is worth recalling the already mentioned preference 
of neoclassical for the study of trade creation and diversion. The same 
cannot be affirmed about terms of trade (El-Agraa, 1999). In this regard, 
the evident fact is that improved terms of trade for a certain country or 
region, necessarily imply a worsening of those upon which they are 
improved. Consequently, what can theoretically be justified with 
symmetrical anonymous countries acting as rational and utilitarian 
individuals, is politically controversial when transposing it into reality. 
This is especially true for western northern countries with respect to their 
trading partners in the South. The welfare gap between the two was 
already a major issue when integration economics took shape, adapting to 
the characteristics and needs of the first. Accordingly, it does not look 
accidental that the terms of trade remain as one of the most frequently 
evoked variable in developmental and dependency theses (Singer, 1950; 
Prebisch, 1970; Cardoso, Faletto, 1969), and one of the main forgotten 
within Ricardian theories (El-Agraa, 1999).  
2.5.2 Trade in Dynamic Analyses 
In dynamic analyses, integration is understood as a medium to long-
term process whereby changes in trade and production are not only 
caused by the reduction in relative prices resulting from tariff reduction. 
The abandonment of equilibrium assumptions in exchange and 
production implies that, in the presence of market imperfections, the 
potential gains (and losses) of an integration process  
 differ according to the starting situation,  
 accumulate progressively over time and  
 are transferred through spillovers to different relevant areas for 
endogenous growth such as information, technology or 




The study of dynamic effects is directly linked to new theories of 
trade and growth. As already mentioned, the NTTs were based on the 
observation of important intraindustrial trade flows between similar 
countries in terms of preferences, factor endowment and technology. 
Moreover, they paid special attention to trade in horizontally 
differentiated goods produced under monopolistic competition structures 
(Krugman, 1979; Lancaster, 1980: Helpman, 1981). According to these, 
the positive effects of integration in this scenario would be related to the 
possibility of benefiting from economies of scale without sacrificing the 
variety of consumer and intermediate goods, which would also allow for 
more specialised inputs (Riveiro, 2005, p. 4). Thus, whereas comparative 
advantage continued to appear key for interindustrial trade and contexts 
of perfect competition in which -vertical- differentiation is given by 
production costs, monopoly competition models with preference for 
variety (Dixit-Stiglitz, 1977) offered interpretations of intra-industrial 
trade that relativized traditional postulates of trade gains. 
For its part, capital accumulation is treated in new theories of growth 
(Romer,1986; Lucas 1988; Aghion and Howitt, 1992) as an endogenous 
variable in the growth process. Moreover, technological change is linked 
to the production of knowledge (Dang, Sui Peng, 2015). Assuming that 
technology transfer is neither exogenous nor egalitarian, these theories 
dismiss the idea of convergence through trade. In fact, they affirm that 
asymmetries between developed and developing countries tend to widen. 
They also believe that public policies aimed at improving, inter alia, 
education, investment in R+D or infrastructure can positively influence 
long-term growth. Renewed versions of other theories such as the 
‘coordination failure’ (Hoff, 2001) also advocate state intervention to 
address coordination failures that the market is unable to resolve. 
Therefore, as they became more sophisticated, dynamic analyses of 
integration gradually incorporated certain considerations of these theories 
with the intention of getting closer to reality. At present, it is the 
cumulative effects of integration that receive greater theoretical and 
practical attention, but also those that offer the least conclusive results 
(Grimwalde et al., 2011). The rise of economic geography also had a 
substantial impact on the study of the regional effects of trade and 
monetary integration (Krugman, 1991b), although its incidence is 
perhaps greater in the study of regional ensembles within states (Combes 
et al., 2008). 
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2.5.3 Trade in the North-South divide 
Despite having conflicting positions in many respects, both 
conventional neoclassical theory, development literature and neo-Marxist 
contributions to dependency share the view that trade plays a determining 
role in the productive structure of southern countries. However, beyond 
the considerations already advanced in the first paragraphs of this 
section, the examination of literature on international trade and 
regionalism for southern countries reveals two significant features. On 
the one hand, it is worth noting the confluence between different aspects 
of political economy and mainstream economic literature. On the other 
hand, there is a marked influence of international institutions like 
UNCTAD and the WB on the promotion and financing of the most 
influential literature in this field. 
As already mentioned in this chapter, the literature of conventional 
economic integration since the 1950s has formulated proposals on trade 
gains for industrialised countries, with LCDs appearing as an exception 
(Mikesell, 1963; Balassa, 1965; Jaber, 1971; Balassa and Stoutjesdijk, 
1975). The theories developed in northern countries in the aftermath of 
European integration suggested that regional goals and processes in the 
South should be aimed at expanding markets and exploiting economies 
of scale (Balassa and Stoutjesdijk, 1975; El-Agraa, 1999). The 
underlying idea was that integration could be an instrument for 
development or, in other words, a means for achieving the preconditions 
necessary for ‘conventional integration’ to confer the benefits of 
participation in international trade (Balassa, 1965; El-Agraa, 1999; 
Grimwalde et al., 2011). 
Face to the rise of different approaches to development in the 1960s 
(Sayigh, 1991; Kings, 2009), the Vinerian tradition used arguments close 
to the perspectives of modernisation (Rostow, 1960) to oppose the 
ECLAC’s postulates of dependence (Prebisch, 1970). The failure of the 
ISI models was interpreted by the most influential integration theorists as 
a test in favor of their proposals (Balassa, Stoutjesdijk, 1975). Since then, 
the approaches to South-South integration have mostly focused on the 
development and diversification of export industry as a means of 
insertion into international trade.  
In another vein, the growing financialisation of the capitalist system 
since the 1970s (Van der Zwan, 2014) and the growing weight of TNCs 
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went hand in hand with the theoretical developments economic 
integration for southern countries. They increasingly focused on the 
importance of FDI, technology transfer and human capital for LDCs, 
which resulted in what Feenstra (1998) defined as “the integration of 
trade and disintegration of production”.  Since the 1980s, the reforms 
implemented in many countries of the South under the advice of the IMF, 
the proliferation of preferential treaties against the paralysis of the GATT 
negotiation rounds, and the promotion of North-South agreements in WB 
development programs consolidated in the conventional economic 
literature the vision of regional integration as a means for insertion in the 
global economy. 
However, in addition to the well-known exceptions to this 
framework implemented in Latin America (Andean Community, 
Mercosur, Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América 
(ALBA-TCP), Asia (ASEAN) or Africa (SADC), it is important to 
highlight the confluence between different perspectives over time and 
their insertion in the current context of integration. As far as international 
trade patterns are concerned, a good example is the evolution of the 
definition and theoretical role of commodity chains (Hopkins, 
Wallerstein, 1977). In the 1980s, Hopkins and Wallerstein (1986,1994) 
used this term as part of their discussion of the World System in an 
attempt to critically examine the historical integration of developing 
countries into intermediate stages of the global labour and production 
chains of capitalism. According to Jennifer Bair (2009, p. 7), the term 
commodity chain was meant to show that the global character of 
capitalism was not a recent or progressive phenomenon, but an inherent 
feature of the system. Through a historical reconstruction of North-South 
relations of production, they asserted that the capitalist system had 
perpetuated since the 16th century a structure of centre and peripheries 
through the “distribution of the total product, not among factors of 
production, but among the various nodes of the commodity chain 
(‘economic activities’)” (Arrighi and Drangel, 1986, p. 16).  
In the 1990s, the concept was reinvigorated by Gereffi and 
Korzeniewicz (1994) in a contribution that paid special attention to inter-
firm networks linking southern exporting countries to the global market 
(Bair, 2005, p. 5). According to Bair (2005, p. 10), the new focus of the 
concept, which would soon become more inclusive through the concept 
of Global Value Chains (GVC), was redirected towards the different 
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regional strategies of industrialisation emerging with globalisation. At the 
same time, it progressively abandoned the historical and systemic 
character with which it had been conceived (2005, p. 10). In recent 
decades, the analysis of GVCs has been bolstered by economic 
sociology, by contributions to governance from the political sciences, and 
by international institutions as well (Bair, 2005).  
Draper and Freytag (2014, p. 1) thus characterise the current 
controversies in this regard: 
 
“In the context of the stalled Doha Round, many 
WTO Members are looking for new approaches to trade 
liberalisation and negotiations, and some have been 
exploring the GVC approach. In essence, this approach 
advocates the liberalisation of goods and services, trade 
and investment, to create host nation environments 
attractive to multinational corporations (MNCs) looking to 
optimise their global investment footprints (…). The GVC 
approach has given rise to suspicions in some developing 
countries and some parts of the broader trade policy 
community. The argument is that what some term the 
‘GVC narrative’ is essentially a prescription for developing 
country liberalisation adding up to the widely criticised 
Washington Consensus package, and through that to 
securing the preferences of developed countries in the 
Doha Round and beyond”. 
 
In short, it would be mistaken to assert that critical contributions to 
international trade with a focus on North-South relations were ignored or 
little relevant to the theoretical and empirical developments of integration 
analyses. The contributions of ECLAC or the approach of dependence 
from Latin America, Arab countries, and also from the Northern 
hemisphere itself, have significantly influenced the implementation of 
regional projects outside the conventional postulates. However, the study 
of integration literature and its implementation raises two relevant points:  
 On the one hand, the predominance of neoclassical and 
Rostowian development prescriptions  
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 On the other hand, the capacity of conventional literature to insert 
critical contributions into the mould of orthodox schemes, often 
helped by their mainstream use by international institutions  
 
Therefore, this brings us to an assertion already underscored in 
chapter one. As for integration as a whole, the different conceptions of 
what trade is or how it affects integration also depend on who analyses it 
and for what. 
 2.6 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter reviews the main empirical contributions to the 
evaluation of economic integration and their complex relationship with 
the theoretical approaches on which they have been built. The analysis of 
the main variables, methods and outcomes of such assessments is 
followed by a discussion about their ties with the cross-cutting divisions 
grasped in the previous chapter. Particular emphasis is put on the scant 
theoretical and empirical attention conceded to LCDs, which appear as an 
exception to standard processes regardless of the fact that they represent 
the vast majority of the world population and territory. From such 
considerations, a further reflection on the central role of trade throughout 
the different approaches to regionalism closes the chapter. 
In the first and second parts of the chapter, the critical analysis of 
variables and methods of assessment of economic integration reveals the 
cleavage between theoretical assumptions and their empirical 
demonstration possibilities, as well as their moderated success in 
bridging the gap between theory and reality. However, these have not 
prevented the consolidation of this corpus as a standard tool and for 
evaluating the welfare effects of regional processes. Also, the 
prioritisation of certain variables at the expense of others that have been 
proved to be relevant suggests the scant neutrality of the choice. 
Particularly, the opposite relationship of Northern and Southern scholars 
with the issue of terms of trade reveals the geopolitical roots of this 
controversial disciplinary disagreement. 
The third section places the development of those empirical tools 
within the framework of the static-dynamic and North-South discussions 
already examined in chapter 1. From this exercise, some considerations 
arise: 
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 On the one hand, empirical approaches reproduce, to a large 
extent, the theoretical contradictions between the importance of 
dynamic effects and the abundance of static ones.  
 On the other hand, North-South divergences in the empirical 
assessment of integration do not lie in the methods employed or 
the variables under study, but in terms of their assumed goals. In 
this regard, when it comes to LDCs, the underlying assumption is 
that regionalism should serve to bring them to the preconditions 
that allowed for economic integration in the North, which might 
imply the neglect of the specific goals and features of the former. 
 Moreover, the scant empirical evidence in orthodox approaches to 
economic integration for southern countries is often argued to 
respond to the lack of abundant data on the subject. However, the 
scarce developments on specific theoretical approaches and 
empirical proposals to face such a challenge suggest that the 
unbalanced agenda of integration between the two hemispheres 
might obey to a far more complex causality. 
 
Finally, the fourth section recalls the main tenets of the whole set of 
theoretical and empirical approaches reviewed along the two chapters to 
reflect on the central role of trade in the study of integration. Although 
regionalism is often characterised as a complex process involving a 
number of transformations, exchanges remain the core measure of 
analysis for both orthodox and heterodox approaches. Beyond the 
evidence of the multiple interpretations to which commerce is subjected, 
a further issue derives: as trade is acknowledged to play quite a different 
role in LCDs and developed countries, the fact that the specific features 
of southern countries play a secondary role in both theoretical and 
empirical approaches might as well involve fundamental confusions on 







3 THE MOROCCAN PATH OF ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION AFTER INDEPENDENCE 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
On the basis of the premises set out in the previous chapters, the 
following sections will analyse the path of integration undertaken by 
Morocco since its independence. In this regard, our study is guided by 
the consideration of international trade as a sector of foreign policy 
shaped by international agreements and socioeconomic circumstance. As 
a consequence, our consideration of integration as a political choice 
among various options within a framework regulated by major 
stakeholders of global economic relations brought us to focus on the role 
of two kinds of agents: those taking decisions on behalf of the economies 
they represent, and those evaluating them on behalf of internationally 
agreed standards.  Accordingly, our analysis builds on the already 
examined interactions between theory, empirical assessment and reality 
in the realm of economic integration.  
The first part of this chapter deals with the historical, socio-political 
and economic context in which Moroccan integration into its regional 
environment took place. Supported by historical research on archive 
documents, it describes particularly the transition from French-Spanish 
colonial rule to the current Euro-Mediterranean framework. Special 
attention will be paid to the prevalence of North-South integration over 
South-South schemes. To this extent, an actor-centred approach will 
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guide our explanation on the outcomes of the process and their relation 
with its former official goals.  
The second part, instead, looks at the same process from the point of 
view of International Economic Organisations (IEOs). A careful 
assessment of their functions in terms of the theories explained 
previously in this work will lead us to complete a heterodox explanation 
on the role of agents in the theory and practice of integration. Rather than 
providing a unambiguous truth on the issues of our concern, this exercise 
aims at questioning the neutrality of agents and hence their absence from 
the discipline -and the agenda- of economic integration. 
  
3.2 OVERVIEW OF THE MOROCCAN ECONOMY: BEYOND 
LOWER MIDDLE INCOME  
The conventional macro-economic indicators provide a standardised 
picture of countries (see Annex 11) and a clear-sighted judgement of their 
behaviour (Desrosières, 1993, 2000; Hartwig, 2006; Broome and 
Seabrooke, 2012; Fioramonti, 2014; Hirschman and Berman, 2014). In 
this light, it is interesting to observe how many of the snapshots that 
characterise Morocco within the international economic arena place it in 
a paradoxical position. Certainly, Morocco is often described as a well-
performing economy 2  in comparison with its Arab and African 
neighbours. However, its allegedly privileged geographical location 
(Leymarie and Tripier, 1993) and progressive modernisation (Escribano 
and Lorca, 2003) does not seem sufficient to rescue it from the group of 
1 Country Profiles elaborated by the European Institute for the Mediterranean and released every 
year in the Mediterranean Yearbook. Available here: http://www.iemed.org/publicacions-
en/historic-de-publicacions/anuari-de-la-mediterrania (As Mauritania is not considered a 
Mediterranean country in terms of European policy, it is the only Maghreb country for which 
these data are not provided every year).  
2 In 2016, a World Economic Forum report stated: “About one-fifth of Africa’s GDP comes from 
a set of countries we call growth stars, with high rates of growth and a high score on stability. 
These countries, among them Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco and Rwanda, are not 
dependent on resources for growth, are actively reforming their economies, and are increasing 
competitiveness.” (Barton and Leke, 2016). In addition, the Global Competitiveness Index (2016-
17), elaborated by the same institution, placed Morocco in position 70 out of 138, more than half 
of the non-European countries in the region. 
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“lower-middle income countries”3, as we will further develop in the first 
part of chapter four. In this regard, Morocco remains at the same among 
the most open economies in the area (Haddad, 1993; Escribano and 
Lorca, 2003; Bouoiyour, 2008; Escribano, 2012), but one of the less 
regionally integrated countries (Escribano and Jordán, 1999; Escribano, 
2000; Achy, 2007; Martínez et al., 2008; Ghelam and Silem, 2009).  
Morocco’s high level of trade liberalisation, together with the scant 
self-sufficiency of its domestic economy (Escribano and Lorca, 2004; 
Cepillo, 2007; Iglesias, 2010), reveals its high dependence on 
international economic relations. In this respect, economists and 
institutions often address two major underlying determinants when 
describing the Moroccan economic structure and its particular insertion 
in the international economy:  
 European colonialism -along with the characteristics of the 
decolonisation process (Belal, 1968; Belal and Agourram, 1969; 
Berrada, 1988; Berrada and Saadi, 1992; Akesbi et al., 2008; Berrada, 
2016). 
 The SAP agreed with the IMF in the 1980s (Akesbi, 1985,1986; El 
Malki and Doumou, 1992; Clement, 1995; Hibou, 1996; El Aoufi et 
al., 2005; Catusse, 2010; Zemni and Bogaert, 2011).  
 
Most of these authors underline the continuity that characterised the 
post-colonial economic structure. The maintenance of colonial trade 
patterns was only disturbed by a massive capital flight that was 
compensated by a model of economic planning, policies of large 
infrastructures and public works (Benhadi, 1975; Berrada and Saadi, 
1992). Since the 1980s, the bid for export development models and the 
financialisation of the economy would contribute to digging into 
asymmetric North-South relations (El Malki, Doumou, 1992). A harsh 
debt crisis stimulated the privatisation of sectors participated by the State 
with the aim to lighten the burden of public finances. Together with 
policies of low wages (Berrada, 1986), price deflation and liberalisation 
3 According to the World Bank's classification, which analyses each year the GNI of countries 
according to their income using the Atlas method, lower middle income countries like Morocco 
would be those with a GNI per capita of between USD 1026 and USD 4035. For more 




of agricultural prices (Akesbi, 1985, 1986), such recipe was supposed to 
lay the foundations for the Moroccan take-off (El Malki, Doumou, 1992). 
However, the 1990s would show, in Morocco as in other southern 
countries, the limits of development models based on the exploitation of 
comparative advantage. The policies of liberalisation-modernisation that 
had led experts and journalists to foresee the awakening of the 
‘Moroccan dragon’ (Leymarie and Tripier, 1992) would end up 
languishing in a soft landing accompanied by a drop of exports 
(Escribano and Lorca, 2003).  
From this confluence between continuity and modernity derives a 
dual agricultural sector that combines export and subsistence (Akesbi, 
2009, 2015; Akesbi et al., 2008, 2010). The influence of the primary 
sector over the rest of the economy is related to the number of active 
population employed (around 40%) rather than to its actual contribution 
to national product or public finances (Berrada and Saadi, 1992; Berrada, 
2016). Such dual structure explains as well the anchorage of Moroccan 
manufactures to the Northern shore of the Mediterranean, the growing 
ties between the financial sector and non-productive activities, and a 
process of privatisation whose means and outcomes have been widely 
questioned (El Malki and Doumou, 1992; Saadi, 2004; Catusse, 2010). 
These dualities together reinforce and are reinforced by other 
socioeconomic features:  
 the Moroccan system of formal and informal labour markets 
(Berrada, 1986; El Malki and Doumou, 1992),  
 its model of social welfare (Catusse, 2005),  
 its public and private finances (Berrada, 2010, 2016),  
 its migration flows (Faini and De Melo, 1995; Cogneau and 
Tapinos, 2000)  
 the imbalances between rural and urban areas (Escallier, 1990),  
 the concentration of activity in coastal poles (Escallier, 1972; 
Gauché, 2010; Zemni and Bogaert, 2011) and  
 the contribution of the education sector to economic development 
(El Aoufi, 2012; Berrada, 2016)  
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 3.3 DID MOROCCAN INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION 
START WITH MOROCCAN INDEPENDENCE?  
When the Protectorate officially began after the Treaty of Fez 4 
(1912), integration (economically and financially) had already been 
underway for several decades (Rivet, 2012). However, with regard to the 
conventional tenets of economic integration, several fundamental 
objections oppose this process to orthodox definitions of such processes. 
As shown in previous chapters, a certain consensus exists in the field of 
integration regarding the basic premises and objectives for integration to 
take place (Meade, 1955; Lipsey, 1960,1970; Balassa, 1961; Hansen, 
1969; Bhagwati, 1971; El-Agraa, 1988; Baldwin and Venables, 1995; 
Jovanovic, 2006; Hosny, 2013):  
i. two or more countries  
ii. that voluntarily decide to reduce economic barriers to trade and,  
iii. if so, to establish economic cooperation links with the aim of 
achieving a net improvement in their welfare.  
 
The prerequisites for the success of these processes often include:  
a. complementarity (Meyer, 1956) or competitiveness (Meade, 
1955; Jovanovic, 2006) between the integrated economies and  
b. the favourable effects of the associated division of labour 
(Holzman, 1976; Krugman, 1991; Jovanovic, 2006),  
c. freedom of movement of goods, services and -as the case may be- 
people in the integrated area (El Agraa, 1985)  
 
In this respect, a number of these authors coincide in distinguishing 
these processes for their discriminatory behaviour (Baldwin and 
Wyplosz, 2012) against economic relations with the rest of the world and 
their inward-looking perspective (Jovanovic, 2006). Accordingly, the net 
improvement in the relative utility of regional consumers and producers 
is regarded as second best (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956) compared to 
4 On 30 March 1912, this agreement between France and the Sharifian empire established a 
Protectorate regime in most of its territory. On 27 November of the same year, an agreement was 
signed between the Spanish Minister of State, García Prieto, and the French Ambassador, León 
Geoffray, to "specify the respective situation of France and Spain in the context of the Sharifian 
Empire" and to "bring their interests into harmony with those of Morocco" (Marchat, 1971, p. 81). 
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international free trade, which would represent the first best. Given the 
particular patterns of economic relations with European countries under 
the colonial rule and the continuity that followed, the question arises 
whether these notions explain accurately the process of Moroccan 
integration into a regionally integrated Europe. 
3.3.1 The French-Spanish Protectorate (1912-1956) as a process 
of economic integration 
Certainly, between 1912 and 1956 Morocco participated in a process 
of trade expansion, productive specialisation and international division of 
labour that, in the long term, led to a net increase in output (Bunle, 1931; 
Garnier, 1939; Joly, 1948). It is also true that trade barriers were 
progressively reduced. Moreover, the establishment of formal cross-
border links with European partners could be considered as part of what 
Tinbergen (1954) would call “positive integration”.  
Be as it may, it is not commonplace in the discipline of economic 
integration to consider colonialism as a case of study. Indeed, scholars 
and institutions tend to describe Euro-Moroccan economic relations as 
having started in the Seventies. The webpage of the European Union 
External Action Service (EEAS) characterises the process as follows5: 
 
“Economic relations between Morocco and the EU 
are of long standing. One of the main commercial 
agreements, made in 1976 and brought in force in 1978, 
includes economic and financial aid in addition to 
commerce. It is under this agreement that industrial 
products from Morocco enter the EU at zero duty.” 
 
When inquiring on that period, it is difficult to get access to the 
above-mentioned or to previous agreements through the official 
information provided by the EU. The same can be said for trade figures 
and other legal arrangements having guided Euro-Moroccan relations 
until the Nineties. Nevertheless, historical research and current trends 
5  https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/morocco/4347/morocco-and-the-eu_en (last access 
15/05/2018) 
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support the hypothesis that Euro-Moroccan integration might be rooted in 
previous colonial relations rather than on the factors highlighted by 
neoclassical economic theories. Some evidence in that regard would arise 
from the following features: 
 Morocco’s main current European partners are its former 
metropoles, France and Spain 
 The Moroccan agricultural exporting sector is largely related to 
the French presence during the Protectorate 
 Euro-Moroccan relations were bound by a preferential colonial 
treaty (Treaty of Algeciras) since 1906 (Rivet, 2012)  
 The Treaty of Rome (1957) establishing the EEC foresaw the 
maintenance of privileged relations with former colonies on 
behalf of historical arguments      
 
In this vein, our second hypothesis was that subsequent AAs aimed 
at safeguarding such exchanges within the new legal framework of the 
European Common Market. Also, following such hypothesis, further 
questions arose on the interaction between North-South and South-South 
schemes of integration. In this case, the research handled in this work 
about the processes of South-South integration undertaken by Morocco 
since its independence suggested that the choice to maintain and deepen 
former relations with European partners might have been done at the 
expense of integration with its Southern neighbours, namely Maghreb 
countries. Supporting this hypothesis: 
 Claims for a united Maghreb were at the basis of the anticolonial 
movements in the area until independence  
 Such claims faded away contemporarily to the Moroccan and 
Tunisian bid for strengthening economic ties with the European 
Community 
 The revival of the Maghreb project arrived at the end of the 
Eighties, when the model of open regionalism arose on the 
wavelength of Neoliberalism 
 No significant advance occurred in terms of trade integration 
among Maghreb countries after the creation of the Arab Maghreb 
Union (AMU), while the EU maintained a growing weight both 
on economic and political terms 
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 The AMU does not act as a regional interlocutor with EU 
countries, except from the informal 5+5 Dialogue among Western 
Mediterranean countries6 
 
Therefore, in view of the mentioned questions and hypotheses, we 
focused on the impact of colonial relations on the current situation of 
Euro-Maghreb relations. Historical research on the French National 
Archives7, together with socioeconomic, political and historical literature 
on the period under review, show that Maghreb integration in European 
markets started with colonialism and continued after decolonisation 
through renewed agreements in accordance with the rules of the 
European Market and the GATT. In particular, regarding Morocco, 
historical documents on diplomatic relations and economic data reveal 
that no big disruption in terms of economic integration followed 
Moroccan independence. Rather, the privileged economic relations that 
France -and Spain- held with Morocco before independence were 
extended to all the EEC countries after European integration. Thus, in the 
following pages, this chapter will further explain the extent to which 
some of the major on-going economic agreements between Morocco and 
the EU stem directly from such period.  
3.3.2 The role of colonialism in centre-periphery relations 
Research on previous relations to the current framework of 
integration is of particular importance when dealing with the transition 
between late European Imperialism and the new economic order of the 
post-WWII. This is because the colonial economic systems established 
since mid-XIX century hold four major features of great relevance in 
terms of economic integration: 
a. Trade relations between colonies and metropolis tended to be 
intense, privileged and sometimes exclusive 
b. The economic structure of the colonised territory often underwent 
vast transformations related to the needs and interests of the 
metropolis 
6 The European partners in this informal dialogue are Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Malta. 
7  This part of the research was carried out during the month of July 2016 at the Archives 
Nationales de France (Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Paris). 
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c. The capital used for economic transformation and the new 
patterns of consumption were intimately linked to the major 
economic actors of the metropolis 
d. The set of alliances forged between capital owners of the former 
system and those arrived with the colonial rule spurred mutual 
interest and cooperation in a wide range of sectors 
 
Then, once political independence is achieved, previous ties remain 
embedded in trade patterns, in domestic economic sectors and, often, in 
interweaving relations among private and public agents. In that respect, 
the newly independent country remains, a priori, in a situation of 
economic dependence whose disruption would entail at least a dramatic 
shock in the short-term. The dilemma arises between keeping a 
peripheral economic structure within the orbit of the ex-metropolis or 
delinking its economy from it. The latter usually implied, against the 
background of post-WWII, swinging between Third World countries and 
the leading powers of the Cold War.  
On that basis, we have studied the transition path followed by 
Morocco after the end of the French-Spanish Protectorate.  
3.3.2.1 Political independence and economic transition in the 
French Mediterranean periphery 
In 1948 France had established the entry of Moroccan products in 
franchise8. In fact, bilateral advantages had always been settled in the 
form of quotas instead of tariff preferences during the Protectorate. This 
was due to the fact that the Treaty of Algeciras (1906) banished the 
establishment of tariff preferences by any of the signatory countries. 
8 In a note on the possible consequences of Morocco's association to the EEC, the Inspector 
General for External Affairs explained the previous economic relations with Morocco: “Since 
September 1948, the Moroccan economy has benefited from considerable export facilities to 
France, thanks to the existence of "duty-free quotas". This regime, which made it possible to 
provide aid to the young Sharifian industry, largely in the hands of French citizens, continued 
after the independence of our former protectorate in 1955. These quotas had been calculated very 
widely and, for industrial products, they were far from being used; in any event, no serious 
competition problems arose for French activities. Moreover, for raw materials, the non-existence 
of customs duty on entry into France makes the fixing of a tariff quota unnecessary.” 
Note à l’attention du Secrétaire Général du Comité Économique Interministériel afférente à 
l’éventuelle Association du Maroc à la CEE de l’Inspecteur Général Chargé des Affaires 
Extérieures, 22 juin 1964. AN 19880053/201. Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Paris 
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Such compromise sought to solve the quarrel for hegemony over 
Moroccan soil, namely among France, Germany, UK and Spain. As a 
consequence, by alleging the will to protect Moroccan sovereignty, the 
Treaty granted equal tariff preferences among the twelve signatory 
countries. 
However, the Fifties shook the order of Mediterranean relations. On 
the Southern shore, a wave of liberation movements placed colonialism 
in the spotlight of the new era9 (Parker, 2013) and forced the old powers 
to withdraw. On the Northern shore, Europe fortified its external 
economic borders and demolished internal ones. However, this shift 
towards an inward-looking perspective did not imply neglecting its 
economic and political links with Southern countries (Ollivier, 2005). In 
this state of affairs, whereas ‘Maghrebism’ was the most popular 
ideological option among the leading elites of Moroccan independence 
(Santucci, 1972; Ageron, 1983; Guermoune, 1988), Europe remained as 
an essential partner.  
The intricate relations between France and its colonial empire were 
at the forefront of intra-European negotiations since the beginning of the 
regional project (Ollivier, 2005; Calandri, 2012). The French struggle 
with the US (Calandri, 2012), first, and with its European partners later 
(Ollivier, 2005), allowed the country to include in Treaty of the European 
Community the exclusive and unilateral maintenance of pre-
independence relations with Morocco and Tunisia through a special 
Protocol10. As far as Algeria was concerned, Article 227 of the Treaty 
9  Regarding the relationship between Cold War and anticolonialism, Parker (2013, p. 125) 
affirms: “Decolonization served as the main conduit by which the Cold War reached –and in a 
sense created- the “Third World”. It could do so in a variety of ways, and from either direction. 
The superpowers could inject the Cold War into anticolonial struggles, sometimes disfiguring 
them beyond their own purposes. The discovery of this Third World agency grows principally 
from historians’ embrace of “transnational” approaches and archives, and from the integration of 
area-, empire-, and subaltern-studies into the literature on postwar global relations. Together, 
these suggest an evolving scholarly definition of decolonization and its place in international 
history. The ultimate dimensions of the process –already underway by the time of the Cold War, 
which first slowed and then sped it along- make it a larger and longer-running twentieth-century 
story than the superpower conflict.” 
10 “Protocole relatif aux marchandises originaires et en provenance de certains pays bénéficiant 
d’un régime particulier à l’importation dans un des Etats Membres” annexed to the Treaty of 
Rome (1957). A communication from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the 
situation with Maghreb countries in that period asserted: “The Treaty of Rome had, under 
pressure from the French negotiators, included special provisions to facilitate the association of 
the countries of the Franc Area; indeed, a Declaration of Intent included in a document entitled 
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recognised its belonging to the French territory and hence to the 
European economic area. By virtue of these considerations, trade patterns 
prior to decolonisation remained valid, but circumscribed to France's 
unilateral concession of preferences. To that extent, the “declarations of 
intention with a view to the association with the European Economic 
Community of the independent countries belonging to the franc zone 
(Morocco, Tunisia) and the Kingdom of Libya”11 and Article 238 of the 
Treaty12 were the only way for Maghreb countries to have a say in the 
renegotiation of their status.  
 
3.3.2.2 Independence within interdependence 
In the case of Morocco, the consensual endorsement of the 
“independence within interdependence” (Rivet, 2012) with France 
defined the post-independence scenario. The decolonisation of Morocco 
consisted of a partial divorce whereby the links of economic integration 
were protected to a large extent. At the same time, Maghreb integration 
was a strong political slogan promoted as the symbol of South-South 
emancipation. The double defy of starting a process of post-colonial 
disintegration while laying the foundations of an independent region 
arose in a delicate period of Nation building. To this effect, since its 
independence, economic and industrial policies in independent Morocco 
were addressed to the adjustment of its productive structure to a 
contradictory purpose: combining empowerment and continuity in its 
process of reinsertion into the world economy. This, in the domestic 
sphere, implied a strong struggle between change and permanence in the 
“Final Act”, and annexed to the Treaty, stated that the Member States were ready “to propose to 
these countries negotiations with a view to the conclusion of economic association agreements 
with the Community”. But, simultaneously, a special Protocol authorized, in the meantime, the 
maintenance of the preferential regime instituted between France and its former protectorates, 
while excluding however from the benefit of the free practice among our partners, the products of 
these countries imported into France”.  
Note du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères Français sur l’association du Maroc et de la Tunisie à 
la CEE, 18 juillet 1969, Paris. AN 19880053/194. Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Paris.  
11 Note du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères au Conseil de la CEE sur l’Algérie, N° 82/CE, 25 
juillet 1968, Paris. AN 19880053/196. Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Paris.  
12 Dossier de la Commission Européenne au Conseil sur les relations entre la CEE et les pays du 




highest spheres of power (Vermeren, 2010; Rivet, 2012) with important 
consequences on the national economy.  
Moroccan integration with Europe will hence be conceived as a 
process of peripheral reconnection (Deblock and Regnault, 2009). By 
restoring previous forms of cooperation, a new model of development 
relying on liberal obedience and without industrialist aspirations replaced 
colonial domination, formerly based on the direct exploitation of natural 
resources and cheap labour. Although it took different shapes according 
to economic, social and political changes occurred in both sides, this neo-
colonial model (Oualalou, 1980) gained momentum since Moroccan 
independence. 
The colonial legacy consisted of an agro-mining model 13  where 
scarce diversification and priority to foreign markets characterised 
economic and capital flows (Jaidi, 1992). The agricultural sector, which 
employed more than three-quarters of the Moroccan population14 at that 
time, appeared as the very essence of ‘colonial dualism’: as for Algeria 
and Tunisia, a traditional structure of self-consumption and low 
productivity coexisted with another introduced by colonial settlers, much 
more productive and designed for exports15. The case of cereals harvest 
is interesting in this regard: although they were produced for self-
13 The export agriculture set in motion during the protectorate had brought together the best lands 
under the ownership of the settlers and a number of Moroccan partners, orienting the production 
system towards the demand of the metropolis (wine, citrus, etc.) (Rivet, 2012). Mining, on the 
other hand, was mainly concentrated in the exploitation of phosphates, of which Morocco is still 
one of the world's leading producers and exporters (Mensah, 2003). 
14 The reports of the European Commission on the Maghreb economies of the Maghreb states that 
in 1967 agriculture employed 70% of the Moroccan working population.  
Communication de la Commission Européenne au Conseil sur les relations avec la Tunisie et le 
Maroc, Confidentiel N°267, 9 février 1968, Bruxelles. AN 19880053/189. Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, 
Paris. 
15 A report by the Commission on relations with the Maghreb countries affirmed this respect: “In 
the three countries two agricultural structures coexist; one is that of the traditional, low-
productivity and largely self-consuming sector; the other, on the other hand, more clearly oriented 
towards the market and in particular towards exports, was generally introduced or developed by 
the French colonists - Although it is difficult to attribute the different crops precisely to one or the 
other sector, it can be affirmed that the cultivation of cereals, dried vegetables, olive trees and 
certain fruit trees (fig, date tree) as well as livestock are in most cases part part of the traditional 
sector. The modern sector, on the other hand, is oriented towards high-yielding fruit crops (citrus, 
apricots), early fruit and wine.” 
Communication de la Commission Européenne au Conseil sur les relations de la CEE avec les 
pays du Maghreb, Secret N°524, 14 décembre 1966, Bruxelles. AN 19880053/187. Pierrefitte-
sur-Seine, Paris. 
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consumption, surpluses were exported to France under a special quota 
system. The progressive abandonment of the traditional sector led to an 
unprecedented cereal shortage in the early 1960s. From 1957 onwards, an 
attempt had been made to tackle the crisis with the operation Labour, 
which sought to spur agricultural productivity through mechanisation. 
However, the higher profitability of the modern sector ended up diverting 
political attention and economic funding to the latter. As regards export-
oriented sectors, Morocco produced significant quantities of citrus 
(oranges, mandarins), primary resources (such as phosphates) and wine. 
Indeed, the latter was the most important agricultural export of Maghreb 
trade, mainly due to the weight of Algerian sales16. 
Also the Moroccan private sector owes to this period, since it built 
on the fortunes grown during the Protectorate through the exploitation of 
trade, land and urban real estate (Belal, 1968; Saadi, 2005). In addition, 
Larabi Jaïdi (1992) points out that the historical context (autarchy and 
shortage of provisions due to the WWII, and the increase in capital flows 
that followed its ending) had led to the implementation of several 
industrial activities linked to sectors such as tinned food or livestock 
farming under the initiative of French private groups. In any case, 
economic relations between Morocco and its ex-metropolis remained 
similar to those established a few years before independence.  
With regard to the secondary sector, along the lines of 
developmental theories, Moroccan economic policies tried in those years 
to spur endogenous and self-centred development (Belal and Agourram, 
1969; Jaidi, 1992; Saadi, 2005) by building a national industrial system. 
The process was accompanied by incentives to export agriculture, 
tourism and by the association between private and foreign capital 
(Munier, 1965; Saadi, 2005). Furthermore, the commitment to monetary 
emancipation was achieved with the creation of Dirham in 1959 (Belal 
and Agourram, 1969). Nevertheless, tensions between the Government 
and the Monarchy, which led to the cessation of Prime Minister Abdallah 
Ibrahim in the same year, and the financial problems underlying the first 
Five-year Plan for Moroccan independence (1960-1964) (Munier, 1965) 
undermined its ambitions.  
16 Note du Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances sur le Maghreb et la Politique agricole 
commune, N°880, 15 Novembre 1966, Paris. AN 19880053/189. Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Paris. 
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3.3.2.3 The ‘pro-liberal’ turn and peripheral reconnection 
The accession of Hassan II to the Throne in 1961 entailed a breakup 
with the tenets of the Non-Aligned movement and a the pro-liberal turn, 
though closely guided by the State (Berrada, Saadi, 1992). In this 
framework, economic incentives were diverted towards the agricultural 
sector -while the distribution of the lands of settlers was still pending- 
and tourism, relegating industrial development to a secondary role and 
privileging continuity in North-South relations (Jaidi, 1992). However, 
since the beginning of the 1970s, the Moroccan economy underwent a 
new transition shaped by some economic and political turning points: 
 the rise in phosphate prices on the world market,  
 the acknowledgement of the limits of the agricultural sector,  
 the Moroccanisation of the economy (Pascon, 1977; Berrada, 
1988; Jaidi, 1992; Saadi, 2005),  
 social instability and turmoil in urban areas, and 
 a deep crisis among ruling actors that would reach a critical point 
at the beginning of the decade, with two successive coup attempts 
against Hassan II (Vermeren, 2010; Rivet, 2012).  
 
Against that backdrop, economic planning in the 1970s emphasised 
export promotion and adaptation to the new patterns of the international 
division of labour (El Malki, 1974, 1982; Jaidi, 1992). State intervention 
focused on the production of intermediate goods by building technically 
evolved plants for chemicals, cement or sugar production. Compared to 
heavy industry, that option allowed to exploit domestic demand and 
resources while reducing costs of implementation, given its lower 
technical demands and the contribution of protectionist measures (Jaidi, 
1992). Besides, that formula was complemented with the participation in 
transformation activities (textiles, dairy products, electrical assembling, 
etc.) through financial holdings dependent on the State17 (1992, p. 5). 
Also, huge public concessions were made to Moroccan companies 
controlled by important families that dominated the sectors of real estate 
and public infrastructure (Saadi, 2005). 
17  Office de Développement Industriel (ODI), Société Nationale des Investissements (SNI), 
Caisse de Dépôt et de Gestion (CDG).  
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According to Berrada and Saadi (1992), the salience of public works 
intensified capital flows between the public and private sector far more 
than they were between the private sector and the rest of the economy. 
This would favour a “significant economic and financial concentration 
that will take the form of diversified economic groups” (Saadi, 2005, p. 
395). However, the consequences of the Oil shock for an economy 
depending on foreign markets for most of its inputs (energy, capital 
goods) led to resize industrial ambitions in successive plans (1978-1980 
and 1981-1985) (Malki, 1982; Jaidi, 1992). Besides, the rapid saturation 
of the domestic market (Saadi, 2005, p. 388) stimulated the will to boost 
international exchanges, until then exploited only for certain agricultural 
resources, fishing or mining (pulp, canned goods, phosphates). 
International trade offered new opportunities linked to the structural 
changes in the international economy in the 1970s and to the growing 
weight of delocalisation (Jaidi, 1992). Morocco hence sought to exploit 
its “comparative advantage” through low wages (Berrada, 1986; Jaidi, 
1992; Saadi, 2005), abundant workforce and a strategic geographical 
location (Jaidi, 1992). 
 
3.3.3 The economy of Morocco in the orbit of the EEC 
In the 1980s, the Moroccan economy would suffer the impact of a 
geopolitically shaken decade. Regarding global trends, the country 
experienced the repercussions of the foreign debt crisis, the policies of 
the Washington consensus, the rise of Neoliberalism and the 
reconfiguration of hegemonic powers. In terms of regional affairs, it 
swung erratically between North-South and South-South strategies. The 
country began the decade by leaving the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU), requested then for accession to the European Community in the 
middle of the decade (Flory, 1986) and at the end of the Eighties was a 
member of the AMU. Meanwhile, the accession to the Common Market 
by Greece, Spain and Portugal pushed European borders southwards: the 
Mediterranean Sea became a frontier and the Moroccan economy literally 
stayed at its doorstep. 
Thus, in the economic field, growing indebtedness, together with the 
severe drought that ravaged the agricultural sector between 1980 and 
1981 and with the fragility of the other pillars of the Moroccan economy, 
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led to an acute crisis in the early 1980s. It was initially tackled through a 
stabilisation plan (1977-1980), which did not prevent the establishment 
of a SAP (1983). The guidelines that the IMF and the WB applied to 
around fifty Southern countries in that decade (Akesbi, 1985) entailed the 
abandonment of interventionism to definitively embark on integration 
into the world economy through trade liberalisation, specialisation based 
on relative endowment factors and export-led growth (Akesbi, 1985; 
Jaidi, 1992; Malki, Doumou 1992; Clément, 1995). Later, growing 
optimism about transformations on the national and international scene 
stimulated euphoric diagnoses of the so-called Moroccan economic 
“take-off” (El Malki and Doumou, 1992). According to those views, 
growth ought to be rekindled through industrial and trade policies aimed 
at “increasing economic efficiency and strengthening the country's export 
potential” (Jaidi, 1992, p. 23). At the end of the decade, Morocco sealed 
its commitment with global integration by joining the GATT (1987) and 
hosting, in 1994, the WTO's birth ceremony. 
Apart from macro-economic adjustment, the SAP implied a selective 
privatisation process that reached its peak in the 1990s under the 
prerogatives of the Washington Consensus (Achy, 2013, p. 2). Among its 
measures, the programme foresaw:  
 The ‘demoroccanisation’ of the financial sector,  
 the establishment of the dirham's external convertibility (which 
allowed profit repatriation),  
 the privatisation of public enterprises and 
 the reform of the financial market to attract foreign investment 
(Saadi, 1995, p. 396)  
 
Such reforms were meant to boost competitive growth and to avoid 
rentier behaviours in private sector and interventionism by the State. 
However, according to Saadi (2005), the liberal turn of the economy 
implied a strong financialisation process (mainly through large state-
owned holdings), the development of financial activities by private 
groups previously concentrated in other sectors, and the withdrawal of 
certain groups towards the financing of more remunerative activities 
(Berrada and Saadi, 1992; Hibou, 1996; Catusse, 2005, 2008; El Aoufi et 
al., 2005). 
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Far from the expectations raised by the trio “liberalisation-
privatisation-budgetary austerity” (Saadi, 2005, p. 396), the ephemeral 
Moroccan take-off through the exploitation of outsourcing (Achy, 2013) 
lasted until the end of the 1980s. After that, the upward trend gradually 
languished until growth figures fell below the average of many 
developing or emerging economies (2013, p. 2). Thus, in the late 1990s, 
growth in Morocco declined and its economic and political model 
seemed exhausted (Akesbi, 2010, p. 53). The rise of competitor countries 
in the world market and the dismantling of the WTO's Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement diverted the production of labour-intensive goods towards 
more competitive destinations (Achy, 2013, p. 5). Thus, the contribution 
of the manufacturing sector to GDP, as well as its capacity to generate 
employment18 and its presence in its traditional markets declined over the 
two following decades19, weighed down by excessive specialisation in 
resource-intensive sectors abundant in unskilled labour (2013, p. 2). 
Lahcen Achy (2013, p. 1) interprets the process as follows: 
 
“Morocco offers an interesting case of how industrial 
policy has been smoothly transformed in the context of 
liberalisation and privatisation in order to continue to serve 
the purpose of rent-distribution, private sector control and 
the exercise of power. Resources and regulatory functions of 
some government institutions may have shrunk or weakened 
in the era of economic liberalisation. Nevertheless, the 
State’s role in regulation and control has mutated over the 
years and now it is directly involved in new spheres of 
power.” 
 
In contrast, the weight of the services sector increased, helped by the 
growth in telecommunications (Hibou, Tozy, 2002) and financial 
18 Achy’s (2013, p. 4) calculations based on data from the Haut Commissariat au Plan indicate a 
contribution by the manufacturing sector of an average of 10,000 of the 120,000 jobs created 
annually by the economy as a whole. 
19  Lahcen Achy (2013, p. 4) emphasized the paradoxical conjuncture of the Moroccan 
manufacturing sector in 2013: “While, manufacturing value added represents on average 25.4 
percent of GDP in the Middle income countries (MICs) and 21.6 percent in developing countries 
(LDCs), it has always remained under 20 percent in Morocco’s recent history. More worrying, the 




services. Thus, Moroccan financialisation took place against the 
backdrop of an economic structure exposed to the fluctuating capacity of 
the agricultural sector to contribute to GDP and to absorb a large 
workforce in a labour market unable to cope with its demographic growth 
structure20. In this respect, despite the fact that the private sector gained 
weight in the economy since the beginning of 2000, with its contribution 
to GDP exceeding 25%, Achy emphasizes that the manufacturing sector 
hardly created new jobs and that the number of companies has fallen due 
to high abandonment rates (Achy, 2013, p. 5). 
In 1999, King Mohamed VI embarked on a deep transformation of 
the economy when he succeeded his father to the throne. Its strong 
commitment to openness and modernisation entailed in that period a 
considerable effort to open up politics to internal demands and, above all, 
to international requirements (Vermeren, 2001; Vairel, 2007; Fernández-
Molina, 2016). In economic terms, tourism, real estate and infrastructure 
boosted growth figures (Akesbi, 2010) while a wide range of State 
investment initiatives for a mise à niveau 21  of private sector were 
implemented in a “scattered, overlapping and non-focused” manner 
(Achy, 2013, p. 13). 
The year 2005 appears as a decisive turning point in the management 
of the primary and secondary sectors. The implementation of an 
industrial plan prepared and monitored by the American consultant 
McKinsey opened the door to what Nourredine El Aoufi called “the 
20 Lahcen Achy (2013) notes that the value added of the agricultural sector fell since the 1990s to 
around 15 to 18% during the first decade of the 2000s. However, its key role in the country's 
economic prosperity lies in domestic consumption and in the job market, as it employs around 
40% of the population. Even in 2016, bad harvests due to adverse weather conditions led to a net 
destruction of jobs in the domestic economy despite a slight increase in industry and services. 
According to data from the Haut Commissariat au Plan on the labour market in 2016: "The 
national economy lost 37,000 net jobs, resulting in an increase of 26,000 in urban areas and a loss 
of 63,000 in rural areas, against an average annual creation of 27,000 jobs during the years 2014-
2015 and 95,000 during the period 2008-2013. The overall volume of employment thus rose from 
10 679 000 in 2015 to 10 642 000 in 2016. This job loss is the result of the creation of 126,000 
paid jobs, including 25,000 in urban areas, and the loss of 163,000 unpaid jobs, all of which were 
recorded in rural areas”. 
21 Promoted and financed by the European Union and UNIDO, the "Modernisation et mise à 
niveau Industriel" programme proposes a series of reforms to integrate developing country 
enterprises into the global economy through the principle of "strategic competitiveness" and with 
the aim of strengthening GVCs. For more information about the program: 
https://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media_upgrade/What_we_do/Topics/Business__investmen
t_and_technology_services/CUP/IUMP/Brochure_IUMP_new__English_.pdf  
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return of planning in a neo-liberal version”. The Emergence Plan (2005-
2009), the Pacte National pour l'Émergence Industrielle (2009-2014) and 
the Plan d'Accelération Industrielle (2014-2020) focus on the promotion 
of several metiers mondiaux (global business) through public incentives 
ranging from the establishment of Tax Free Zones to the implementation 
of clusters or training structures aimed at meeting the needs of those 
sectors in terms of manpower. Through the concept of “competitive 
modernisation”, the plan presented a strategy articulated around eight 
sectors considered key for the Moroccan economy:  
1) offshoring (concentrated in French Francophone markets plus 
Spain) 
2) the automobile sector  
3) the aeronautical sector  
4) electronic devices  
5) agriculture  
6) fisheries  
7) textiles and  
8) the ‘artisanat industriel’ (industrial handicraft)  
 
The latter disappeared from the plan in 2009, while the first three, 
gathered around the Med-Zones or maquiladoras Méditerranée, gained 
momentum since then. In the five-year plan of 2014, however, the central 
strategy was articulated around the creation of “performing ecosystems” 
through fiscal incentives of diverse nature, complemented by large 
infrastructures (Tanger-Casablanca TGV, ports, green energy) that, 
according to forecasts, would further open the Moroccan economy to 
foreign investment. 
In the agricultural sector, the Maroc Vert project, launched in 2008, 
reproduced a similar logic. The analysis and diagnosis of McKinsey led 
to a proposal to modernise the sector and adapt it to the dynamics of the 
international market. The official goal was to mitigate the dualist 
structure inherited from the colonial period through an “aggregation” 
strategy: that is, the implementation of a model of large investor farmers 
that gather around them dozens of small and medium-sized farms. 
Notwithstanding, the plan was based on two largely asymmetric pillars: 
one aimed at strengthening agriculture with high productivity and added 
value, and another to the accompagnement solidaire of small subsistence 
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farms. Out of them, the most favoured in financial terms remains, by far, 
the first pillar (Akesbi, 2009). 
3.3.4 Economic Integration Beyond Theory 
The choices and trends followed by Morocco since the beginning of 
the XX century reveal the complexities lying behind any process of 
international economic integration, especially when it comes to formerly 
colonised territories. In this regard, as far as theory is concerned, theories 
of integration do seem to take into consideration the specific features of 
such countries. Therefore, some of the core tenets of orthodox 
approaches fail to grasp such complexity: 
a. Countries at the centre of the analysis: the consideration of 
countries as individual subjects entitled to voluntarily decide on 
integration through economic agreements, the Moroccan case would 
only be susceptible of analysis since its independence in 1956. 
However, as seen above, integration had clearly started before. 
b. Trade agreements as catalysers of integration: without diminishing 
the essential role of trade, agreements are not always the key 
milestone of a process of integration, nor do they always pursue an 
increase in exchanges. Sometimes, they appear rather as a means for 
formalising already existing exchanges within a normative regulatory 
framework. To this extent, it is also questionable that an increase in 
trade is always a core goal of economic integration, as it will be 
shown later in this chapter.  
c. The economic rationale of integration: the assumption that 
economic integration decisions should respond to economic 
rationality neglects both the political aspects of the choice and other 
individual interests that might go beyond economic ones. In this 
regard, economic rationality would definitely argue in favour of 
North-South integration in Morocco right after independence. 
However, the strong claims for South-South integration with 
Maghreb countries might have an explanation overcoming the scope 
of utility functions.  
d. The relationship between trade, output and welfare: especially when 
it comes to post-colonial economies, it is somehow hazardous that net 
trade creation entails welfare improvement through the means of 
higher output, without taking into consideration the characteristics of 
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such trade. Among other reasons, the assumption that output equals 
welfare neglects redistributive issues, which are often of major 
importance in post-colonial economies. 
e. Welfare as a goal: welfare, understood as utility maximisation, is a 
core concept of orthodox economics and the ultimate goal of 
economic integration according to theory. However, if one accepts 
that trade agreements respond also to certain alliances between 
leaders whose ambitions might be, to a certain degree, different from 
those of the citizens to which they represent, it would be misleading 
to consider the links between trade, growth and welfare as a 
straightforward chain.  
 
Given such complexities, the following sections will enquire on the 
political and historical determinants of this process in Morocco, as well 
as the role of agents in the confluence between its options at hand and the 
choices undertaken. Key for this exercise is to consider economic 
integration as an instrument of foreign policy. Eventually, decisions 
about integration are political choices discussed and endorsed by political 
actors.  
 
3.4 REGIONAL OPTIONS AND STRATEGIC CHOICES: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MOROCCAN INTEGRATION 
After having reviewed the economic and political factors 
determining the anchorage of the Moroccan economy to its former 
metropolis after independence, we will discuss the external factors, actors 
and actions that influenced the erratic path followed by Morocco in terms 
of regional integration. Notwithstanding, the comprehension of the whole 
set of political and economic factors influencing the process requires 
widening the analysis to the surrounding context. To do so, we identified 
the actors, interests and goals involved in each major turning point of 
Moroccan regional integration until nowadays. Special attention will be 
paid to project of United Maghreb and its collision with the successive 
Euro-Maghreb frameworks that followed decolonisation. In this regard, 
the review of this process will be key to understand the extent to which 
the ambiguous relationship between the European Community and 
Maghreb countries shaped Mediterranean policies and, more in general, 
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the current European approach towards neighbouring countries. Indeed, 
in our view, no country in the European neighbourhood represents better 
the blessing and curse of continuity in North-South economic relations 
after independence as Morocco and Tunisia do. 
As mentioned before, the aftermath of the Moroccan and Tunisian 
independencies was marked by the discrete continuity of trade flows22 in 
the midst of a geopolitical turmoil triggered by the transformations in 
Mediterranean relations (Calandri, 2012) and by the construction of the 
Single Market around the steel curtain (Ollivier , 2003). Nevertheless, in 
spite of certain political and economic gestures of rupture, the scope of 
changes was rather ambiguous.  
At the beginning of the 1960s, while France faced the withdrawal of 
its imperial domains and the intensification of intra-European ties 
(Baladur, 1972; Ollivier, 2003), Morocco made steps forward to lead the 
cause of the neutral and decolonised African countries (Zerbo, 2003; 
Rivet, 2012). However, translating discourses into facts was more 
complex in a country where foreign trade accounted for half of Gross 
National Product (GNP) and there was almost no value chains linking 
domestic sectors among them (Munier, 1965). Thus, while France 
managed to save its current account balance through competitive 
devaluations and a certain opening towards the markets of the North, 
Morocco hardly intervened in its customs regime. This, despite damaging 
almost exclusively French imports (Munier, 1965), allowed for a scant 
reduction of Moroccan dependence on its former metropolis. 
Nonetheless, political instability would soon threaten the balance of 
power that France had managed to maintain hitherto by filling the gap 
between the old and new orders (Catroux, 1953; Turpin, 1958; Ollivier, 
22 The defence of Moroccan interests by France in the EEC on numerous occasions proves that 
the maintenance of economic relations was a fact and that it required legal legitimacy. As an 
example, the Directorate of External Economic Relations stated in a note drafted during the 
negotiations of the Association Agreement: “France has an interest in the association. Apart from 
political considerations, economic realities must be stressed. The three countries of North Africa 
currently constitute for our producers a privileged market where our preferential links still 
allowed us to sell in 1964, 3.900 million F. and in 1965, 3.800 million F. of French products. In 
1965 Algeria made about 75% of its purchases in France, Morocco 38% and Tunisia 39% (44% in 
1964, year not disturbed by the crisis). We export to these countries five times more than our five 
EEC partners combined (771 million dollars against 156 in 1965).” 
Note du Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances sur le Maghreb et la Politique agricole 
commune, N°880, 15 Novembre 1966, Paris. AN 19880053/189. Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Paris. 
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2003). At the same time, the independence of Algeria in July 1962 left 
the country in a legal vacuum within the European Single Market. 
Furthermore, the signature of the Evian Agreement between Algeria and 
France entailed the continuity of certain relations that were contradictory 
with a number of Communitarian principles23. This happened parallel to 
the British demand for membership of the European Community, which 
placed the Maghreb exception on the table as an uncomfortable example 
before eventual negotiations with the Commonwealth24.  
On the one hand, France was clearly keen to maintain its “special 
ties” with the southern Mediterranean - and, especially, with Algeria. On 
the other hand, it wanted to avoid granting similar privileges to the 
relations between Britain and its former metropolises. In the quest for a 
compromise, it managed to maintain “a more ambiguous attitude on 
imports coming from Algeria” to prevent the Commonwealth from 
benefiting from similar historical preferences within the Community25. 
23 In a presentation to the EC on the situation of Algeria after independence, the French delegation 
stated: “On the multilateral level, if we compare the situation of Algeria which became 
independent after the Treaty of Rome, with that of Morocco and Tunisia which were independent 
before the Treaty of Rome, we note that : Algeria was not linked to a member of the Common 
Market but to the Six: Algeria's particular situation vis-à-vis France is not covered by any 
particular legal text: there is no protocol covering relations between Algeria and France as there is 
for Morocco and Tunisia. There was hence both greater integration and greater fragility in 
relations between Algeria and the Common Market. There were thus theoretically three solutions 
to take these multilateral relations into account. The first was the break-up, which we did 
everything we could to rule out. The other two were the association with the Six or a protocol 
guaranteeing the existing customs regime between Algeria and France, a system that would at 
least have been retained if Algeria had been independent at the time of the signing of the Treaty 
of Rome.” 
Annexes au rapport intérimaire de la Commission au Conseil au sujet des conversations 
exploratoires engagées avec l’Algérie, 24 juin 1964, Bruxelles. AN 19880053/196. Pierrefitte-sur-
Seine, Paris. 
24 In a communication on the situation in the Maghreb before the CAP, the French Foreign 
Economic Relations Directorate said to this respect: “France has therefore decided very clearly to 
apply levies to Moroccan or Tunisian products already under regulation. (...) But it is very 
important to remember under what conditions these precedents were established. On July 30, 
1962, when the regulations came into force, English negotiations were in progress. The main 
issue on the agenda at the time was imports from the Commonwealth. On this particular point the 
negotiations lasted until August 4, 1962. To avoid setting a precedent for the Commonwealth, the 
French government chose to apply agricultural levies to Morocco and Tunisia.” 
Note du Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances sur le Maghreb et la Politique agricole 
commune, N°880, 15 Novembre 1966, Paris. AN 19880053/189. Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Paris. 
25 Note du Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances sur le Maghreb et la Politique agricole 
commune, N°880, 15 Novembre 1966, Paris. AN 19880053/189. Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Paris. 
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Nevertheless, in return, it would be compelled to worsen the terms of 
trade with Morocco and Tunisia by applying them customs duties. 
3.4.1 The formula of Association as a postcolonial compromise 
(1962-1969) 
French unilateralism in the maintenance and modification of 
preferences and, more in general, asymmetry of bilateral economic 
relations, led Morocco and Tunisia to request the opening of talks for a 
negotiated formula of Association26. However, the differences between 
their legal statuses27 and the nature of their goals brought them to begin 
separately talks with the Six. Notwithstanding, in the eyes of the 
Community, both their basic concerns and their central demands were 
similar. The advances in European integration exacerbated the need for a 
bilateral or multilateral agreement replacing unilateral French 
concessions:  
 the imminent implementation of the CAP,  
 the entry into force of the CET and  
 the proliferation of AAs with Mediterranean partners, leaving 
without effect the relative advantages acquired by the Maghreb 
in the Treaty of Rome28. 
26  Note on the possible consequences of the Morocco-EEC Association by the Permanent 
Representation of the Interministerial Committee for Community Affairs: “A Protocol annexed to 
the Treaty of Rome specifies that its application does not require any modification to the special 
customs regime granted to Moroccan products on entry into France. However, as this protocol is 
an option and not an obligation for the French authorities and does not give Morocco any rights, 
Morocco might fear that one day we might abandon it and therefore prefer a bilateral convention, 
to which it would be a signatory, which would guarantee it exemption on entry into France and 
the other EEC countries. Morocco would no longer be at the discretion of French goodwill.” 
Note à l’attention du Secrétaire Général du Comité Économique Interministériel afférente à 
l’éventuelle Association du Maroc à la CEE de l’Inspecteur Général Chargé des Affaires 
Extérieures, 22 juin 1964. AN 19880053/201. Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Paris. 
27 Dossier de la Commission Européenne au Conseil sur les relations entre la CEE et les pays du 
Maghreb (Algérie, Maroc, Tunisie), Secret, 14 octobre 1964, Bruxelles. AN 19880053/189. 
Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Paris. 
28 France's decision to apply less favourable conditions to Morocco and Tunisia since 1962, as 
well as the protectionist regulation of the agricultural sector on the Community market and the 
conditions of agricultural production in Morocco, led to exports like cereals falling from 89% of 
the value of Moroccan exports to the EEC to only 3% between 1957 and 1964. Citrus fruits, wine 
and primary products, the main exports of the Maghreb countries, will also suffer important 
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After the endorsement of AAs with Greece (1961) and Turkey 
(1963), the opening of talks with Spain and Israel would transform the 
framework of Euro-Mediterranean relations in the years to come. In that 
period, both Morocco and Tunisia, and Algeria shortly after, would base 
their requests on agricultural preferences, technical and financial support, 
and on the improvement of conditions for the Maghreb workforce in the 
territory of the Community. 
Against that backdrop, internal and external circumstances 
stimulated Franco-Moroccan understanding.  After a period of relentless 
degradation of its traditional agricultural exports, Morocco was hit in 
1964 by economic recession, inflation and low currency reserves 
(Munier, 1965; Belal, Agourram, 1969). It called for the cooperation of 
“fellow industrialised countries and international financial organisations” 
(Munier, 1965, p.302) to help it with a five-year austerity plan (Munier, 
1965). Such programme was focused on economic opening and 
international integration by exploiting its comparative advantage. Those 
circumstances would push Morocco to ask its ex-metropolis for advocacy 
on its interests in Brussels29. In this regard, the Rabat’s “deliberate option 
in favour of Europe”30 was interpreted as an unequivocal political gesture 
that contrasted with the growing difficulties in relations with Tunis. 
Therefore, privileging Morocco in the negotiations for an eventual 
consequences following the association of Mediterranean countries with the Community and due 
to the growing integration of the European market.  
Télégramme à l’arrivée en provenance de la Délégation Française auprès de la CEE au MAE de 
Paris, N°405/08, Boegner, 6 avril 1965, Bruxelles. AN 19880053/201. Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Paris. 
29 Note on the Association of Morocco with the EEC from C. Beaurepaire, Inspector General for 
External Affairs of France, to Mr Dromer, Secretary General of the Interministerial Economic 
Committee for European Economic Cooperation: “After much hesitation and despite a certain 
internal political opposition, the Sharifian Royal Government began exploratory talks in Brussels 
a few months ago with a view to examining the conditions under which an economic association 
agreement could be established between Morocco and the EEC. (...) The Government of Rabat 
has now taken a definitive option and, in addition, has requested that the French representatives 
become, when the time comes, the defenders of the Sharifian position within the Group of the Six. 
Assuming that the French Government is politically favourable to the conclusion of such an 
agreement, it is interesting to examine the following points: What would be the quota and tariff 
modalities of this association? What consequences could this agreement have on trade in 
industrial products between France and its former protectorate?” 
Note à l’attention du Secrétaire Général du Comité Économique Interministériel afférente à 
l’éventuelle Association du Maroc à la CEE de l’Inspecteur Général Chargé des Affaires 
Extérieures, 22 juin 1964. AN 19880053/201. Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Paris. 
30 Note du Secrétaire Général du Comité Interministériel pour les Questions de Coopération 
Économique Européenne pour le Premier Ministre sur le Maroc et la CEE, 1 septembre 1964, 
Paris. AN 19880053/201.Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Paris. 
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association was seen not only as an opportunity to reward the liberal turn 
of the country, but also as an appealing opportunity for other European 
partners to enjoy French preferences regarding its primary reserves (zinc, 
lead, phosphates)31. Furthermore, having a certain margin of choice in the 
process of Moroccan industrialisation would help to prevent those inputs 
from competing with European industries: 
 
“Finally, an association agreement between Morocco 
and the EEC could have other indirect effects on the 
economies of European powers; indeed, it is certain that 
Rabat will obtain financial aid which will be partly 
allocated to industrial investments. It will then be essential 
that the donations or credits are not intended for the 
construction of industrial complexes, unprofitable given 
the exiguity of the Moroccan market, but whose existence 
would hinder the performance of similar European 
installations; it is here that the main reference is made to a 
zinc foundry. The difficulties of the foundries in the EEC 
countries, especially France, would be greatly increased if 
Morocco kept all its lead and zinc ores to transform them 
on site into metal; moreover, a Moroccan foundry could 
not operate under normal conditions of profitability32.”  
 
In 1965, the formula proposed by the Commission and backed by 
France was a “Zone de Libre Échange Aménagée”33. Such a solution 
31  Note du Conseil sur les relations avec le Maroc et la Tunisie, N°566/65, 17 juin 1965, 
Bruxelles. AN 19880053/190. Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Paris. 
32 Note à l’attention du Secrétaire Général du Comité Économique Interministériel afférente à 
l’éventuelle Association du Maroc à la CEE de l’Inspecteur Général Chargé des Affaires 
Extérieures, 22 juin 1964. AN 19880053/201. Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Paris. 
33 Note on the association of Morocco and Tunisia in 1969: “Practically, and in particular because 
of the reduction in requests submitted by Morocco and Tunisia, in order to facilitate the 
conclusion of an agreement, the members of the EEC gave their assent to the establishment, with 
the Maghreb countries, of so-called " arranged" free trade zones, containing trade and tariff 
provisions, but excluding financial aid and labour regulations. Thus, it was a question of defining 
the contours of a specific trade and association regime different from that applied with the 
EAMAs and that concluded with Greece and Turkey. It should be recalled that on the Sharifian 
side, opposition was expressed against an agreement incompatible with the theses of neutrality 
and political non-engagement.”  
Note sur l’association du Maroc et de la Tunisie à la Communauté Économique Européenne, 21 
avril 1969. AN 19880053/194. Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Paris. 
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would allow the transfer of French privileges to European partners, while 
regulating the different legal situations of Maghreb countries without 
undermining their intention to get integrated among them. However, the 
position of the Maghreb countries was ambiguous in this regard. In 
addition, successive diplomatic crises, regulatory problems and the harsh 
opposition of Italy to the concession of extra-community preferences in 
sectors of its interest, delayed the conclusion of the agreements until 
1969. 
The consolidation of preferential Euro-Maghreb relations hindered 
European ambitions in terms of integration (CAP and CET) in favour of 
French interests. In addition, the EEC found itself in a complicated 
position before the GATT, according to which the legality of building a 
satellite network via preferential agreements was unclear34. While key 
dates for the accomplishment of the Common Market approach, the 
urgency of a short-term solution pushed both parties to conclude a partial 
agreement limited to rules of commercial nature. Financial cooperation 
had to be postponed to further negotiations of a wider agreement whose 
conclusion was foreseen for 1974. Meanwhile, European partners could 
demand substantial counterparts adaptable to the legal framework in 
force in the Community. Among the main Communitarian demands, 
some were openly asymmetrical, as it was the case in the request for 
compensation guarantees to private investors affected by nationalisation 
measures. In the field of agricultural products, a compromise was 
reached through quotas and import calendars. In this way, a partial 
agreement was resolved on April 1, 1969 with almost total liberalisation 
of exchanges in the secondary sector and a complex scheme of 
preferences for the most sensitive agricultural products. 
3.4.2 Second generation AAs in a wider Mediterranean 
perspective (1970-1978) 
Since 1969, Communitarian efforts focused on political integration: 
how and to what extent was the Community to become a single body in 
the field of foreign policy? (Smith, 2004; Bindi, 2010). A number of 
factors would complicated the answer:  
34 Communication de la Commission Européenne au Conseil sur les relations de la CEE avec les 




i. The enlargement of the Community to nine members (among 
which, the UK);  
ii. the extension of the Yaoundé convention (1963-75), once focused 
on Francophone Africa, to former British colonies in the 
Commonwealth and to some territories in the Pacific and the 
Caribbean (Bindi, 2010);  
iii. the urgent need to curb the flows of extra-community workers in 
the midst of the decline of the Trente Glorieuses (Castles, 1986; 
2006) and  
iv. the increasingly unsustainable situation of Algeria within the 
Common Market.  
 
In France, the resignation of Charles de Gaulle in April 1969 led to 
the presidency of George Pompidou, who presented an ambitious plan 
that synthesised his ideas on the future of Europe through three 
keywords: completion, deepening, and enlargement (Bindi, 2010, p. 18). 
Thus, in the attempt to overcome the limits of economic cooperation, the 
European Political Cooperation was launched with the aim of articulating 
common positions on foreign policy (Murphy, 1989, 2003) on priority 
issues regarding regional areas of particular interest: Middle East, South 
Africa, Central America and Afghanistan (ECSC, 1988). 
In the same period, the miscellany of agreements, reforms, conflicts 
and statements that shook the Mediterranean borders of the Community 
reached an impasse. Awareness on the problems that the peculiar 
Mediterranean framework caused on transatlantic relations led the 
Council to request an inclusive proposal to the Commission (Calandri, 
2012, p.42). Besides, the so-called ‘Rossi report’ before the European 
Parliament (EP), on December 8, 1973, criticised the links “tied in 
disorder” under the auspices of a “run-of-the-river policy” (Berdat, 2007, 
p.94). That statement pushed the EP towards the search for a joint policy 
“rather than a cosmetic arrangement of treaties already concluded” 
(2007, p.94). 
During the discussions on the above-mentioned proposal at the 
European Council (June 6, 1972), French Foreign Minister Maurice 
Schumann spoke for the first time about applying a “global approach” 
(Berdat, 2007, p.98) to the Mediterranean. In fact, the evolution of the 
principles and goals of the AAs would show once again the convergence 
between French interests and Community solutions in this area.  
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The US would counterattack before the GATT by demanding the 
opening of the citrus market and the removal of barriers to foreign 
industrial products (Calandri, 2012, p.46). Notwithstanding these 
difficulties, both economic data and archive documents show that the 
endorsement of the commercial agreement barely changed the direction 
or intensity of trade in any case35. In fact, although the agreements of 
1969 managed to survive despite their legal ambiguity, Morocco would 
see its advantages erode progressively immediately after its endorsement. 
Several factors influenced the decay:  
a. The Community enlargement to Nine members 
b. The scant compliance of such agreements with GATT 
provisions36  
c. The proliferation of AAs in the Mediterranean 
d. The application of the system of generalised preferences37 
e. The deficiencies in the conventional price system38 
35 In a report by the EEC's Commercial Advisers in Morocco in 1971, France was confirmed to be 
strengthening its position as the main supplier (31%) and customer (36.6%) of the products that 
Morocco exchanges with the Community market. Other partners (USA, Germany or Italy) 
remained as before the agreement.  
Rapport des conseillers commerciaux des pays de la CEE au Maroc, 16éme, 23 juin 1971, 
Bruxelles. AN 19880053/199. Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Paris. 
36 In 1970, Morocco and Tunisia complained that they had not been informed of the removal of 
their dossiers from the GATT agenda and requested that they be decoupled from the rest of the 
Mediterranean agreements, the two countries lodged complaints “on account of the different legal 
nature of the provisions of the Treaty of Rome under which the agreements had been concluded.” 
Télégramme en provenance du Secrétaire Général du SGCI sur l’Association CEE-Maroc et 
Tunisie, N°1296, F.Irion, 8 juillet 1970, Bruxelles. AN 19880053/194. Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, 
Paris. 
Other GATT measures, such as the condemnation of certain provisions of the agreements 
concluded with Spain and Israel on citrus fruits, caused them to flood the European market - in a 
season marked by overproduction - in fear of seeing this preference eliminated in the short term. 
This brought Morocco to sell below the conventional price and to suffer, therefore, the 
withdrawal of a preference subject to compliance with that price.  
Sommaire des conclusions de la 3ème réunion du Comité d’association CEE-Maroc, N°6/70, 23 
mars 1970, Bruxelles, AN 19880053/205. Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Paris. 
37 “Like the Tunisians, the Moroccans expressed their concern that the entry into force of this 
system, as well as, for the rest, the consequences of the "enlargement of the Community", would 
result, through the sharing of preferences with the other developing countries, in draining the 
substance of the agreement.” Télégramme à l’arrivée en provenance de la Délégation Française 
auprès de la CEE au MAE de Paris sur le Conseil d’Association CEE-Maroc, N°1099-1108, 
Boegner, 12 juin 1970, Bruxelles. AN 19880053/205. Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Paris. 
38 The greater export capacity of the Spanish and Israeli economies often drove them to disregard 
conventional prices. Therefore, less than a year after the entry into force of the Association 
Agreement, Morocco complained of a 7% reduction in its exports to the Community, while Spain 
and Israel increased their exports by 40% and 28% respectively (Ibid.). 
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f. The export coverage rate for exports began to fall steadily39 as 
diversification efforts on both products and buyers found to be 
unfruitful and the weight of European imports on Moroccan trade 
continued to grow40. 
 
A second-generation AA was established in 1976 against that 
backdrop. On the basis of the premises of the Global Mediterranean 
Policy (GMP), which planned to extend the agreement to the financial 
and technical fields (as agreed upon during the negotiations of the 
previous agreement after Moroccan insistence). European partners 
negotiated three parallel and similar agreements for the three Maghreb 
countries (EC, 1982). Only the technical and financial assistance policy, 
demanded by Maghreb countries and required by the US (Calandri, 2012, 
page 42) would entail a significant difference with the former version. 
3.4.2.1 The ‘unspoken exit’ of Algeria 
First and foremost, the GMP was meant to give consistency to the 
four types of agreements that coexisted in the Mediterranean without a 
coherent articulation. Such a mixture was to become even less 
performant after the Communitarian enlargement to Nine (Oualalou, 
1982). In particular, the increasing bias towards the northeast of the 
Community made it essential to enhance the political and economic 
weight of the EEC in the Mediterranean in order to rebalance power 
relations. Thus, for the first time, the Mediterranean appeared as a region 
for the Community. This shift implied the need to define its geographical, 
political, legal and economic limits. To this extent, the EEC foresaw that 
the insertion of the British colonial legacy into the European orbit would 
help meeting that goal: 
 
“While it is true that the enlargement of the 
Community has the effect of shifting its centre of gravity 
northwards, the historical links which bind Great Britain to 
the Mediterranean region multiply the reasons for 
developing a Mediterranean policy on a basis of parity and 
will strengthen the trend in that direction” (EP, 1973, p.38).  
39 From 86.3% in 1969 to 71.1% in 1971, according to official documents managed by the EEC (Ibid.). 
40 "While the EEC's share of imports is decreasing, it is strengthening its export position" (Ibid.). 
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The coexistence of non-preferential treaties (Yugoslavia) with 
preferential ones (Spain, Israel), AAs with non-European countries 
(Morocco, Tunisia) and AAs with European countries susceptible of 
accession (Greece and Turkey) had to be translated into one formula 
capable to embrace the peculiarities of each case. Furthermore, for the 
Algerian situation to be resolved, the upcoming arrangement had to add 
further provisions on employment, financial and technical assistance that 
compensated for its ‘unspoken’ exit from the Common Market. Besides, 
such treatment had to be extended to Morocco and Tunisia based on 
principles of affinity and non-discrimination between Maghreb countries. 
Thus, the idea was that the agreements entered into force “at the same 
date and if possible before the expiry of the agreements concluded with 
Morocco and Tunisia” (EP, 1973, p.24). Also, the finding that “trade 
between Maghreb countries and the Community has scarcely been 
influenced by the conclusion of AAs” and that trade between the EEC 
and the Maghreb would have developed less than the total foreign trade 
of the Community (EP, 1973) were interpreted as evidence of the need to 
deepen the content of the agreements. These, moreover, were presented 
as the only escape for Maghreb countries to overcome 
underdevelopment: 
 
“In view of the intensity of the relations between 
the Community and the Maghreb countries, the only 
possibility for these countries to escape from their state 
of relative underdevelopment lies in an improvement 
and more effective regulation of their relations with the 
Community. It is therefore important to start studying 
as soon as possible the ways and means of a general 
approach to relations with the Maghreb countries. In 
order to promote regional cooperation among the 
African countries, and the economic development of the 
countries of North Africa, it will be necessary to open, 
so far as possible, global and simultaneous negotiations 
with the three countries” (EP, 1973, p. 55).  
 
However, it was noted that, given the “affinities” between the 
Northern and Southern shores of the Mediterranean, it was “particularly 
desirable to ensure, in the sphere of common regional policy, that 
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development cooperation is not to be put into practice at the expense of 
certain groups of the population” (EP, 1973, p. 55). 
On the basis of those premises, negotiations between the 
Commission and the three countries began in July and October 1973, 
continued in autumn 1974 and April 1975, and were eventually 
completed in January 1976. The agreements entered into force on 
November 1, 1978, with unlimited duration but subject to periodical 
reviews. However, in view of the requests by Spain and Portugal to join 
the EEC, it was chosen to wait for the conclusion of such negotiations to 
re-examine the agreements within the new context.  
In general, the texts of the agreements established a liberal exchange 
scheme in relation to industrial products (already recognized in the 
previous agreements), although with quantitative restrictions in the case 
of textiles that were to be temporary, as well as in cork and petroleum 
products (abolished in 1979). However, most of the industrial products 
imported into the EEC from the Maghreb remained linked to the primary 
sector. Furthermore, in the case of the textile industry, of great 
importance both in Morocco and Tunisia, they were asked to 
“voluntarily” restrict some of their exports to the EEC due to the 
Community crisis in the sector since 1978. An exception to this was 
textile exchanges belonging to intra-industrial trade and, therefore, to 
European companies with delocalised activities in those countries, for 
which such restrictions did not apply (EC, 1982, p. 19). 
Notwithstanding, according to Najib Akesbi (2015), despite the 
extension of the range of products under preferential regime, access to 
those being “important for Morocco and sensitive for Europe (like 
tomatoes, potatoes, oranges, tangerines, etc.) was kept under restrictive 
conditions: entry prices, quotas, calendars” (Akesbi, 2015, p.44). This, 
according to him, shows a transformation in the modes of protection 
rather than a true step towards liberalisation. 
3.4.3 The Mediterranean enlargement and the Maghreb ‘sub-region’ 
If there is an outstanding moment of the Moroccan bid for 
regionalism, it happened in the 1980s. As previously mentioned, open 
regionalism spread in that decade, and few countries in the world 
remained careless about it. For its part, in the span of a decade, Morocco 
left the OAU, asked for European membership, joined the GATT and 
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participated in the establishment of the AMU. The latter is particularly 
interesting because the state of intra-Maghreb relations in the early 1980s 
hardly allowed to predict that such would be the decade of regional 
integration in the area. Finally, the creation of the AMU arose parallel to 
the process of European mediterraneisation, which provided the 
Common Market with most of the agricultural products that Maghreb 
countries used to export hitherto.  
In the 1980s, the confluence of the CAP with the Mediterranean 
enlargement of the EEC had a great impact on Euro-Maghreb relations: 
the extension to twelve members after the accession of Greece, Portugal 
and Spain turned the EEC self-sufficient or even created surpluses in a 
good number of products until then acquired in Morocco, Algeria and 
Tunisia (Guth and Aeikens, 1980). In this respect, while the EEC’s 
Mediterranean policy continued to preach the trade liberalisation as a key 
to development and shared prosperity in the southern basin, the entry of 
three Mediterranean economies into the protectionist framework of the 
European agricultural policy hindered the possibilities of North African 
partners to exploit their comparative advantage in the sector (Akesbi, 
2016). Besides, this situation and its political consequences were not 
restricted to primary products, since also the preferences granted to 
industrial sectors would decay as a result of the adhesion. Indeed, not 
only preferential access to the Community market for industrial products 
had a limited impact given the low level of industrialisation of some of 
the beneficiary countries (Guth and Aeikens, 1980), but it also led the 
Community to abandon certain projects and proposals that it had 
previously promoted around the Mediterranean. In an analysis previous 
to the enlargement, Guth and Aeikens (1980, p. 9) noted: 
 
“There are certain Mediterranean countries in particular 
whose industrial trade interests will be affected as industrial 
products (chemicals, machinery and transport equipment, 
manufactured goods). (…) Where the steel industry is 
concerned Spain’s accession will further increase 
overcapacity in the EEC and endanger Algeria’s and Egypt’s 
plans to step up steel production for export (…). More 
problems may also be caused by the fact that there are plans 
in some Mediterranean countries (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, 
Morocco, Tunisia), as well as in the applicant countries, to 
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set up a fertilizer industry or expand the existing one. The 
most serious effects will be felt in the textiles, clothing and 
footwear industries. The structural problems in these sectors 
in the Nine will be aggravated considerably by enlargement. 
Since these industries are very important for the overall 
economy of the applicant countries as well, efforts will be 
stepped up to make market access more difficult for non-
member countries.” 
 
Morocco faced the transition in a context of deep economic and 
financial restructuring as a result of a sharp increase of the external debt 
in the first years of the decade (Benlahcen, 1991, p. 116), which added up 
to its dependence on the European market. To this extent, the application 
of the SAPs under the IMF and WB not only required a vast restructuring 
of the domestic economy and a drastic reduction of the expansive 
policies implemented until then. It also required substantial liberalisation 
of exchanges with the aim to improve prices according to the orthodox 
logic of international trade (Benlahcen, 1991, p. 130). According to this, 
growth would be achieved through a process of export expansion 
accompanied by parallel efforts to reduce imports. Taking into account 
that the integration of the three central Maghreb economies in the 
European market remained at similar levels to those of the colonial 
period (Sid Ahmed, 1993), the margin of manoeuvre to reduce or 
renegotiate such conditions appeared rather limited. 
Against this background, the transformations in European 
Mediterranean policies following the expansion could be summarised in 
two major milestones:  
 the first had to do with the modification of the Cooperation 
Agreements of 1976 and with the special role of Fishery 
agreements in it;  
 the second, with the need for the EEC to articulate a new 
approach to Mediterranean policies.  
 
Therefore, around 1988, the agreements linking Morocco and the 
European Community had undergone remarkable changes that, in 
general, translated into fewer margins of market and more financial 
cooperation. Within this framework, the EEC provided economic and 
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technical assistance to Mediterranean countries to support the reforms 
adopted in the framework of the SAPs. Financial and technical 
cooperation were also applied to the Fishery agreements whereby Spain 
extended to the Community the preferences it had inherited from colonial 
times (Holgado and Ostos, 2002). 
In any case, both the reconfiguration of the Mediterranean market 
and the economic circumstances in which it took place made it necessary 
to accomplish an exhaustive review of the GMP (Sánchez, 2003). In a 
context marked by the adjustment and liberalisation policies in the three 
Maghreb economies, together with the growing weight of the intra-
Community market and the significant geopolitical changes on the 
Eastern flank of Europe, the existing framework seemed limited. From 
the end of the decade, a new package of policies would be explored to 
support economic reforms, promote private investment and enhance 
access to the Community market (Sánchez, 2003). 
In the 1990s, Euro-Maghreb relations would definitively dilute 
within the wider scope of the Mediterranean framework. This trend was 
reinforced by the closure sine die of the Moroccan-Algerian border in 
1994. Conforming to this tendency, Morocco deployed an extensive 
program of domestic and external measures that would boost its role as a 
valuable interlocutor in North-South relations (Dkhissi, 2015; Akesbi, 
2017). On the one hand, a vast programme of privatisations accompanied 
the abrogation of the ‘Moroccanisation’ Act41 (1993), the implementation 
of a new Investment Code (1995) complying with international standards 
and a number of monetary and financial reforms (El Aoufi et al., 2005; 
Achy, 2013; Berrada, 2016; El Mataoui, 2017; Oubenal and Zeroual, 
2017). On the other hand, trade liberalisation with the EU continued 
through the signature of an AA in 1996 whose main red lines regarded 
41 The institutional Moroccanisation of 1973 had been approved with the aim to enable Moroccan 
citizens to recover part of the national assets owned by foreigners since the colonial period. The 
final goal was to spur development through investment and a more equitable redistribution of 
income. However, its results remained limited. Contrary to expectations, foreign capital kept 
important interests in the secondary and tertiary sectors, while high-level positions of 
Administration and large indigenous capital seised most of the gains on the national side 
(Berrada, 1998). More precisely, the effects of Moroccanisation on foreign capital were only 
significant for small individual capitalists established in Morocco. French groups could sell part 
of the shares of their subsidiaries to nationals. Henceforth, not only their financial risks decreased, 
but they could also benefit from significant liquid resources and secure their presence in Morocco 
(El Aoufi, 1990). As a result, a renewed alliance between foreign and indigenous capital favoured 
the former status quo between Morocco and Europe.  
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the limits imposed by the CAP (Akesbi, 2015). After the entering into 
force of the AA in 2000, Moroccan international exchanges 
experimented a progressive increase until the crisis of 2008. After 
overcoming the shock, growth resumed with certain vigour. 
3.4.4 The Euro-Mediterranean Association and the quest for 
‘shared prosperity’ 
The new framework of Euro-Mediterranean relations must be 
understood against a backdrop of deep transformations. The need to 
modify the cooperation agreements with riparian countries from the 
South after the enlargement towards the Mediterranean became more 
urgent with the endorsement of the Maastricht Treaty (Hamdouni, 1992). 
Furthermore, the fall of the Berlin Wall compelled the Community to 
reshape its relations with its Eastern neighbours. The confluence of such 
events would profoundly transform the morphology of European borders 
and would increase the importance of regional foreign policy.  
The Lisbon Declaration of the European Council in 1992 sought to 
convince the European Community not to disregard the Maghreb, whose 
stability, prosperity and integration appeared as priorities for European 
partners (Echeverría, 1995, p.53). However, in spite of the gestures 
deployed in support of Maghreb Union, the structure of exchanges would 
make it clear once again that the EU would not abandon its traditional 
bilateral and asymmetric region-country approach. In addition, 
Mauritania and Libya were never taken into consideration as part of the 
same block (1995, p.55). In any case, the EU would launch from 1992 a 
“Mediterranean-renewed policy” based on the Euro-Mediterranean 
approach proposed in Lisbon (Hibou and Martínez, 1998; Frikha, 2002) 
and endorsed by the European Council in the meetings of Essen (1994) 
and Cannes (1995) (Frikha, 2002). 
As previously mentioned, bilateral relations would be governed by a 
new generation of AAs. Nonetheless, their economic provisions were 
limited to following the lines already promoted by the Bretton Woods 
institutions within the frame of SAPs (Hibou, Martinez, 1998). In its 
multilateral dimension, in November 1995, the Euro-Mediterranean 
Conference of Barcelona released a Declaration establishing the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, “by providing a multilateral framework that 
complements the bilateral relations based on the AAs” (Pace, 2006; 
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Remiro and Martínez, 2012). Formally inspired by the Conference for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Barcelona Declaration 
endorsed commitments in three areas: 
 A political and security component aiming to create a common 
space of peace and stability that respects human rights and 
democratic principles  
 An economic and financial component, with the gradual 
establishment of a free trade zone by 2010  
 A social, cultural and human component aimed at developing 
human resources and foster understanding between cultures and 
exchanges between civil societies 
The other major novelty was the progressive transition and 
adaptation of partner countries to the European regulatory framework, 
summarised by the concept of acquis communautaire. According to this, 
Mediterranean countries were to get closer to the norms of the 
Community Law under the justification of the search for a progressive 
compliance with international standards. Frikha (2002) interprets the 
progressive adoption of Communitarian rules in the Euro-Mediterranean 
area as a sort of “pre-adherence to globalisation”, whereby the 
procedures launched by the EU in the Mediterranean basin would lead to 
a Free Trade Zone inspired by the model of the Common Market and in 
accordance with the system regulated by the WTO.  
On a different note, the prevalence of North-South relations in the 
Maghreb was reinforced by the launch of the US initiative Eisenstadt in 
the late 1990s to promote the integration of Maghreb via foreign 
investment and the expansion of the domestic market (Migdalovitz, 
2011). Without going further in the details of its subsequent failure, it is 
interesting to see how the Maghreb became an international political 
subject without any actor behind to play such role. The concept of 
Maghreb was institutionalised as a geopolitical space opposed to the 
Middle East and distinct from the rest of Africa. Nonetheless, it seems 
from the gap between economic figures and political significance that its 
main characteristic lays in not existing as such or having failed in the 
attempt (Lamrani, 2013). 
Be it as it may, more than twenty years after the outset of the 
Barcelona Process, the limited extent of its achievements (De Ville and 
Reynaert, 2010) has not blurred the image of this framework as a major 
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turning point in Mediterranean affairs. Although the Euromed 
Association was not an unprecedented initiative and would not attain any 
of its main goals, its establishment remains as the cornerstone of North-
South dialogue and integration in the Mediterranean. In this regard, the 
most powerful asset of this framework seems to be its capability to 
prevail over time and reality as a promise of “stability and shared 
prosperity”, as stated by the Barcelona declaration.  
The binding nature of regional imbalances explains well the 
comprehensive breadth of the European approach since the Barcelona 
Declaration (1995). As already addressed, security and economic 
concerns in the south spurred northern actors to protect their economic 
interests and to expel any risk of expansion (Bicchi, 2007; Cebeci and 
Schumacher, 2017). Despite the widening scope of AAs, the idea of 
regionalism was progressively diverted from quantitative to qualitative 
issues. Accordingly, the degree of adaptation to the acquis 
communautaire became the benchmark of Mediterranean integration. 
According to its logic, compliance with European norms would also 
facilitate South-South integration in the area regarded by the acquis. This 
approach to the norms of Community law from different areas ranging 
from the customs nomenclature to the technical rules of intra-Community 
trade, under the rationale of seeking progressive conformity with 
international standards, reinforced the image of the EU as a normative 
model of regional integration (Whittman, 2011). Indeed, in addition to its 
objectionable contribution to South-South integration due to the various 
rhythms and statuses accorded to the five countries of the AMU, the 
other major criticism levelled at the Euro-Mediterranean region is its 
purely European nature (Hibou and Martínez, 1998, p. 2-3): 
 
“So the Partnership is most of the time presented as a 
purely European project, concerned above all with 
redefining the interests of the Old Continent in a changing 
region: redefining economic relations with one of its 
peripheries, creating a common foreign policy and 
attempting to preserve a backyard against a more dynamic 
American policy in the region. Moreover, Europe is 
inventing a new diplomacy, trying not to create a break with 
its tradition of openness towards the countries of the South 
or with regard to national traditions of cooperation. It is in 
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this context that some have seen the Partnership as a neo-
colonial project, while others perceive it as a rebalancing in 
European construction and foreign policy.” 
 
For the signatories of the Southern Mediterranean, some authors 
point out that the interest of the agreement lies in the maintenance and 
legal protection of the status quo. According to Hibou and Martínez 
(1998, p. 8): 
 
“As in the past, aid, debt and cooperation can be part 
of a process of empowering governments in relation to 
their social bases: thanks to these levers of action, the 
ruling elites can, to a certain extent, do without popular 
support and try to strengthen their means of action in the 
face of actors who might want to emancipate 
themselves.” 
 
3.4.5 From the Euro-Mediterranean Region to the Southern 
Neighbourhood of the EU 
Since the beginning of the 2000s, growing Communitarian unease 
about migrations (Benantar, 2013) and security (Neuvonen, 2015) would 
enhance Moroccan means for negotiation and consolidate its prior status 
in Euro-Mediterranean policies (Belguendouz, 2005; Jaidi and Martín, 
2010; Remiro and Martínez, 2012). Mohamed VI would exploit this 
trend since 1999 by enacting a foreign approach based on what Irene 
Fernández-Molina (2016) defines as a “(neoliberal) economistic and 
pragmatic thrust”, relying on the concept of ‘economic diplomacy’ and 
upholding its privileged relationship with the EU. Helped by its 
geographical position, the Moroccan international approach has 
increasingly lied on a strategic use of micro-, meso- and macro-economic 
agreements whose scope overcomes the straightforward logic of trade 
liberalisation and growth.   
At the same time, the enlargement to the EU-24 (2004), which 
pushed the Community borders towards the East, triggered further 
transformations in the Euro-Mediterranean area. Growing concerns about 
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excessive expansion stimulated an internal debate on the convenience of 
reformulating EU’s approach to new neighbours with no prospect of 
accession. The ENP was hence drafted for the new border countries of 
the East, but was then applied also to SMCs. French advocacy of the 
Mediterranean interests in opposition to Atlantic Europe culminated in its 
extension to all the surrounding countries. As the then President of the 
Commission Romano Prodi put it, the idea was to create around the new 
European orbit a “ring of friends”, whose status was placed somewhere 
beyond Association, but remaining away from membership (Gänzle, 
2007). In fact, the first proposal addressed the possibility of achieving a 
level of integration and liberalisation comprising the four freedoms, i.e. 
free movement of “people, goods, services and capitals” (Gstöhl, 2008). 
The ENP was appeared as a global cross-border approach whose 
core lied in a bilateral and differentiated application according to the 
specificities of the partner country (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005; 
Nidhi, 2009). Thus, the general umbrella of the ENP would serve to 
negotiate with each neighbouring country the degree to which it accepted 
to harmonise its political and economic relations with the acquis 
communautaire. As membership was not foreseen as a reward for the 
regulatory effort, this would come through financial cooperation and 
improved access to the Community market. In this manner, the 
neighbourhood policy became a global instrument directed to three 
different sets of countries united by the common feature of lacking a 
perspective of adhesion:  
 the true new neighbours that started to share borders with the EU 
after the enlargement;  
 the old neighbours from the Mediterranean basin, for whom 
membership is not an option a priori  as for they are not 
European States;  
 and the Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), without 
common borders with the Union.  
Nevertheless, since Mediterranean relations were already governed 
by a regional framework, some clarification was needed in that respect. 
To this end, in the communication outlined by the EC in 2003, it stressed 
the Communitarian duty to “promote regional and subregional 
cooperation and integration, as necessary conditions for political 
stability, economic development and the reduction of poverty and social 
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divisions in its common environment” (EC, 2003, p.3), mainly in 
reference to the SMCs. Indeed, the communication asserted that the “big 
difference” between the southern and eastern borders of the EU lied in 
the “existence, in the Mediterranean region, of an explicit regional 
dimension that calls for the development of initiatives and interregional 
cooperation in a wide variety of sectors” (EC, 2003, p. 9). Thus, 
regardless of the apparent contradictions between bilateral-differentiated 
principles and regional goals, the EC asserted: “intensification of 
regional and subregional cooperation and integration between the 
southern Mediterranean countries will be strongly encouraged within the 
framework of the new ENP” (p.10).  
Within this framework, Morocco would become the “privileged 
neighbour” in EU southern border. Together with Ukraine in the East, it 
remains the country that benefits from more funds in the 
neighbourhood42. Also, in response to its compliance with EU rules and 
will to deepen its relationship with the Community, Morocco would be 
rewarded with a Statut Avancé (EEAS, 2008) in 2007. This document, 
emanating from the “more for more” principle of the ENP, was not a 
binding agreement but a sort of declaration of intent addressing a 
roadmap to strengthen bilateral relations. Among the declared goals, the 
preparation of a Comprehensive and Deep Free Trade Agreement 
(CDFTA) was foreseen with both countries. The main ambitions of this 
arrangement concerned the facilitation of the establishment of enterprises 
in the area and further provisions in terms of investment, service 
liberalisation and improved mobility for certain groups of professionals. 
However, the complex economic and political circumstances that would 
rise up in the years to come, let alone the inherent complexities of the 
negotiations, would bring talks to a stalemate both in Morocco and 
Tunisia. 
To add up to the overlapping regional initiatives in the 
Mediterranean, in the 2007 French presidential campaign, Nicolas 
Sarkozy promoted the creation of a Mediterranean Union with more 
specific objectives in areas of common interest. According to him, the 
dubious achievements of the Euro-Mediterranean Association were to be 





Spain, Italy, Greece and Cyprus formed an entity that would work closely 
with the EU and develop common institutions (Remiro and Martínez, 
2012; Hoekman, 2016). The Mediterranean formula caused distrust in the 
Community and open rejection from several Member States, who 
criticised the “deficit of Europeanism” (Remiro and Martínez, 2012, p. 
162). On the other hand, Southern Mediterranean countries appeared to 
show little enthusiasm. Moreover, Turkey clearly opposed it in response 
to French reluctance to Turkish accession to the EU. In this state of 
affairs, the proposal was re-adapted to make it “digestible for all” 
(Remiro and Martínez, 2012, p. 161). In March 2008, the European 
Council approved in Paris “the principle of the UfM”, which included all 
the Member States and the Mediterranean countries not belonging to the 
EU. On the scope, goals and evolution of the UfM in its first years of 
existence, Albinyana (2017) affirms: 
 
“The UfM was born as a balloon that had lost its air, 
amidst a pompous Summit of Heads of State and 
Government in Paris, the only one so far that has gathered 
all 43 Euro-Mediterranean countries. Indeed, the headlines 
that (former French President) Sarkozy’s project managed to 
grab were transformed by the politics and diplomacy of 
negotiations into a downsized project of much lesser impact 
and tainted with a strong flavour of intergovernmentalism. 
The previous Barcelona Process had been underpinned by a 
set of principles regarding human rights, good governance 
and international law that had been subscribed by all the 
parties involved. In contrast, the UfM abandoned the pursuit 
of political and legal reforms in the region, which mirror the 
EU’s mission, and instead is focused on the political 
dialogue among “equal” partners and on the implementation 
of concrete projects. The latter appears to be in line with 
classical functionalist thinking: the belief that flexible and 
transnational institutions with clear practical functions can 
ameliorate international economic stagnation and security 
tensions.” 
 
The events of 2011 would definitely weaken the prospects of this 
multilayered regional framework and forced, once again, their review and 
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reform (EC, 2011). However, paradoxically, sub-regional initiatives in 
the Maghreb came back to the fore. Indeed, the EC affirmed in 2013 that 
the Arab Spring had stressed “political, economic and social challenges 
that can only be effectively faced at the regional level” (EC, 2013) and 
manifested its engagement in the region by recognising the importance of 
supporting the integration of Maghreb countries. For the EC, regional 
cooperation in this area would help to solve common challenges such as 
instability in the Sahel region and energy security, the need to create jobs 
and fight against climate change (EC, 2012). In addition, it affirmed that 
the Maghreb sub-region could play a pilot role in the Mediterranean area, 
while preserving coherence with broader initiatives such as the UfM or 
the Mediterranean Solar Plan (EC, 2012, p. 14). 
In the reviewed ENP (EC, 2015), Morocco seems to have lost its 
pole position among ‘good pupils’ in favour of Tunisia. Sherif and 
Kausch (2018, p. 22) affirm in this regard: “As the EU is engaged in 
soul-searching on how to approach its periphery and on its role in the 
world more broadly, Tunisia appears to offer a handy testing ground for 
decisive EU action in the neighbourhood.” The rising of Tunisia 
exemplary case of “democratic transition” compared to its Arab peers 
stimulated the EU to accompany the process through financial and 
political cooperation. As an illustration, Colombo and Meddeb (2018, p. 
38) underscore: 
 
“Tunisia was one of the main and most active 
beneficiaries of the EU’s new approach vis-à-vis civil 
society (European Endowment for Democracy [EED], 
2018). This approach was enshrined in the EU’s vision, 
goals and priorities for cooperation with Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs) in external relations unveiled in 
September 2012 (European Commission, 2012; Council of 
the European Union, 2012).” 
 
In the meantime, sluggish progresses in the negotiation of the EU-
Morocco DCFTA were further hampered by growing tensions regarding 
the legality of the current Agricultural (2012) and Fishery Agreements 
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(2014) on behalf of their relationship with the parts of the Sahara 
classified in the UN list of Non-Self-Governing Territories43.  
 
3.4.5.1 Neighbours of Neighbours: the diversification of 
Moroccan economic diplomacy 
In the same period, Morocco signed a number of North-South and 
South-South bilateral and regional agreements in an effort to diversify its 
partners and exchanges. Concerning bilateral integration, FTAs with the 
United Arab Emirates, Turkey and the US came into effect between 2003 
and 2006. According to Fernández-Molina (2016), the latter responds to 
a pattern of triangular games whereby Morocco tries to balance its 
foreign relations with Northern hegemons, namely the US and the EU. 
Following this argument, the causality of integration is not to be 
circumscribed exclusively to economic reasons. 
Regarding South-South arrangements, the initiative that raised more 
expectations was the Agadir Agreement. Sanctioned in 2004 by 
Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan, it was open to Arab Mediterranean 
countries bound to the EU through an Association or an FTA. The 
ultimate goal was the establishment of a Mediterranean Free Trade Area 
(MAFTA) that coalesced with the guidelines of the Great Arab Free 
Trade Area (GAFTA) signed in 1997. However, its provisions regarding 
the Pan-Euro-Mediterranean system of Rules of Origin (RoO), following 
43 On 21st December 2016, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) stated that the “Liberalisation 
Agreement must, however, be interpreted, in accordance with the relevant rules of international 
law applicable to relations between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco, as 
meaning that it does not apply to the territory of Western Sahara”. (ECJ, Case C‑104/16 P, art. 
132) 
Later, on the 27th February 2018, the ECJ ruled in case C-266/16 that “the EU-Morocco Fisheries 
Agreement is valid, for not applying to the waters of Western Sahara.” It implies that the 
agreement remains valid, but in the new protocol (the Agreement has to be renewed in July 2018), 
in order to comply with the ECJ verdict, the Commission has to explicitly exclude Western 
Sahara from the territorial scope of the agreement. The ECJ invalidated the agricultural agreement 
because it was applied to Western Sahara and hence did not comply with international law, in 
particular with the principle of the relative effect of treaties (Vienna Convention) and the 
principle of self-determination. One year later, the same Court asked for an explicit exclusion of 
the disputed territory from the fishery agreement, since the EU cannot recognise Moroccan 
sovereignty over Western Sahara adjacent waters. Since then, EU-Moroccan relations are at stake. 
Despite the ongoing negotiations, the economic diplomacy of both actors is struggling to find a 
compromise between the Moroccan political lines and EU law.  
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the European acquis communautaire, spanned doubts about their 
compatibility (Zorob, 2008). This case will be explored in detail in the 
following chapter.  
In the last years, the turbulence concerning Agricultural (2012) and 
Fishery agreements (2014) and the shift of Moroccan political discourse 
and economic diplomacy towards Africa give good account of the 
importance of trade as an instrument of foreign policy (Hoekman, 2016). 
On this matter, it is necessary to emphasise the growing role of Morocco 
as a player of economic diplomacy (Fernández-Molina, 2016): in its 
relations with EU, Morocco has more than capitalised on EU’s migratory 
concerns and ‘externalisation’ of borders (Zaragoza, 2016). On the other 
hand, regarding South-South initiatives, it has started an ambitious 
process of political reintegration in the African continent preceded by a 
series of strategic economic agreements. In particular, in the occurrence 
of the Moroccan return to the African Union (AU)44 on the 31st January 
2017, Mohamed VI underscored in his speech the extent of its 
achievements:  
 
“Since 2000, Morocco has signed nearly a thousand 
agreements with African countries, in various fields of 
cooperation. By way of comparison, do you know that 
between 1956 and 1999, 515 agreements were signed, 
whereas 949 agreements have been signed since 2000 - in 
other words, almost twice as many! During this period I, 
personally, was keen to give fresh impetus to this action, by 
making more visits to various African sub-regions. On each 
of the 46 visits I paid to 25 African countries, numerous 
agreements were signed involving the public as well as the 
private sector. My action has been particularly geared 
towards the field of training, which is at the heart of my 
country’s cooperation with sister nations. This has enabled a 
number of African students to continue their higher 
44 Former OUA until 2002. The Sirte Declaration of 9 September 1999 defines the institutional 
transition from the OUA to the AU, which was officially established on 9 July 2002 in Durban. 
All African states are members, except Morocco. On the one hand, Algeria denied the Moroccan 
return to the Organisation and pointed out that Morocco joined a new institution. On the other 
hand, Morocco noted that the Constitutive Treaty of the AU makes explicit reference to the OAU, 
which celebrated its 50th anniversary in Addis-Ababa in 2013, and whose accounting records still 
listed Moroccan unpaid quota. 
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education in Morocco, thanks to the thousands of 
scholarships given to them.” 
 
Certainly, the return of Morocco was preceded by an intense series 
of diplomatic visits and economic agreements that helped the Alawite 
kingdom attract the favours of a good number of countries and overcome 
the hostilities of others historically aligned with Algerian positions in the 
Sahara dispute. To this extent, special mention deserve the agreements 
made with Nigeria and the demand for accession to the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), as they would both 
entail a sort of isolation of Algeria through the tightening of physical and 
commercial ties between Morocco and West Africa. Having ratified the 
death of the AMU during the King's official speech during the African 
Summit, Morocco requested its admission to the ECOWAS less than one 
month later. A strong emphasis on its African roots, features and plans 
has since then seized growing aspects of Moroccan public and private 
affairs. 
Although the dynamism shown by Moroccan exports towards the 
region confirm the potential gains of this request45, Moroccan belonging 
to the Euro-Mediterranean area raised concerns about its accession 
among Members of the region. On the one hand, a preliminary report 
released at the Abuja Summit on the 16th December 2017 warned about 
potential collisions among the different regional frameworks in which 
Morocco takes part. On the other hand, a number of private actors in 
countries like Nigeria (the biggest market in the region) have expressed 
their opposition to Moroccan accession by arguing the threat posed by its 
relationship with the EU.  According to their view, through the 
intermediation of Morocco, EU countries might be able to 
advantageously introduce its products in the area. Regardless of the 
outcomes of such affaire, it appears that in the multifold analysis of the 
interactions between North-South and South-South frameworks 
undergone by Morocco, the presence of the EU is never a negligible one. 
However, to what extent do IEOs take these factors into account? 
45 Data on this subject will be elaborated in the following chapter. 
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3.5 THE ANALYSES OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 
ABOUT MOROCCAN INTEGRATION 
Beyond the theoretical axioms and empirical contributions that 
constitute the economic fundamentals of integration, regional 
cooperation schemes are, fundamentally, legal arrangements emanating 
from political decisions. It is for this reason that Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 
pay great attention to the role of IEOs in regulating their characteristics, 
their limits and, in general, the agenda governing economic regions. In 
this vein, this section analyses how economic theories and geopolitical 
aspects interact in the discourse of these institutions. In the case of 
Morocco, in order to analyse the contribution of IEOs to its path of 
integration described above, the written contributions that these 
institutions have released on “economic integration” of Morocco has 
been explored during six months of this research. Although our work 
focuses particularly on regional processes, the choice of a broader range 
of integration options (which can also be bilateral or multilateral) was 
justified by the need to go deeply into the aspects related to the agenda-
setting impact of such institutions. For the scope of this thesis, it is key to 
seize role they attach to regional integration according to the context and 
the aspects that they underline. Therefore, this enquiry was developed as 
follows: 
In the repositories of documents published by WTO, UNCTAD, WB 
and IMF on their web pages, a search was conducted that contained the 
key words “economic integration” and “Morocco”. With more than 3,000 
search results reviewed, those that specifically outlined selected aspects 
related to Moroccan integration were chosen, ruling out those where 
Morocco is simply quoted in lists of countries or as part of sets in which 
its role is not specified. Once this first screening was made, the 232 
resulting documents were ordered chronologically, from 1983 to 2017, 
identifying them according to the following criteria (See Annex 2): 
 Institution from which they emanate 
 Title of the document 
 Theme (keywords in Annex 2) 
 Integration framework (N-S, S-S, bilateral, multilateral) 
 Specific content about Morocco. 
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Of the 232 documents, 116 were published in the current decade, while 
89 of them belong to the years 2000, 15 to the 1990s, and only two 
documents from UNCTAD date from the 1980s. It is worth noticing that 
this asymmetry might be related, above all, to the choice of the source. 
Being repositories of digital or digitised documents, the case might be 
that the documents released before the date of their creation have not 
been uploaded on a systematic manner. Regarding authorship, 120 were 
released by the UNCTAD, 47 by WTO, 35 by the WB and 18 by the 
IMF. In this case, it would be the relevance of trade for each IEO 
(addressed more directly by the UNCTAD and the WTO) what explains 
the different weight of each institution in the material collected. The 12 
remaining documents were published jointly, by two or more of the 
institutions analysed. 
 
Figure 3.1 Distribution of the research material 
 
Source: own elaboration with IEOs’ reports. 
 
From this first classification, these documents were identified 
according to their major topics and regrouped in four big sets: 
i. Analysis: those that focus on the evaluation and 
characterisation of quantifiable and comparable aspects 
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related to regional and multilateral processes in which 
Morocco participates. This type includes, therefore, the 
documents that examine the figures of a particular 
phenomenon such as commerce, growth or FDI. 
ii. Monitoring: those that evaluate the implementation of 
domestic policies or integration programs promoted and/or 
financed by the institutions themselves. In these, more than 
characterising certain aspects of the Moroccan economy or its 
integration, their objective would be to evaluate the solutions 
applied by public and private institutions to specific issues 
related to integration. 
iii. Recommendation: those that propose measures or lines of 
action aimed at improving specific aspects of Moroccan 
integration, either from the point of view of regulation 
(changes in domestic economic policies, in the financial 
sector, etc.) or from a broader perspective by suggesting 
strategic options for medium or long-term development. 
iv. Promotion: those whose main objective is to present and 
promote actions, measures or strategies that such institution 
has designed or which it considers beneficial for the economic 
development of one or more countries. Unlike 
recommendations, directed to a particular case, these 
proposals have a more general scope. 
Nonetheless, in most cases a single function does not predominate. 
On the contrary, it happens usually that descriptive contributions go 
accompanied of prescriptive conclusions. In this regard, as will be further 
explained in detail, the dominant pattern throughout the reports is the 
presence the following links: 
 regulatory goals are often manifested through analysis and 
monitoring 
 legitimation goals are pursued through recommendation and 
promotion 
 
In addition, it was also observed that, although each IEO appears to 
resort more often to one or some of these patterns, an underlying shared 
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approach can be grasped in cross-sectional diagnoses and complementary 
recipes over the decades. 
Besides, in each of these classifications, documents that adopt an 
“holistic” contribution to the insertion of Morocco in its regional and 
global environment, were distinguished from those that propose a 
‘sectorial’ insight, concentrated on some specific aspects related to 
Moroccan international integration or to the national economy. Also, 
documents that focus exclusively on Morocco (alluding to the country in 
the same title of the communication), are distinguished from those that 
focus on some of the regional or geographic sets where it takes part, and 
from those that adopt a more general approach. These last ones turned 
out to be the most numerous, while only 38 documents were specifically 
concentrated on Morocco, 25 in the areas where it belongs (Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA), Mediterranean, Maghreb...) and other 33 
refer to the continental geographical area. This division allowed us to 
understand how the roles of international institutions discussed 
previously in this work are displayed in the specific case the Moroccan 
path of integration.  
In sum, the exploration of this material in the following sections 
aims to seize the interactions between the economic fundamentals of the 
institutional discourse, on the one hand, and the Moroccan options and 
choices in the field of economic integration, on the other hand. For this, 
we will start from the relationship between the two main axes that 
articulate most of the classification (descriptive and prescriptive) with 
two temporal axes (present and future), together with the functions linked 
to them (regulation and legitimation). 
3.5.1 Analysis and monitoring in the explanation of crosscutting 
features 
Although the Moroccan path of integration has expanded in different 
directions during the last thirty years, the approaches of IEOs focus on 
the analysis and monitoring of three non-exclusive schemes whose 
functioning is articulated through the tenets of open regionalism: 
 South-South cooperation, with special interest in the construction 
of a Pan-African area, 
 The integration of the Maghreb and Arab markets,
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 The inclusion of these in the Euro-Mediterranean framework.
Thus, in practice, all the communications endorse the principle of 
‘second best’ and regional integration is understood as a springboard 
towards global commerce. In this regard, South-South cooperation 
frameworks are proposed as an essential step in preparing developing 
countries towards North-South integration. However, each one of these 
schemes is treated with a different focus depending on the goals to be 
pursued and the prevailing context. 
In a first approach to the contents, methodologies and purposes of 
those analyses, we notice the different perspective from which the 
various integration schemes of Morocco are approached. In this respect, 
its insertion in the Euro-Mediterranean context is analysed differently 
from its participation in South-South cooperation schemes and, more 
specifically, in the Arab and Maghreb areas. In the first case, priority is 
given to studies that monitor the effects of the AAs signed following the 
Barcelona Process or the implementation of specific measures such as the 
system of RoO. In the second, despite the fact that such regional areas are 
also established on the basis of integration agreements, they prioritise the 
analysis of the ‘physical’ characteristics of such regions and forecast the 
room for reinforcement of intra-regional cooperation rather than 
monitoring the existing arrangements.  
Taken as a whole, the underlying premise behind these contributions 
is that overcoming the low level of South-South integration would 
contribute to making better use of the North-South Euro-Mediterranean 
regional framework. Special mention should be made of the study of the 
Agadir Agreement signed in 2004 between Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and 
Tunisia. Despite being a South-South agreement, it is part of the project 
to create a Euro-Mediterranean FTA along the lines of the acquis 
communautaire. Consistent with this logic, the studies on its effects also 
followed mostly the monitoring discourse that is usual for studies on the 
Euro-Mediterranean area.  
Regarding broader South-South integration schemes with a 
continental perspective, the nature of the analyses, mainly led by 
UNCTAD, has changed in recent decades following the evolution of 
international trade. Thus, in the 1990s, their contributions were mainly 
linked to monitoring intra-and inter-regional trade and investment flows. 
However, the last two decades have seen a rise in the promotion by the 
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UNCTAD of a FTA among the different regions of the continent to 
facilitate the insertion in GVCs and the achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). This appears to conform to the growing 
delocalisation of sectors like services or transports after their 
liberalisation under the GATS, as well as to the growing role of logistics 
in the agenda of international trade.  
Among the studies that aimed at evaluating the processes of regional 
integration where Morocco participates, there is also a mounting interest 
in certain features of South-South regionalism regardless of their poor 
performance along the years. In this regard, the integration of Maghreb 
did not acquire relevance in the agenda of IEOs until fifteen years after 
its founding agreement was ratified. Furthermore, in most cases, the 
assertion of the failure of integration came along with estimates of its 
costs and potentialities. Contrary to this pattern, the application of the 
Agadir Agreement underwent a continuous and detailed monitoring from 
the first years of its implementation.  
In the next page, Table 1 synthesises the evolving contribution of 
IOs in this respect. It classifies by decades the main topics and types of 
assessment chosen for the treatment of the subject, focusing not only on 
the centre of the analysis but also on the way it is presented. To this 
extent, the function of agenda setting underlined by authors such as 
Kahler (1995), Avant et al. (2010) or Amin (2014b) is apparent in the 
growing presence of a region whose main characteristic is not to be 
integrated. In the reports of these institutions, Maghreb became anew the 
subject of regular studies after fifteen years of existence, but only to 
become an example of a non-integrated region whose nonexistence is 
affirmed to be both full of potential and cost generator.  
Regarding the role of such approaches, it can be seen that the choice of 
monitoring roles (MN) (Grabel, 1999; Martins, 2008) and analysis roles 
(AN) is not neutral. The ex-ante analyses and the focus on the ‘objective’ 
characteristics of the analysed area predominate in approaches to South-
South integration, and especially in the case of Maghreb. On the 
contrary, in the works on the Euro-Mediterranean region, the monitoring 
of implemented policies is privileged, with much less emphasis on the 
characteristics of economic relations prior to the integration agreement. 
Both Euro-Mediterranean and Maghreb schemes follow longstanding 
relationships and are related to a ‘natural neighbourhood’ that then 
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derived in RIAs that, by the way, are not too distant in time. However, 
whereas Maghreb integration appears as a failed attempt and desirable 
project, the Euro-Mediterranean is presented as a scheme whose relative 





ethodologies and variables used by IEO
s 
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3.5.2 Advocacy and recommendation: complementary recipes 
As mentioned above, evaluation and monitoring are often 
accompanied by advocacy or recommendation of measures for solving 
the shortcomings revealed in the assessment. In this vein, only in 43 of 
the documents the analytical function clearly prevails over the 
prescriptive function, while advocacy appears more often than 
recommendation. The latter arises in 35 reports, a figure that corresponds 
precisely to the number of documents where Morocco is the centre of 
analysis rather than a part of a larger study. In any case, as for evaluation, 
both functions are consistent with each other and with the axioms of the 
economic theory on which they are based. 
 
Table 3.2. Core issues and main focus of IEOs in the analysis of Moroccan 
integration 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on reports from IMF, UNCTAD, WB, WTO 
  
IEO MAIN SCOPE 
MAIN FIELDS OF PROMOTION 
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2011c, 2011d, 2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 
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2009c, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d, 2012b, 
2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2013e, 2013f, 2014d, 

















to GVCs, regulatory 
dimensions 
(UNCTAD, 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2000a, 2000b, 
2000c, 2000d, 2003b, 2003c, 2003d, 2003e, 2004a, 
2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d, 2005e, 2005f, 2005g, 
2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d, 2006e, 2007a, 2007b, 
2007c, 2007d, 2007f, 2007g, 2007h, 2007i, 2007j, 
2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2008d, 2008e, 2008f, 2009a, 
2009b, 2009c, 2009d, 2009e, 2009f, 2009i, 2009j, 
2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010e, 2010f, 2010g, 2011a, 
2011b, 2011c, 2011d, 2011e, 2011f, 2011h, 2012c, 
2012d, 2012e, 2012f, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2014a, 
2014b, 2014c, 2014d, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d, 
2015e, 2015f, 2015g, 2015h, 2015i, 2015j, 2015k, 
2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2016f, 2016g, 
2016h, 2016i, 2017a, 2017b) 
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The table above shows the evolution, in recent decades, of the 
discourse and the role of each institution when tackling the Moroccan 
path of integration, in particular, and the characteristics of international 
economic relations in general. Although the scope of action varies, the 
core message remains linked to the regulation of North-South relations 
through cooperation in order to level the playing field between 
developing and developed countries. The underlying premise is that 
reducing asymmetries in market access will encourage trade, which will 
bring to a mutually beneficial situation through improved multilateral 
integration. 
The advocacy function, closely linked to the notions of legitimacy 
and normativity mentioned by authors such as Coicaud (2002), Clark 
(2011), Brown (2012) and Amin (2014b), is the most predominant 
throughout the material analysed 46 . Based on the principles of open 
regionalism, institutions place their suggestions in an intermediate step 
between the economic circumstance and the counterfactual scenarios of 
economic theory. However, while the role of evaluation appears as a 
cross-cutting function of all the institutions under study, their 
prescriptions are often complementary. That is, there is a rather clear 
division between the functions of each organisation and, therefore, in the 
aspects where their proposals are most prominent. In particular, despite 
following a common line of discourse in promoting potentially beneficial 
measures in accordance with the logic of open regionalism, each 
institution encourages a specific domain, whether financial integration, 









46 In 179 of the 232 documents analysed, the promotional character prevailed over the overall 
message or was proposed as a logical corollary to the analyses conducted. 
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Table 3.3. Specific issues of advocacy by IEOs 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on reports from IMF, UNCTAD, WB, WTO 
 
  
IEO MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS MID-TERM GOALS MAIN REFS. 
1990 
COMMON Liberalisation and public finances adjustment Growth and stability   
IMF Financial development and integration 
‘Integration speeds 
growth’ (IMF, 1996a, 1996b) 
WB - - - 
WTO Openness, strengthening private sector 
‘Modern economy based 
on free market, private 
property and regional 
integration’ 
(WTO, 1998, 1999) 
UNCTAD 
Better competition policy, 
economic integration and 
boosting role of private sector 
Openness and 
integration as a means 
to expand trade and FDI 
(UNCTAD, 1992, 1997, 1998, 
1999a, 1999b) 
2000 
COMMON Exports diversification and regulatory harmonisation 
Growth and 
multilateral trade  
IMF 
Harmonizing trade regulation 
and reducing distortions, 
reforming tariffs and customs, 
international financial integration 
Trade facilitation, 
entrepreneurship 
increase and FDI 
attraction 
(IMF, 2004, 2005a, 2005c, 2005d, 
2006a, 2007b, 2007c) 
WB 
Fostering MENA integration, 
reducing labour market rigidities, 
fiscal policy, more flexible 
exchange rate, reducing anti-
export bias 
Promoting growth and 
employment 
(WB, 2005b, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 
2007a, 2007b, 2009b) 
WTO Reducing non-tariff measures and subsidies 
Improving competition 
policy 
(WTO 2003a, 2005a, 2005c, 2006, 
2009a, 2009c) 
UNCTAD 
Deepening Euromed and intra-
Arab integration, open 
regionalism 
Developed-oriented 
trade liberalisation in a 
multilateral trade system 
(UNCTAD, 2003b, 2003c, 2003d, 
2003e, 2004a, 2005a, 2005, 2005b, 
2005c, 2005g, 2006d, 2007d, 2007f, 
2007i, 2008a, 2008b, 2008e, 2009a, 
2009c, 2009e, 2009i, 2009j) 
2010 
COMMON Deepening Euro-Mediterranean integration  
Integration into Global 
Production Sharing  
IMF 
Fiscal consolidation and 
fostering integration with AMU 
countries and financial 
integration in Africa 
Reducing rigidities to 
spur growth and 
progress in MENA 
region 
(IMF, 2013, 2014, 2016, 2017b) 
WB 
Energy and transport 
connectivity, financial integration 
and cross-border facilitation 
Long term green growth 
in Mediterranean region 
and global integration of 
Morocco 
(2010a, 2010c, 2010d, 2010e, 
2010f, 2010g, 2010h, 2011a, 2011b, 
2011b, 2012a, 2012b, 2013b, 2013c, 
2014d, 2015, 2016a, 2016b, 2017) 
WTO 
Deepening South-South 
integration and exploitation of 




(WTO, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d, 2012b, 
2013a, 2013c, 2013d, 2013e, 2013f, 
2014d, 2014e, 2014f, 2015, 2016a) 
UNCTAD 
Moroccan integration in world 
maritime network, reducing non-
tariff measures and deeper 
regional integration 
Improving links between 




(UNCTAD, 2010a, 2010d, 2010e, 
2010f, 2011a, 2011b, 2011e, 2011f, 
2012f, 2013, 2013c, 2014a, 2014d, 
2015b, 2015c, 2015e, 2015g, 2015i, 
2015j, 2016a, 2016f, 2017b) 
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These recipes, which are framed in broad programmes implemented 
simultaneously in several countries (e.g. Aid for Trade by the WTO, 
Consensus building by the UNCTAD, etc.), have a more specific 
character and accompany the analyses that evaluate the Moroccan 
economy or its international and regional integration. In this regard, the 
coercive nature of a large number of them should be noted, since the 
granting of financing or the inclusion of the country in cooperation 
programmes are subject to certain domestic economic policy measures. 
In other cases, the follow-up of the recommendations is based on the 
postulates of economic theory or on economic incentives that are not 
necessarily subject to strict conditionality. 
Although economic integration and open regionalism remained 
central to the agenda of the institutions during the three decades under 
study, the explanations on how they contribute to growth have gradually 
changed. Apart from the transformations in the realm of logistics and 
GVCs coinciding with the liberalisation of sectors like textiles, services 
or air transports under the GATS, the analysis of the whole material 
suggests that the discursive evolution was more superficial than 
substantial. Thus, behind the new mechanisms of the international market 
that these organizations aspire to achieve, the same principles of the 
traditional theories of integration remain, altered only by contingent 
transformations. In this regard, despite the increasing consensus on the 
importance of the dynamic effects of regional processes, economic 
integration continues to be promoted, in most cases, by appealing to its 
potential for growth through trade creation, through increased investment 
flows and the specialization of the domestic economy in certain parts of 
the GVCs. 
3.5.3 Sectorial analyses and proposals: Morocco as an example  
In addition to macroeconomic aspects, we must emphasise a growing 
presence of sectorial studies whose objective seems to be linked, but with 
peculiar characteristics, to the function of advocacy. Here the mechanism 
appears to work in the opposite direction: the promotion of measures or 
lines of action is carried out through the example of a particular country 
or region that embodies the dynamics promoted. Then, the analysis of the 
successful sector acts as a kind of reward to the country for its good 
practices, a manifestation of support from the institutions and an 
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invitation to deepen in this line. This could be interpreted as well as a 
way to help reducing uncertainty and as an open window to foreign 
investment. 
Thus, these contributions appear to suggest that, although Morocco 
must still make certain efforts to improve economic stability in the 
domestic sphere and competitiveness in the international market, its 
commitment to insertion into the world economy appears as solid, 
progressive and relatively successful. In addition, it appears that 
throughout the decades the country is adapting to the trends of the world 
economy and positioning itself in sectors with more potential impact for 
development. This is demonstrated, according to the reading of these 
IEOs, by the readaptation of traditional sectors such as agriculture or 
textiles to GVCs. Something similar occurs with the growing importance 
of logistics and incentives for industrial location, in which the Tangier 
Med project is often cited as an example of success. There is also an 
accent on the Moroccan leadership in service exports, on its incursion 
into the aeronautical sector and its satisfactory performance in offshore 
structures. At the same time, its commitment to clean energy and to 
South-South cooperation in the electricity market is also underscored. 
Regarding its path of regional integration, the reports released by 
these IEOs suggest that the Arab and Maghreb integration has failed, but 
mainly due to adverse starting conditions. On the contrary, Moroccan 
integration with developed countries is an example both for the 
Mediterranean basin and also regarding its FTA with the US. On this 
matter, it is often outlined that Morocco was the African country to 
endorse a bilateral agreement of this kind. Finally, Morocco's dynamism 
in business and financial intra-African relations is listed among the most 










Table 3.4. Issues and sectors where Morocco appears as an exemplary case study 
 
Source: own elaboration from reports by IMF, UNCTAD, WB, WTO. 
 
Therefore, in view of the previous analyses, it could be concluded 
that, in spite of certain deficiencies and failed projects, the economic 
integration of Morocco has advanced satisfactorily. In the same way, it 
could be expected that the creation of commerce and the attraction of 
investment derived from this process to have positively contributed to 
welfare in Morocco through economic growth and job creation. 
However, none of the reports pays particular attention to the 
historical evolution of integration until the moment of the assessment. 
Neither the distribution of -expected or verified- welfare does, be it in 
terms of territorial imbalances, income inequality or the structure of the 
labour market.  
Apart from this, three striking features arose in our exploration that 
grasped our attention because contradictory with the historical research 
exposed previously in this chapter: 
 The role of Europe in the Moroccan path of integration is mostly 
neglected, apart from some general mentions to shared colonial 
legacy.  
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 Maghreb integration appears as a failed project, but it is still 
promoted and financed, particularly since the beginning of the 
New Millennium. 
 The analyses of South-South integration and North-South 
integration diverge in their focus and methodology of analysis.  
 
Building on the contradiction identified between the results of 
historical research and those provided by the analysis of international 
institutions, the next chapter will enquire on these three aspects. 
Particularly, it will discuss the role of South-South initiatives undertaken 
recently by Morocco. To do so, a special focus will be put on the reasons 
of their promotion by IEOs and by the EU itself within the overarching 
framework of the prevailing pattern of North-South integration between 
Morocco and the EU since decolonisation. 
 
3.6 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter analysed the path of integration undertaken by Morocco 
from two different points of view: historical research and documentation 
from IEOs on the subject. In both cases, our study was guided by the 
consideration of international trade as a sector of foreign policy shaped 
by international agreements and socioeconomic circumstance. Therefore, 
we assume integration as a political choice conditioned by the 
socioeconomic context and by the legal framework, regulated by major 
stakeholders of IR.  
The first part of this chapter deals with the historical context in 
which Moroccan integration into its regional environment took place 
since independence. Supported by historical research on archive 
documents, it describes the transition from French-Spanish colonial rule 
to the current Euro-Mediterranean framework from an actor-centred 
approach. The second part, instead, looked at this process since the 1980s 
and from the point of view of IEOs. The assessment of their functions 
followed the theories explained in the previous chapters.  
Our main findings are that Euro-Mediterranean relations and the 
integration agreements signed in the area in recent decades were highly 
determined by previous colonial ties, particularly between France and 
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Maghreb countries. Indeed, Moroccan dependency from the European 
market has been maintained since the colonial period through a set of AA 
that helped a process of peripheral reconnection whereby Moroccan 
development is bound to the political decisions and economic 
performance of the EU. By legitimating former privileged relations with 
the France and extending them to the Communitarian framework, 
Moroccan economic structure and international exchanges remained 
attached to the Mediterranean orbit of the EU. Furthermore, the wavering 
needs and interests of the European markets due to successive phases of 
enlargement determined the shape and scope of Euro-Mediterranean 
integration more than intra-Mediterranean dialogue did.  
Although the Moroccan path of integration has expanded in different 
directions during the last thirty years, the approaches of IEOs focus on 
the analysis and monitoring of three non-exclusive schemes whose 
functioning is articulated through the tenets of open regionalism: South-
South cooperation, with special interest in the construction of a Pan-
African area; the integration of the Maghreb and Arab markets, and the 
inclusion of these in the Euro-Mediterranean framework. In this regard, 
South-South cooperation frameworks are proposed as an essential step in 
preparing developing countries towards North-South integration.
Paradoxically, in the reports of these institutions, Maghreb became anew 
the subject of a regular study after fifteen years of existence, but only to 
become an example of a non-integrated region whose nonexistence is 
affirmed to be both full of potential and cost generator. 
An assessment of the contributions made by IEOs about Moroccan 
integration seems to indicate that, while Morocco must still make certain 
efforts to improve economic stability in the domestic sphere and 
competitiveness in the international market, its commitment to insertion 
into the world economy appears as solid, progressive and relatively 
successful. Regarding its path of regional integration, the Moroccan 
relationship with developed countries is an example both in the 
Mediterranean basin and in its relations with the United States, since 
among them there is a pioneering Free Trade Agreement in Africa. Also, 
its prominent role in intra-African relations is increasingly underscored.  
Building on the contradiction identified between the results of 
historical research and those provided by the analysis of international 
institutions, the next chapter will discuss the role of South-South 
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initiatives undertaken recently by Morocco in the Mediterranean. A 
special focus will be put on their interaction with the prevailing pattern of 








4 FROM AMU TO AGADIR: SOUTH-SOUTH 
AGREEMENTS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF 
NORTH-SOUTH INTEGRATION  
 
 
 4.1 INTRODUCTION 
As shown in Chapter 3, according to the main IEOs involved in the 
regulation of integration processes, the Moroccan path of international 
integration in the last three decades has been relatively successful if 
compared to its peers. In this regard, although they underscore the need 
for some steps forward in terms of South-South integration, Morocco 
appears as a potential catalyser of virtuous circles in that direction, due to 
its geographical strategic position and performing strategies in a number 
of trade and financial sectors. The only marked exception to these overall 
positive views seems to fall into the Maghreb area, which is usually 
defined as a region whose main characteristic is the lack of integration.  
The above reasoning is guided by the underlying premises of 
orthodox views on regional integration. To a large extent, IEOs 
evaluations and recommendations in terms of economic policy assume a 
direct causality between trade, growth and welfare. According to this, 
reducing barriers to trade improves welfare by enhancing better resource 
allocation and, through that means, increased trade and output growth. 
However, this rationale explains little about the reasons why, despite its 
overall satisfactory performance, Morocco has never abandoned the pool 




Following the considerations previously made in this work regarding 
the political economy of international integration, this chapter deepens 
into two major contradictions identified in Chapter 3. On the one hand, it 
aims at examining the underlying factors behind the contradictory 
assertions by IEOs about its allegedly satisfactory path of international 
integration and the sluggish performance of its welfare indicators. On the 
other hand, it tries to build an explanation to its allegedly failed attempts 
to strengthen South-South integration by widening the scope of research 
to political and micro-economic reasons that might have been disregarded 
by IEOs and orthodox scholarship. Namely, based on the historical 
review of the previous chapter and following a case-by-case assessment, 
it closely looks at the interplay between specific South-South agreements 
and North-South integration in the context of Euro-Mediterranean 
relations. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The first part examines the 
consistency of the presumed causality between economic integration, 
trade, growth and welfare in the case of Morocco. The second part 
focuses on the reasons beneath the establishment of South-South 
integration agreements in a regional framework where vertical relations 
have prevailed for more than a century. The main findings of both parts 
are summed up in the conclusions.  
4.2 INTEGRATION AND WELFARE: STRAIGHTFORWARD 
CAUSALITY? 
The neoclassical approach to economic integration suggests that 
successful processes of integration will drive member countries to an 
increase of welfare through the potential effects of trade creation for 
specialization, FDI, income, employment and, all in all, for economic 
growth (Balassa, 1961; Baldwin and Venables, 1995; El-Agraa, 1999; 
Jovanovic, 2006). As discussed in chapter 1, these changes in trade 
generate static and dynamic effects in the participating economies. For 
instance, trade (and productive) specialization would occur according to 
the principle of comparative advantage, which results in a better allocation 
of resources and greater efficiency. In addition, the intensification of 
international trade is expected to lead to an improvement of economies of 
scale, greater competition and provides an incentive for investment, 
innovation and technical progress. These processes appear to be greatly 
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facilitated by the favourable effect of trade liberalisation on FDI 
attraction. Accordingly, the empirical assessment of regional integration 
usually lies on variables like trade patterns, FDI or GDP. Thus, by 
following these logics, an increased output is somehow equated with gains 
in welfare, and an increase in trade flows is seen as a positive step in that 
direction.  
Notwithstanding, although there exist a relationship between trade 
and growth, welfare depends on further dynamics than output, like income 
distribution, to mention one of them. Moreover, it should not be directly 
assumed that the linkages between trade and economic structure are so 
strong that improvements in the former have a direct and positive impact 
on the latter. In the case of Morocco, several figures and indicators 
elaborated by the same international institutions analysed before (UN, 
WB, IMF, WTO) suggest that the above-mentioned relationship is not as 
straightforward as implied in a number of reports. 
In this section we will look at the evolution and correlation of these 
variables for the Moroccan economy in the context of its integration 
strategy. Our aim is to identify, on the one hand, whether the relative 
success of Moroccan integration reported by the various IEOs holds in the 
light of variables that go beyond the evolution of trade volume and the 
rate of economic growth. On the other hand, we analyse the extent to 
which the effects of integration on growth and welfare, through trade, do 
explain the integration choices made by Morocco. 
4.2.1 Trade and growth  
The relationship between trade and growth remains as one of the 
underlying premises of many of the policy recipes promoted by the 
institutions analysed in chapter 3. Nonetheless, some underlying features 
ought to be considered when assessing the level of economic welfare in 
terms of these two variables.  
Undoubtedly, Moroccan foreign trade increased in the period 1995-
2016. Exports multiplied by 3.3 and imports by more than 4 between the 




Figure 4.1. Exports, imports and trade balance of Morocco,  
thousands US$, 1995-2016   
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from UNCTADstat  
Between 1995 and 2016, there was an intensification of trade: exports 
and imports grew faster than GDP (Figure 4.2). This means that there was 
an increase in the degree of trade openness of the Moroccan economy, 
measured as (X+M)/GDP, from 43.6 in 1995 to 62.3 in 2016. 
Notwithstanding, it is worth noting that, whereas exports have risen from 
17.8% to 22.1% of GDP since the 1990s, the weight of imports almost 
doubled in the same period, from 25.9% of GDP in 1995 to 40.2% in 
2016. 
Figure 4.2. Evolution of GDP, Exports and Imports in Morocco, (Index, 1995=100) 
      
Source: Own elaboration based on data from UNCTADstat  
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Moreover, it should be added that despite the significant growth of 
foreign trade in Morocco, its figures remain slightly below the average of 
Middle-Income Developing Countries 47  (Figure 4.3) and they were 
accompanied by an increase in trade deficit, as shown by Figure 4.1.   
Figure 4.3. Evolution  of exports and  Imports, Morrocco and Middle -income 
Developing  Economies (Index, 1995=100) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from UNCTADstat  
 
The evolution of the Moroccan current account balance has been 
particularly negative, not only compared to its situation in the past, but 
also in comparison to other countries (Figure 4.4). IMF data on these 
issues show that, since 2002 (i.e. two years after the entry into force of the 
AA), Morocco has undergone a worse performance than the average of 
the countries in the MENA region. The same happens when compared to 
wider analytical groups where it belongs, such as ‘Emerging market and 
developing economies’. Not to say with the group ‘Advanced economies’ 
or, more specifically, the EU-28, whose influence on Moroccan economy 
can be observed also on the direct impact of its economic shocks on the 
latter. 
 
47 The group of countries in which the World Bank includes Morocco according to income level.   
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Figure 4.4. Current account balance, (Percent of GDP), 1995-2016 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from IMF. 
Regarding the sectorial specialisation of trade, as mentioned in 
previous chapters, Morocco exports mainly primaries, textiles and certain 
types and pieces of machinery. Within the first group, phosphates 48 , 
fisheries, and fruit and vegetables count for most of the sales. Among 
imports, petroleum, automobiles and cereals are the most exchanged 
products.  
Taking the SITC commodity classification Rev 3, exports are 
concentrated in the following sectors: Food and live animals (where 
“Fish, crustaceans, molluscs and preparations thereof” and “Vegetables 
and fruits” account for 86.7% of the sector in 2016), Chemicals and 
related products (where 60% corresponds to “Fertilizers”), Machinery and 
transport equipment (where “Electrical machinery, apparatus and 
appliances” and “Road vehicles” account for 91%), and Miscellaneous 
manufactured articles (“Articles of apparel & clothing accessories” are 
the 82.3%) (Figure 4.5a). These four sectors accounted for 78.6% of total 
exports in 1995 and 85.5% in 2016.  
 
 
48 Morocco holds, indeed, the first place among the world exporters of phosphates. 
FROM AMU TO AGADIR: SOUTH-SOUTH AGREEMENTS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF NORTH-SOUTH INTEGRATION 
189 
Figure 4.5a. Morocco Exports by sector (%) and Total Exports i 
(thousands US$)1995-2016 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from UNCTADstat  
 
On the other hand, imports are concentrated in the following sectors: 
Food and live animals (where in 2016 45.4% corresponds to “Cereals and 
cereal preparations”); Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 
(where “Petroleum, petroleum products and related materials” account for 
67.2%); Chemicals and related products; Manufactured goods; and 
Machinery and transport equipment (where “Electrical machinery, 
apparatus and appliances” and “Road vehicles” account for 54.2%) 
(Figure 4.5b). These five sectors account for 70.3% of total imports in 





Figure 4.5b. Morocco Imports by sector (%) ant total Imports  
(Thousands US $), 1995-2016 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from UNCTADstat  
 
Considering a higher level of disaggregation (with the products of the 
SITC commodity classification, Revision 3, at the two-digit level), the 
concentration of exports, which was relatively high, has decreased since 
2003 (which can be interpreted as a gain in competitiveness in new 
products). Imports, for their part, showed very low levels of concentration 
in 1995 and reduced their diversification from that year onwards (Figure 
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We use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to analyse the 
concentration in export and import patterns. The HHI is defined as 
 
where X represents total exports (or imports), xi represents exports 
(or imports) of product i and n is the number of products. HHI is equal to 
1 if the trade pattern is completely concentrated and equal to 1/n for the 
case of equal distribution of shares between all products. In this case, 
taking the 63 products of the SITD Rev 3 classification at the two-digit 
level, the HHI could range from 0.016 to 1. 
Figure 4.6. Exports and Imports Herfindahl-Hirschman Concentration Index, 
Morocco, 1995-2016 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from UNCTADstat  
 
In addition, the period under analysis saw a specialisation of trade 
towards manufactures and, in particular, to Medium-skill and 
technology-intensive industries, as well as a fall in the weight of primary 
products (Figure 4.7). Between 1995 and 2016, the share of exports of 
primary products49 fell from 42% to 29%, while that of manufactured 









products 50  rose from 58% to 70%. Among manufactures, Labour-
intensive and resource-intensive industries are losing weight in favour of 
Medium-skill and technology-intensive industries, which currently 
account for the largest percentage (in 2016, 40% of manufacturing 
exports are of this type).  Also in those years, the share of imports of 
primary products fell from 44% to 31%, while that of manufactured 
products rose from 56% to 69%. Among manufactures, Low-skill and 
High skill lose weight in favour of Labour-intensive, resource-intensive 
and, above all, Medium-skill and technology-intensive industries, which 
accounted for 43% of manufacturing imports in 2016. 
Figure 4. 7. Morocco Exports and Imports of Primary Commodities and Manufactured 
goods by degree of manufacturing,  1995-2016 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from UNCTADstat  
As stated above, while Moroccan exports attain 22% of its GDP, 
imports have overcome the 41% of GDP. In this regard, the major 
contributing sectors to the negative trade balance are: (3) Mineral fuels, 
lubricants and related materials”, (6) Manufactured goods, where 1/3 of 
exports and imports correspond to “Textile Yard and related products” 
and (7) Machinery and transport equipment (Figure 4.8). 
50 SITC 5+6+7+8-68-667 
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Figure 4.8. Exports and Imports as % of total trade by sectors, 1995 and 2016 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from UNCTADstat  
 
In sum, it appears that trade developments since 1995 have been 
relatively favourable: exports and imports are increasing, exports are 
becoming more diversified, the weight of primary products is falling and 
manufacturing, in particular Medium-skill goods, is increasing. This 
might be seen as a success of trade liberalisation following integration 
agreements. Again, following theory, trade intensification is expected to 
stimulate investment, in particular FDI, which leads to innovation and 
technical progress and, ultimately, economic growth.  
In effect, the Gross Fixed Capital Formation increased steadily 
since 1995, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of GDP, especially 








Figure 4.9. Gross Fixed Capital Formation, millions US$ and % of GDP, 1995-2016   
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from World Development Indicators 
 
The attraction of FDI, with the inherent volatility that this variable 
shows in any economy, has also been increasing in the period 1995-2016, 
in line with the average of Middle-income developing economies (Figure 
4.10).  
Figure 4. 10.  Evolution of FDI inward flows, Morocco and MICs, (Index 1995=100) 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from UNCTADstat  
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As shown in the previous chapter, this trend has been continuously 
underlined as a major achievement of Morocco in the last years as a 
consequence of its international and domestic policies. The FDI 
contribution to investment in Morocco has undoubtedly been positive.  
According to UNCTADstat data, its evolution as a percentage of Gross 
Fixed Capital Formation moved from 3.5% in 1995 to 10.5% in 2015. 
However, FDI is not the main source of capital inflows to Morocco. 
Although the FDI has grown considerably since 1995, remittances from 
migrated Moroccans overcome by large the weight of FDI in the country 
(Figure 4.11). 
Figure 4.11. FDI and Remittances in Morocco, current US$ in millions, 1995-2016 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from UNCTADstat  
 
According to the World Development Indicators, FDI measured as a 
percentage of the GDP moved from 0.24% in 1995 to 2.24% in 2016. 
Nonetheless, it is worth noticing that, over the same period, inflows of 
remittances moved from 5.05% to 6.84% of the GDP. 
In a way, remittances can also be related to integration as they derive 
from labour reallocation among countries and, surely, they might have 
direct effects on welfare as they stimulate domestic consumption. 
Notwithstanding, remittances are far from being the kind of capital flows 
that institutions and economic theory understand as dynamic effects of 
integration. To this regard, given that their role in development is subject 
to discussion (The Haas and Plug, 2006; Adenutsi and Ahortor, 2010), a 
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careful analysis of the Moroccan case would be needed before stating a 
priori what these stable and long-lasting capital inflows may mean. 
In terms of production, Moroccan GDP grew between 1995 and 
2016, both in absolute and per capita terms. When we compare it with the 
countries in its income group (MIDE) or with its main trading partner (the 
EU), we observe that Moroccan growth rates, although highly volatile, 
have been above those of the EU, especially since the crisis, but lower on 
average than for the MIDE (Figure 4.12).   
Figure 4.12. GDP, Annual average growth rate, Morocco, MICs and EU 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from UNCTADstat  
 
Given these annual growth rates, between 1995 and 2016, Moroccan 





FROM AMU TO AGADIR: SOUTH-SOUTH AGREEMENTS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF NORTH-SOUTH INTEGRATION 
197 
Figure 4.13. Evolution of GDP, US dollarst at constant prices (2010) in millions, 
Morocco and MICs, Index 1995=100 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from UNCTADstat  
 
A similar behaviour is observed for GDP per capita. The growth of 
GDP per capita is also lower in Morocco than in the MIDE and higher in 
Morocco than for the EU, especially after the crisis (Figure 4.14).  
Figure 4.14. Evolution of GDP per capita, US dollars at constant (2010) prices, 
(index, 1995=100) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from UNCTADstat  
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With regard to the EU, there was a slight rapprochement, given that 
the GDP per capita of Morocco jumped from 6.4% of that of the EU28 in 
1995 to 9.5% in 2016. Nonetheless, this cannot be interpreted as a major 
step forward, since this is not so much due to the progress made by 
Morocco as to the stagnation of the EU since 2008. As of 2016, 
Morocco's GDP per capita (at constant US dollar of 2010) was $3,400 
compared to $35,884 in the EU28 or $41,300 in the EU15. Thus, the 
North-South gap continues to be wide and the growth of GDP is not 
sufficient to reduce it. When we compare Morocco with the MIDE, 
although the Moroccan per capita income is still higher than the average 
for the MIDE ($3400 compared to $2178 in 2016), the gap is narrowing: 
while in 1995 the per capita GDP of the MIDE was 61.8% of that of 
Morocco, in 2016 it was 64% (Figure 4.15). 
Figure 4.15. GDP per cápita, US$ at constant prices (2010) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from UNCTADstat  
 
Morocco’s economic structure does not differ much from developed 
and emergent countries in terms of the weight of economic sectors. 
Similarly to the vast majority of current economies, the services sector 
already accounts for more than 56% of the GDP in 2016 (54.6% in 1995), 
while industry (including construction sector) contributes with around 
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30% and agriculture shows a slightly declining path from 15.4% in 1995 
to 13.6% in 2016 (Figure 4.16).  
Figure 4.16. Industry, Agriculture and Services, Value Added (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from World Development Indicators   
 
However, the structure of employment and the territorial distribution 
of population differs largely from these percentages: the services sector 
employed 35.4% of the workforce in 1995 and 42.7% in 2016; the share 
of industry fell from 22.6% to 19.5% and agriculture, with a much higher 
share of employment than its contribution to GDP, employed 37.7% in 
2016 (42% in 1995), (Figure 4.17). The asymmetries between rural and 
urban areas in a country where the 40% of the population lives in the 




Figure 4.17. Industry, Agriculture and services, Employment  
(% of total employment)  
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from World Development Indicators   
 
As regards the labour market performance, the proportion of the 
country’s population aged over 15 that is employed increased over the 
period 1995-2016 from 39.6% to 44.5%. The unemployment rate 
decreased over the same period from 22,9% to 9.4%. Notwithstanding, it 
is important to underscore that these decrease in unemployment is partly 
explained by the decrease in labour force. The Labour force participation 
rate (the proportion of the population ages 15-64 that is economically 
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Figure 4.18. Morocco: Labor Force, Employment and Unemployment  
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from World Bank Development Indicators  
 
Another reason why the unemployment rate has fallen in Morocco is 
undoubtedly due to high levels of emigration, especially of young people, 
during the period under study. According to data from WDI, net 
migration, (defined as the total number of immigrants less the annual 
number of emigrants, including both citizens and noncitizens), amounted 
to more than 2 million people between 1995 and 2012, representing 6.3 
per cent of the total population of Morocco and 9.5 per cent of its 
working-age population in 2012. 
According to the data provided by the Haut Commissariat au Plan 
(HCP), employment evolution over the period was accompanied with an 
increase in sectorial and regional disparities, on the one hand, and a 
tendency towards precariousness at the workplace on the other hand. This 
trend is particularly noticeable in the agricultural and construction sectors, 
which are, in fact, responsible for almost the 50% of Moroccan jobs, 
although only a 7,5% and a 7,4% of them, respectively, are regulated by a 
work contract. In addition, the low level of women participation in labour 
force, the growing seasonality of work after the 2008 crisis, the almost 
inexistent social security coverage and the weight of non-remunerated 
work complete a picture made of inequalities and growing asymmetries 
(HCP, 2015).  
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Regional disparities are large and widening. According to data from 
the HCP, in 2015, two regions, Casablanca-Settat and Rabat-Salé-Kénitra, 
created almost half of the national wealth (48.2% of GDP by value), 
32.2% and 16% respectively. The third place corresponds to Tanger-
Tétouan-Al Hoceima with 10.1%. Moreover, this trend is accentuated by 
the fact that the regions that contribute most to GDP are also those that 
are growing above the national average (4.5%), especially for Tanger-
Tétouan-Al Hoceima (7.9%) and Casablanca-Settat (7%), according to 
2015 figures. 
In the light of the above data, the relative favourable evolution of 
GDP and GDP per capita cannot be directly interpreted as an 
improvement in economic development and welfare (further evidence 
will be provided below). But neither can economic growth, although 
partly linked to trade growth, be directly attributed to the process of 
economic integration. 
Although the evolution of trade, albeit with some nuances, has been 
positive, it cannot be directly attributed to the effect of the regional 
integration agreements signed by Morocco during the period under study, 
as can be observed by analysing the evolution of Moroccan foreign trade 
with its main trading partners.  
The EU, and in particular France and Spain, are undoubtedly the 
main destination of exports and origin of imports in Morocco. On the 
other hand, the trade partners belonging to the areas of integration with 
other countries of the South have an almost insignificant participation in 
the whole period (Figures 4.19a, 4.19b). This fact could be interpreted as 
evidence of the “success” of integration with the North or of the “failure” 
of integration with the South, despite the incentives given by the EU itself 
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Figure 4. 19a. Exports of Morocco by partner, in thousands $, 1995-2016 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from UNCTADstat  
Figure 4.19b. Imports of Morocco by partner, thousands $, 1995-2016 
 




Despite maintaining its relevance, the weight of Spain and France, as 
well as the rest of the EU, is not the same for exports as for imports, nor 
does it remain constant over time. The EU represented 66% of Moroccan 
exports in 1995 and 59% 20 years later. This was accompanied by the 
divergent behaviour between France (whose relative weight fell from 
33% to 18%) and Spain (whose relative weight increased from 8% to 
22% of total Moroccan exports). In turn, Morocco’s share of exports to 
the countries included in integration agreements with the South remained 
around at 6% of the total (5.9 in 1995 and 5.5 in 2015). Here again, the 
relative share of the different integration areas has not followed the same 
evolution: while Agadir members and, above all, the ECOWAS, have 
increased their share, this is at the expense of a decrease in the percentage 
of exports to AMU (see Figures 4.20a and 4.20b)51. Thus, this lack of 
intensification of intra-regional trade does not support the assertion of any 
real successful outcome of the integration agreements.   
Figure 4.20a. Exports of Morocco by partner, 1995 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from UNCTADstat  
51 (*) Since Tunisia is part of the AMU and participates in the Agadir Agreement, its exchange 
flows with Morocco have been taken separately from both areas in order to avoid counting them 
twice. Therefore, the weight of Tunisia on Moroccan trade is presented individually. 









             EU 28 
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Figure 4.20b. Exports of Morocco by partner, 2015 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from UNCTADstat  
 
In the case of imports, EU's share increased over the period, from 
48% to 53%. Here again, Spain’s share is increasing and France’s is 
falling, although less sharply than for exports. The share of South-South 
integration areas have risen very slightly, from 3.92% to 3.94%. In the 
case of imports, AMU increased its share (from 2% to 2.6%), as did 
AGADIR (from 0.7% to 1.6%), while ECOWAS decreased its weight 
from 1.5% to 0.2% (see Figures 4.21a and 4.21b). Although in the case 
of imports there is a certain intensification of intra-regional flows, the 
results cannot be interpreted as a success of integration agreements, 
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Figure 4.21a. Imports of Morocco by partner, 1995 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from UNCTADstat  
Figure 4.21b. Imports of Morocco by partner, 2015 
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The EU maintains the pre-existing relevance of some of its members 
(in particular France and Spain) before the integration agreements. But 
the various agreements with the South, largely encouraged by the EU 
itself, do not seem to have yielded significant results in terms of increased 
intra-area trade flows. This ex-post result should come as no surprise in 
view of the low weight that these economies had in Morocco's total 
exports and imports and what the ex-ante complementarity indices 
between Morocco and these economies already suggested.  
The trade complementarity (TC) index, proposed by Michaely 
(1996), indicates to what extent countries are “natural trading partners”, 
i.e., it measures to what extent the export (import) profile of a country j 
matches the import (export) profile of a country k. Then, this index of 
trade compatibility can give useful information on perspectives for 
trading partners that can motivate countries to participate into integration 
groups. 
In general, two countries with a high TC index may gain from trade 
expansion following a preferential trade agreement more than two 
countries with a low TC index may do. So, the index can be particularly 
useful in an ex-ante evaluation of the potential gains from bilateral or 
regional trade agreements (Michaely, 1996).52  
The UNCTAD statistics present data for this index calculated as the 
sum of the absolute value of the difference between the import shares and 
the export shares (at 3-digit SITC, Revision 3 level) of the countries j and 
k and divided by two:53  
            
Where, m x  is the index of trade complementarity of importer 
country i with exporter country j; x m  is the index of trade 
52 The index matches only the demand of partners and does not include other trade determining 
factors such as distance of partners, the possibility of transport or trade barriers. When countries 
are geographically distant, have high transportation and transaction costs or a large difference in 
terms of size (a match in percentage terms does not imply a match in levels), a high 
complementarity index may not imply a gain from increased trade. The index may also suffer from 
aggregation bias. 












complementarity of exporter i and exporter j;  is goods in 3 digit SITC 
Revision 3;  is the share of goods  in country i’s total imports from 
the world;  is the share of goods  in country j’s total exports to the 
world.  
The index value ranges between 0 and 1 (or 100 percent). Where 0 
indicates that there are no matches at all between country j and country k 
export/import pattern (there is no god imported by one country which is 
exported by the other) and 1 indicates a perfect correlation in the 
export/import pattern (one country exports precisely what the other 
import).  
The values of the index for Morocco as exporter and importer 
towards its partners belonging to the same regional areas for the period 
1995-2013 are shown in table 1. As partners, we take the EU28 as a 
whole and some relevant countries for the study (France, Spain, Italy and 
Germany); UMA, AGADIR and their respective countries; and ECOWAS 
and its main economies. 
The countries showing highest and increasing index over the period 
were EU members, both as exporters and importers, but mainly as 
exporters, which are actually the main Moroccan partner countries in 
terms of trade flows. For the countries of Southern regional areas, TC 
index shows in general low levels.  
As usual, CI values are lower for the country as exporter than as 
importer. The export structure of Morocco fits less with the import 
structure of most of its partners, since Moroccan imports are more 
diversified. In this regard, for 2013, we can see that the more diversified 
structure of Moroccan exports increasingly fits the imports structure of its 
partners.  
Then, taking into account the qualitative information given by the TC 
index for the late 1990s or the beginning of the 2000s potential gains from 
regional trade agreements with those “Southern” countries were not to be 
expected to a large extent. With respect to the TC index, the situation 
seems to have changed slightly in recent years, particularly for ECOWAS 
as an importer, but given the low weight of these economies in Morocco's 
total trade flows, no major results are to be expected in the short term for 
the Moroccan economy. 
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Table 4.1:  Trade complementarity index for Morocco by regional group,  
1995-2013 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from UNCTAD 
 
Thus, in the light of the data presented above, it can be argued that 
the potential effects of integration on trade, and consequently on 
economic growth and welfare, may not the determining factors for the 
signature of such agreements by Morocco, nor for their promotion and 
promotion by the EU. We must therefore ask ourselves what reasons 
justify the insistence on these integration arrangements. This question will 
be answered in the rest of the chapter. But before that, we will examine 
whether the advances in terms of GDP and GDP per capita shown 
previously in this chapter are accompanied by an increase in development 




4.2.2 Growth and Welfare  
In spite of the inherent difficulties that measuring such a complex and 
ambiguous concept as welfare implies, the UN Development Program 
(UNDP) has set one of the most influential approaches to this regard 
within the field of Economics and Development. The Human 
Development Index (HDI) tries to balance the focus on economic growth 
with other dimensions that have to do with national policy choices and 
with the way they influence people’s capabilities. Life expectancy at birth, 
years of schooling and Gross National Income are the main variables 
taken into consideration. 
The available data concerning Morocco show a remarkable 
improvement since 1990, from 0.489 to 0.647 in 2015. In fact, the last 
report available situates Morocco in the 123th position in a list that 
currently includes 188 countries. However, HDI evolution was not as 
dynamic as GDP per capita (Figure 4.22). Between 1995 and 2015, the 
average annual growth was 1.6 for HDI and 4.3 for GDP per capita.  
Figure 4.22. Evolution of Morocco GDP per capita and HDI, (Index, 1995=100) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from UNDP and World Bank WDI  
 
Indeed, results are nowhere near as favourable when we take into 
account not just the three HDI dimensions (a long and healthy life, access 
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to knowledge and a decent standard of living), but inequalities in 
distribution across the population for these dimensions.  
As regards income inequality, the Gini index measures the extent to 
which the distribution of income among individuals or households within 
an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution (a Gini index of 0 
represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect 
inequality). According to data from World Bank Development Indicators, 
in the case of Morocco, Gini index increased from 39.5 in 1998 to 40.7 in 
2006.  
Moreover, when looking further at Human Development Data within 
the framework of the HDI, other striking features arise about the 
distribution of welfare within the country. The Coefficient of Human 
Inequality, introduced in 2014 as an experimental measure that calculates 
a simple average of inequalities in health, education and income, shows a 
rising progression since 2010, leaving Morocco in the 125th place in 2015. 
To this regard, the Inequality-Adjusted Income Index (IHDI), which 
adjusts the HDI for inequality in the distribution of each dimension across 
the population, shows a much lower figure (Figure 4.23), confirming that 
unequal distribution is a growing constraint to welfare in Morocco.  
Figure 4. 23. HDI and Inequality (2015) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from UNDP  
Therefore, the Inequality-Adjusted HDI shows worse figures for 
Morocco than its position in the HDI ranking suggests. Neither it can be 
assessed that the effects of trade and growth have been distributed equally 
in the country, nor can it be supposed that the good performance of 
Moroccan trade after the last economic crisis has pushed the country 
towards a more equal path of development.   
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In addition to inequality in the income distribution and the other HDI 
dimensions across the population, gender inequality is also to be 
underscored: HDI for women is significantly lower than for men (Graph 
23). UNDP data for 2015 show that the mean years of schooling are 3.8 
for women and 6.4 for men and estimated GNI per capita (in 2011 PPP $) 
is 3.388$ for women and 11.091$ for men.  
As for female participation in the labour market, which is the 
cause and consequence of other inequalities, it is low and increased only 
slightly between 1995 and 2016 (from 24.3% to 26%) (Figure 4.24). 
Figure 4.24. Female participation in Labor force (% of total labor force) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from World Bank Development Indicators 
The steady growing trend showed until 1999 was followed by a 
dramatic fall until 2002. Then, after two years of recovering, a softer but 
steady decline brought figures back to 1990s numbers, especially due to 
the recent trends of the textile sector, where they provided for most of the 
labour force. 
Although women's participation in the labour market is above the 
average for the countries of the region (MENA), it is below that of its 
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income group (Lower Middle Income Economies) and well below than 
that of European and, in general, world countries (Figure 4.24).  
It is clearly the low participation of women in the labour force what 
makes the difference in their situation on the labour market compared to 
that of men. In fact, the unemployment rate (as a percentage of the 
workforce) is very similar for men and women (Figure 4.25). 
Figure 4.25. Labor Force participation, Employment and Unemployment in  
Morocco by gender, (1995-2016) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from World Bank Development Indicators 
 
A report by the WB (2015) on economic growth, structural 
transformation and gender inequality stated that the “recent (although not 
dramatic) structural transformation of the economy” has taken place at the 
expense of women participation in the labour market. According to this 
study, the relative decline of labour shares in low-productivity sectors 
(agriculture, services and textiles) and the slight increase in employment 
in high-productivity ones has entailed a “diverging path of reallocation” 
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whereby women remained “trapped in low productivity sectors” (2015, p. 
39). In this regard, the WB warns about the gender asymmetries in labour 
mobility, especially when economic shocks happen: 
 
“The population of Morocco overall has gained during the 
past decade in terms of welfare but this progress has occurred 
via non-inclusive labor market developments. Women have not 
improved their labor market status and, if anything, they are 
more dependent on their male counterparts as ever before. 
Rural women in particular seem to function as a ‘shock 
absorber’ for the economy. When the economy is doing well, 
rural women participate to the labor market in greater numbers 
but when the economy suffers this group is the first—and often 
the only group—to be excluded.” (WB, 2015, p. 36). 
 
In sum, a short insight into how output is distributed among citizens 
considering their income, gender or occupation is enough for 
understanding that the straightforward relationship between trade, growth 
and welfare implied in economic theory neglects several major aspects of 
development. Also, economic statements about development as composed 
by growth and structural change (Panchamukhi et al., 1989) reveal 
themselves incomplete without a further analysis about how these 
phenomena take place and who remains outside of the formula. In this 
regard, one of the reports by the WB (2016b) quoted in Annex 2, 
regarding the causes and outcomes of the Arab Spring in MENA countries 
reflected on the predictability of mainstream economic indicators as 
follows: 
 
“The past five years have shown that traditional 
performance monitoring methods are not adapted to the 
current MENA region. The results of individual projects, 
for example the number of kilometres of roads built, do not 
show that the country may be in the midst of a civil war. 
Even macroeconomic results such as GDP growth, 
monetary poverty and income distribution did not anticipate 
the Arab Spring, let alone its extensions. All countries had 
rising growth rates before 2010. Extreme poverty, at 2.4 per 
cent, had been virtually eliminated. In most countries, 
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inequalities were low and decreasing or stagnating. In 
contrast, other units of measurement, such as indicators of 
welfare, opportunities for expression and public 
accountability, and opportunities for the middle class (not 
the poorest 40 per cent), heralded the problems that 
triggered the Arab Spring and with which the region 
continues to struggle.” (WB, 2016b, p. 23) 
 
In the case of Morocco, the positive performance praised by 
international organisations about its international and domestic choices 
does not take into account the widening socioeconomic gaps that these 
choices might have spurred. Finally, the premises about eventual 
convergence between countries through economic integration do not seem 
to fit the Moroccan path either. 
 
4.3 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOUTH-SOUTH 
INTEGRATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 
Over the past fifty years, the great number and scarce performance of 
South-South regional agreements have challenged the core assumptions of 
mainstream theories of integration. As shown in Chapter 3, IEOs like the 
IMF, the WB or the UN release every year reports that regret the lack of 
intra-regional exchanges in Africa, the failure to attract FDI due to 
uncertainty and instability, or the inability to unleash ‘endogenous 
growth’ through innovation and competitiveness. In this regard, the 
European Union is acknowledged to be the main example and promoter of 
the virtuous circle of integration. However, in spite of its efforts to export 
welfare through trade integration and political cooperation, the European 
Union finds its closest counter-example in the Mediterranean basin. If 
there is a place in the Mediterranean where the EU has traditionally 
encouraged the integration recipe, it is the Maghreb region. However, the 
outcomes of this support achieved so limited outcomes that the ‘non-
Maghreb’ as an object of analysis gained more salience than its opposite.  
Apart from relativizing the relationship between trade, growth and 
welfare, the statistics above highlight the centrality of epistemology in the 
research process. Beyond the technical accuracy of the methodology 
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employed, the object of study and the premises on which the analysis is 
based largely determine the results and the conclusions derived from the 
process. This goes often unnoticed when it comes to certain non-
hegemonic subjects within a certain field. We argue that this is the case 
for some Global South/Third World/Developing countries.  To a certain 
degree, the different aspects related to economic and political agency and 
structural features underlying Moroccan integration falls within a realm 
that Fernández-Molina et al. (2018, p. 2) call “subaltern foreign policies”: 
 
“Mainstream scholarship tends to care little about the 
international action of states that are subordinate, peripheral 
and relatively disempowered, lying certainly outside the 
Euro-American core of the Western-centric global order or 
the club of rising powers increasingly challenging it. It only 
recalls their existence in three types of often interrelated 
instances: when these states are the targets of the action of 
any of the big guys of international politics, when they 
become involved in major crises and armed conflicts with 
regional and global spillover, and when they provide 
appropriate case studies to test hypotheses or illustrate 
theories. While the latter academic-driven interest is 
legitimate, it remains problematic insofar as it treats the 
selected country ‘cases’ as means to an end rather than ends 
in themselves.”  
 
As it has been mentioned in previous chapters, the underlying 
premises of orthodox economics in general, and economic integration in 
particular, often set aside the role of the agents that take decisions and also 
of those who evaluate or regulate them. In this vein, the missing links 
between economic integration and foreign policy affairs imply a neglect of 
concepts like power and legitimacy in favour of the neoclassical axiom of 
utility. Similarly, global IEOs often appear as the subjects undertaking the 
analysis, but their direct involvement in the shape and outcomes of 
influence regional processes is hardly ever addressed. As institutions that 
promote a specific discourse and as authorities with regulatory and 
normative power, they have a significant influence on what is said and 
about what. In this vein, IEOs tend to reproduce the debates and changing 
trends being held in the academy, rather than focusing on the actual 
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political or socio-economic concerns that occupy the domestic agenda of 
the country at stake. Furthermore, the case of Morocco is particularly 
challenging in the field of Economic Integration, where its position is full 
of grey areas: 
 
“From its positional in-betweenness, North Africa 
struggles not only to be seen as the little brother of the Middle 
East within the horizontal construction of the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region that has prevailed for decades, 
if not centuries. At the same time, North Africa’s intimate 
proximity to Europe, by choice or by necessity, is inherently 
contentious as part of the legacy of colonialism and the 
product of post-colonial dependence. In sum, this liminal 
space looks like not quite the proper Middle East, not fully 
African and certainly at, yet outside, the exclusive borders of 
Europe -’on the outside of Europe looking in’ (White, 2001)” 
(Fernández-Molina et al. 2018, p. 3). 
 
In general, beyond slight methodological approaches and thematic 
priorities, the assessment of South-South projects in the area provides 
little insight into the reasons why they have taken place. Similarly, their 
implications in areas that exceed the presumed objectives of the theory 
and the variables that seek to grasp them, remain often unexplored. 
Consequently, our work has focused on re-building incomplete 
explanations about such processes in a case-by-case manner, by 
considering the aspects already mentioned in this and previous chapters. 
In this regard, evidence from Chapter 3 suggests: 
a. Despite clear evidence on the role of (intra-)European affairs and 
decisions in the path of Moroccan international integration, EOIs 
do not address them as decisive factors behind this phenomenon. 
Nor do they carry out specific assessments on such influence or 
even on the interactions between the overlapping North-South and 
South-South schemes that the EU promotes in the area.  
b. Almost the opposite occurs in the case of Maghreb (non) 
integration. Here a number of aspects deserve attention: 
i. Despite strong promotion and continuous efforts declared 
by international and domestic actors, trade integration 
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among Maghreb countries has barely progressed for more 
than half a century.  
ii. Although United Maghreb was a strong political claim 
during the decolonisation period in Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia, the project faded away after independence due to a 
sharp deterioration of intra-area relations. Notwithstanding, 
an integration agreement arrived unexpectedly thirty years 
after against a backdrop of instability and crisis. The 
reasons often argued to justify such a turning remain quite 
shallow in this regard: arguments like the improvement of 
bilateral relations between country leaders or the will to 
negotiate as one -stronger- actor face to the European 
Community do not seem to find any hard evidence in 
subsequent years. 
c. The Agadir Agreement, as a South-South arrangement aimed at 
creating an Euro-Mediterranean diagonal system of rules of origin 
on the basis of the acquis communautaire holds some 
characteristics that make clearly distinguish it from other S-S 
agreements: 
 
i. It is a South-South agreement promoted and largely 
financed by the EU whereby signing countries should 
approach European trade rules and standards 
ii. Despite a number of ‘physical conditions’ like the distance 
between signatory countries or the fact that, to a certain 
extent, their economies are concurrent among them, the 
agreement raised high expectations. Also, hopes were high 
that other Mediterranean countries would join afterwards. 
However, neither this happened, nor integration among the 
four countries has fulfilled expectations so far. 
iii. Within the Mediterranean framework, the four (and only) 
signatory countries are long-standing privileged partners in 
European Foreign Affairs.  
In this vein, our contribution aims at providing a comprehensive 
insight on those processes that can complement mainstream approaches by 
taking into account the following aspects: 
 Both PTAs and FTAs belong to Foreign Policy Affairs, hence are 
political decisions.  
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 Their political nature goes along with a legal one. They regulate 
the terms of integration and respect also the regulatory framework 
set by IEOs and International Law. 
 IEOs are not only responsible for the regulatory aspects of 
integration, but are also in charge of its promotion, evaluation and 
follow up. 
 In line with the reasoning developed in previous chapters, the 
approach that these institutions apply to the study and promotion 
of a certain type of integration is not neutral or unambiguous. 
Rather, country profiles and their international behaviour matter on 
how their results are perceived. 
 Not one theory fits all cases. Similarly, not all countries are evenly 
represented in international institutions and neither they do within 
the scientific field. As a consequence, some voices, needs and 
approaches are more willing to reach ‘universal validity’. 
 When it comes to North-South and centre-periphery relations, 
there is solid evidence that Southern countries undergo dynamics 
of ‘subalternity’ face to Northern/Western ones (Fernandez-
Molina et al., 2018). Often, their domestic agenda, as well as their 
socioeconomic structure and internal politics are largely 
underestimated when assessing their performance under 
mainstream approaches. 
 History does matter. Regional processes do not necessarily start by 
preferential agreements. Rather, integration among countries, as 
well as their relationship with their main partners, are rooted in the 
long term. In this regard, for countries having undergone processes 
of colonisation, the footprint of past relations has triggered 
patterns of specialisation that are more complex than Ricardian 
logics of trade and specialisation may suggest. 
 As a consequence of the premises set above, International 
Economic Agreements are also to be understood as mechanisms of 
legitimation of already-existing economic relations within the 
process of transition towards new regional and international 
economic frameworks. Accordingly, the role that IEOs play in 
such transitions is to be considered carefully.  
With such premises at hand, the following sections analyse the 
political economy of the most recent experiences of South-South 
regionalism undertaken by Morocco. First of all, the political and 
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socioeconomic aspects lying behind the creation and evolution of the 
AMU are assessed within the framework of Euro-Mediterranean relations. 
Secondly, the reasons and outcomes of Agadir Agreement are examined 
under the same light. The chapter will conclude by characterising the 
current state of affairs of the Moroccan approach to South-South 
integration against the background of a dominant pattern of North-South 
relations.  
 
4.3.1 Reassessing the goals of Moroccan South-South integration  
In 1960, Lipsey advanced the “natural trading partners” hypothesis. 
According to this hypothesis, the greater the proportion of intra-area trade, 
and the lesser with the rest of the world, the likelier it was that a regional 
agreement would enhance welfare.  Over half a century later, this idea was 
developed by a number of economists and objected by authors like Schiff 
(2001). He argued that the volume of exchanges does not necessarily 
provide an objective measure of the extent to which trading partners are 
“natural”. In his view, a more reliable indicator was the degree to which 
the goods exchanged between them were complementary 54 . Other 
literature has pointed to the impact of export competitiveness, export 
concentration, geographical proximity or the institutional framework in 
these phenomena. IEOs’ analyses of Moroccan integration largely build 
on these considerations when promoting Maghreb integration despite its 
adverse conditions of departure. Nevertheless, some aspects remain 
unclear regarding the interplay between South-South and North-South 
agreements in the area. Their approaches often avoid focusing on the roots 
of such processes and apply a narrow corset to the assumed theoretical 
goals ‘for which’ (Cohen, 2014) they are to be promoted.  
The AMU has existed for almost thirty years now. However, the 
treaty linking the economies of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and 
Mauritania in Marrakech in 1989 is now seen as a tale of failure or, at 
best, of eternal deferral of steps forward. Among the many obstacles that 
frustrated Maghreb integration, economists and political scientists point to 
political causes. The relations between the five countries have never 
ceased to be guided by a continuous flow of diplomatic crises that swing 
54 For further information on this index applied to the Moroccan case, see Table 1. 
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between circumstantial quarrels and structural rivalry (Zouiri, 2010; 
Larramendi, 2018). The EU identifies two issues that hinder integration at 
the sub-regional and international levels. In the first case, it refers to the 
Western Sahara conflict between Morocco and Algeria as a direct cause of 
the obstruction of the development of the AMU. However, authors like 
Biad (2013) find part of the causes of the Maghreb regional situation in 
the management of the EU, highlighting the coincidence of the launch of 
the Barcelona Process with the moment when the AMU entered a process 
of crisis and recession. 
Almost twenty-five years after the establishment of the UMA, a new 
South-South attempt rekindled expectation around the Mediterranean. The 
Agadir Agreement sanctioned in 2004 by Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and 
Jordan and open to Arab Mediterranean countries bound to the European 
Union through an Association or an FTA, aspired to expand until the 
establishment of a Mediterranean Free Trade Area (MAFTA). Through 
the diagonal accumulation of RoOs, it ultimately pursued Euro-
Mediterranean integration based on the Pan-Euro-Mediterranean system 
of rules of origin, following the European acquis communautaire. 
Nonetheless, more than ten years have gone and, as seen previously in this 
chapter, the virtuous circle foreseen by this peculiar South-South 
arrangement was never set in motion.  
Beyond the trade figures already analysed in this chapter, the 
rationale and ambitions of both processes will be assessed in the following 
sections.  
 
4.4 THE (NON)-MAGHREB WITHIN EURO-MED RELATIONS 
Together, the five countries of the Maghreb had in 2010 a population 
of around 90 million people distributed unequally along the territory. 
Indeed, about 90% of the population is concentrated in northern and 
coastal areas (Mebtoul, 2011). Also water resources and agricultural land 
are concentrated in the coastal strip, where mountain ranges slow down 
the harshness of the desert and allow for the development of 
Mediterranean agriculture (Escribano and Lorca, 2007). Although 
demographic growth in the region has slowed down in recent years, the 
level of economic growth has not been able to absorb an ever-increasing 
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supply of surplus labour (Abad, 2013), which has progressively migrated 
to urban areas, widening the development gap in rural zones. On the 
whole, foreign trade has been characterised in recent years by current 
account surpluses in oil-producing countries and chronic deficits in 
resource-poor ones, with the EU playing a major role in both cases. On the 
other hand, although the financial crisis has negatively affected the entire 
region, its impact varied along countries. 
In terms of economic structure, the Maghreb countries differ in 
certain respects: Libya has traditionally been rich in natural resources and 
poor in labour supply, and Algeria is rich in resources, but also in labour 
supply. Although both are involved in processes of economic transition at 
the moment, Libyan transformations are certainly the most challenging 
ones. Indeed, as Tim Eaton (2018) argues, Libya functions nowadays as a 
‘war economy’. For their part, Morocco and Tunisia, relatively poor in 
resources and with abundant labour force, have the most open and 
diversified economies. There, agricultural and manufacturing exports, 
foreign investment, remittances from migrants and tourism play a major 
role, as it has been shown above.  
Several authors, however, do not only advocate the potential of the 
sub-region as an economic bloc, but they also have argued that the cost of 
non-South-South integration and, in particular, of non-Maghreb (Zouiri, 
2010; Mebtoul 2011) could become unsustainable for the economies of 
the region (Zouiri, 2010). In this regard, they recall El Malki’s arguments 
that “the Maghreb construction is not formulated in terms of choice, but in 
terms of survival” (El Malki, 1988, p. 212). In favour of this argument, 
several factors that advantageous to integration are underscored. Among 
them, Zouiri (2010) highlighted the characteristics of human capital, 
historical, geographical and cultural ties whereby a French-speaking 
Western model melted into a Berber-Arab-Islamic culture. Moreover, they 
argue, the existence of shared challenges continually highlighted by 
international institutions could be seen as an opportunity to overcome 
them from a regional approach. The high vulnerability of European trade 
dependence, an unattractive environment for investors, inefficient 
education systems, insufficient scientific and technological development, 
chronic youth unemployment and governance issues are often mentioned 
by institutions and scholars in this context. 
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Still, despite the avowed failure of the AMU and the scant 
performance of the Agadir Agreement (2004), the EU has reinforced its 
support to a united Maghreb as a key for stability and progress after the 
wave of protests that shook the Mediterranean in 2011 (EC, 2012). This 
appears even more paradoxical when retracing the discourse on Maghreb 
through the XX century. Regional claims in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia 
started in the 1920s and played a central role in the quest for sovereignty 
during anti-colonial struggles. In this respect, beyond their actual level of 
integration or the suitability of the different regional frameworks in place, 
one central question arises: how did it happen that Maghreb regionalism 
as an emancipatory project ended up as an ill-performing FTA inserted 
within the North-South framework that it opposed?  
 
4.4.1 The AMU: a South-South parenthesis in North-South 
relations? 
Little after the Mediterranean enlargement of the European 
Community, the AMU (1989) was established on the Southern shore of 
the basin. Three decades had been gone since the project of a united 
Maghreb had faded away due to intra-regional disputes and border 
conflicts among almost all the countries of the region (Aghrout and 
Sutton. 1980). Furthermore, the so-called ‘Maghreb Cold War’ that had 
frozen the relationship between Morocco and Algeria since 1963 
(Guermoune, 1988; Murphy, 2010) had grown bigger over ideological 
divergences. In addition, that quarrel provoked the exit of Morocco of the 
OAU, isolating itself politically from the rest of the continent.  Although 
certain bilateral or trilateral initiatives took place in that period, the 
climate of confrontation and the inconsistency of the alliances remained as 
inner features of the Maghreb area. However, as the decade went on, the 
process seemed to take a new impulse. 
In this regard, numerous authors attribute this shift to the mandate of 
Chadli Benjedid after the death of the Boumediene in 1978 (Chaalal, 
2011). The politics of “positive neighbourhood” and a more pragmatic and 
liberal attitude from the new leader in the management of national 
hydrocarbons are often addressed as triggering motives of a renewed 
confluence between Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania, followed by a 
meeting between Hassan II and Benjedid in Oujda in 1983 (Balta and 
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Rulleau, 1990; Chaalal, 2011) that would spur the integration process 
since 1986. That year, the main leaders of the parties that led the 
independence struggle gathered in Algiers to commemorate the 
anniversary of the 1958 Tangier conference (Aït-Chaalal, 2011). New 
meetings took place afterwards that led to the restoration of Libyan-
Tunisian relations at the end of 1987. Certainly, the new impetus to 
political Maghreb seemed to come from the East, pushed by the particular 
involvement of Algeria, which unfolded gestures of friendship to all the 
neighbours of the region (Aït-Chaalal, 2011). Against this background, 
Morocco and Algeria restored diplomatic relations on May 16, 1988. 
From that moment on, the wheel of political integration accelerated 
sharply.  
At the beginning of January 1989, Hassan II officially received a 
delegation from the Polisario Front (Aït-Chaalal, 2011) and the Algerian 
president made an official visit to Morocco. According to Aït-Chaalal 
(2011, p.47), with these gestures, “the last political obstacles in view of 
the signature of a Maghreb Treaty fell down.” A few months later, in the 
city of Marrakech, on 7 February 1989, the treaty ratifying the creation of 
the AMU was signed. 
In view of these considerations, a step backwards seems necessary to 
grasp the underlying reasons behind the sometimes-contradictory 
explanations on the reasons why Maghreb should be an economic region 
whilst AMU has never worked. To do so, it would be misleading to keep 
the focus on why did integration fail, as some of the mentioned analyses 
do. Rather, there are reasons to wonder why did it happen and how the 
current situation relates to the goals pursued by the creation of a regional 
ensemble in 1989. As for Moroccan insertion in the Euro-Mediterranean 
framework, the next sections will review the political economy of the 
Moroccan insertion on Maghreb regionalism since the transition towards 
independence.   
 
4.4.1.1 The roots of Maghreb regionalism: North-South versus South-
South options 
To explain the roots of non-integration in the Maghreb area, it is 
necessary to go back to the colonial footprint and analyse the production 
systems inherited from that period. The three countries of the central 
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Maghreb began their independence with disjointed economies in which 
two agricultural sectors (traditional and modern) coexisted. For those 
specializing in the export of unprocessed crude oil, dependence on the 
metropolitan market was also an essential asset (Zouiri, 2010). Thus, in 
the attempt to implement a common strategy for the new era of 
independence, the obstacles that hampered the project were, among 
others: 
 The diversity of economic development strategies 
 The diversity of industry standards and references 
 The weakness of project financing conditions, foreign trade and 
the insurance system 
 Obstacles to factor mobility 
 The weakness of economic movement between partners and 
obstacles that go beyond the customs authorities 
 The lack of necessary transport infrastructure, both between and 
within countries 
Notwithstanding, the idea of Maghreb Unity had reached strong 
popularity in the aftermath of decolonisation. Apart from sociocultural 
elements like language, religion or genealogic origins, many historians 
highlight colonial vicissitudes as a cohesive element of Maghreb 
consciousness (Santucci, 1972; Ageron, 1983; Gallissot, 2015). The 
resistance against colonial allegiance expanded since the beginning of the 
Protectorate from the Rif Mountains to the Anti-Atlas, as well as along the 
borders of French Algeria and in the Sahara. Notwithstanding, since the 
1920s, nationalist and regionalist claims increased from two poles of the 
intellectual elite: Arab students in Paris and Islamic intellectuals in Fes 
built their anti-colonial narrative by praising a Maghreb alliance around 
Arab identity and against French imperialism (Ageron, 1983; Vermeren, 
2010). As an example, the creation in Paris of the Association d’étudiants 
musulmans nord-africains (AEMNA) in 1928 was largely guided by the 
goal to “politicise in the sense of anticolonial nationalism all the Maghreb 
students and to raise awareness of the Muslim world towards the North-
African question” (Ageron, 1983, p. 32). 
After WWII, the Comité de Libération du Maghreb Arabe (1947), 
lead by the Riffian dissident Abd El-Krim, was created in Cairo with 
representatives of nationalist parties, but internal divergences and the 
prominence of national goals divided Maghreb supporters and weakened 
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the movement (Santucci, 1972, p. 131). Regionalist goals would be 
relegated until Morocco and Tunisia achieved their independence in 1956. 
Both of them would then support the Algerian war against France as a fair 
and necessary cause within the framework of the “Maghreb des peuples” 
—People’s Maghreb—. From Cairo, Abd El-Krim summoned Moroccans 
to “pursue the war of liberation until the emancipation of Maghreb” 
(Rivet, 2012, p. 560). 
However, the differences between post-colonial regimes and the rise 
of border conflicts would relegate regionalism to a secondary place. 
Furthermore, the negotiated independence of Morocco entailed the 
preservation of the status quo in many respects. As explained in the 
previous chapter, continuity was facilitated by the Treaty of Rome, which 
preserved “imperial preferences” under the disguise of “particular regimes 
of imports” (Etienne, 1970, p. 174). As a consequence, Morocco, Tunisia 
and Algeria remained subject to French unilateral concessions within the 
framework of the Common Market. What is more, the different legal 
statuses of their economic arrangements with the European Community 
made it difficult and, to a certain degree, unworthy to agree on a common 
position that strengthened their geopolitical weight.  
Despite a number of bilateral and trilateral meetings and the signature 
of around forty bilateral agreements (Santucci, 1972), the decay of 
regionalist goals would be definitely confirmed after Algerian 
independence. Since 1963, the debate on Maghreb unity was replaced by 
long-lasting border disputes. Moreover, the subsequent decline of Third-
World ideals within the majoritarian Moroccan parties nourished a vision 
of Algeria as “the rival nation” that conceived Maghreb in terms of 
domination, as an instrument for its appropriation of the Sahara (Leveau, 
1985, p. 251). 
In February 1963, the three ministers of Foreign Affairs of Morocco, 
Algeria and Tunisia met in Rabat with a double goal: on the one hand, to 
lessen discrepancies and to re-examine feasible paths towards unification; 
on the other hand, to adopt “common attitudes at the diplomatic level” and 
to harmonise their economic policies “towards large economic ensembles 
like the EEC” (Guermoune, 1988, p. 284). However, by then Maghreb 
ambitions were already subject to the European paradigm of integration 
from many points of view. Morocco and Tunisia had started individual 
conversations with Europe in view of the signature of Association 
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Agreements. For its part, Algeria still belonged de facto to the Common 
Market (Valay, 1966). The low expectations raised by the political 
complex scenario led to the decision to “build the real Maghreb by the 
basis”, by trying to focus on “what can be done at the level of economy” 
(Santucci, 1972, p. 133) with the help of the technical assistance provided 
by UN Economic Commission for Africa. Since 1964, the Grand Maghreb 
(which included Libya and Mauritania) would become a vaguely defined 
intergovernmental project guided by an unclear roadmap. 
In April 1964, a conference of experts in development organised by 
the Economic Commission for Africa exposed in Tangier the main 
features of Maghreb markets and proposed a sectorial strategy for 
industrial development in the region. With assistance from the UNCTAD, 
the sectorial approach was replaced in 1967 by a global one. Three 
possibilities were proposed to this regard (Santucci, 1972, p. 145): 
 The ‘minimum’ one, foreseeing economic union as “a simple 
declaration of intentions”  
 The ‘maximal’ one, inspired by the Treaty of Rome  
 The ‘intermediate’ one, based on “interaction between trade 
liberalization and industrial harmonization”  
Maghreb countries chose the third, but not significant outcomes 
would follow. The common declaration issued after the conference of 
Rabat in 1970 confirmed Algerian reluctance to pursue the process of 
Maghreb integration. The official reason was the threat that Moroccan and 
Tunisian Investment Acts would expose the country to the expansion of 
neo-colonialism through the attraction of international capital. In practice, 
Algeria had adopted a national plan for industrial development and its 
involvement in a regional strategy was subject to its possibility to lead it. 
In the meanwhile, the three countries had been renegotiating separately 
their relations with European partners. 
 
4.4.2 The energy sector as the engine of integration: Market 
integration in the Western Mediterranean 
Rather than the failure of Maghreb integration, the striking fact at first 
sight is that an integration agreement was endorsed against the turbulent 
regional background of the time. Even more in view of the fact that flows 
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of trade, capitals and workforce do not appear to have really undergone 
any dramatic change ever since. These two features suggest that different 
reasons and goals related to the regional geopolitical and economic 
context ought to be considered. Accordingly, a careful assessment of the 
terms of the agreement and of those that preceded it in the 1980s, placed 
within the framework of the geopolitical shocks experienced on both sides 
of the Mediterranean during such period, provided this research with a 
number of hints that brought us to the energy sector: 
i. The only sector where a trend of economic cooperation began 
among Maghreb countries in the 1980s that did not exist before 
was natural gas. A set of joint ventures was put in place in 
order to bring gas from Algeria and Libya to Italy and Spain 
through pipelines that crossed Tunisia and Morocco. 
ii. The bilateral and trilateral South-South integration initiatives 
came, since the beginning of the decade, from a strong 
Algerian advocacy for Cooperation Agreements. 
iii. The prerogatives of such agreements, as well as those of the 
Treaty of Marrakech, entailed regulatory changes that allowed 
to set up those projects within a safe legal environment. 
iv. European governance in the sector of energy underwent 
significant transformations in the same period. 
v. Transformations in the energy sector in Spain also appear to be 
related to those trends. Besides, the 1980s are the decade of 
Spanish accession to the Common Market. 
vi. The only merchandise that still today crosses legally the 
terrestrial borders that separate Morocco and Algeria (closed 
since 1994) is natural gas -and, to a much lesser extent, 
electricity. 
Therefore, the following sections will deepen on the relationship 
between the transformations having taken place in the regional energetic 
landscape, the signature of South-South agreements and North-South 
integration in the Euro-Mediterranean framework. 
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4.4.2.1 The Euro-Mediterranean landscape of natural gas in the 
1980s: a confluence of circumstances 
The development of the Euro-Mediterranean gas market had a 
regional dimension at its origin. Nonetheless, this did not exactly overlap 
with the Internal Energy Market (IEM) and had mainly a multipolar shape 
with the main Member States (MS) playing a central role (Rubino, 2016). 
Given the initial focus of the EEC on coal and nuclear energy and the 
following marginalisation of the EEC in sensitive questions regarding 
global oil supplies, natural gas remained for decades far from priorities in 
the regional agenda. This situation left margin for European governments 
to foster a quasi-monopolistic control of energy markets by their ‘national 
champions’ (Rubino, 2016). Since the aftermath of the oil crises in 1973, 
the natural gas industry in the Mediterranean entered the agenda of 
European integration.  After that, a Euro-Mediterranean market developed 
in two phases:  
 1st phase: regional markets were developed by connecting the main 
import hubs (in Italy and Spain) with transport pipelines to the large 
gas exporters in the region (Algeria and Libya) through long term 
contracts (LTCs) that sometimes explicitly included the take or pay 
clause: 
o The buyer took the volume risk, and the seller took the price 
risk 
o This was possible because the respective domestic markets 
were dominated by large vertically integrated utilities on both 
sides of the pipelines.  
o Most of these long term contracts (LTCs), after more than 40 
years, are still in place in the Mediterranean exchanges 
o Moreover, the long-term contracts left no necessity, room or 
incentive for diversification.  
 2nd phase (transition): European integration induced a top down 
transformation of the existing energy systems, toward a tightly 
specified target model as defined by the EU institutions (Tholens, 
2014). 
Therefore, since its early stages, the gas industry was dominated by 
bilateral relationships. The main actors of these commercial and strategic 
interactions were national decision makers, usually represented by state 
owned companies in charge of the entire supply chain in their respective 
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domestic markets (Rubino, 2016). This situation would change with the 
progressive liberalisation of energy markets promoted by European 
institutions during the 1990s.  
 
4.4.3 The heart of Maghreb in Hassi R’Mel: South-South (micro-
economic) integration 
The Algerian reserves of natural gas, far more abundant than oil ones, 
were known since 1956, but they would remain a second-class resource 
until the 1980s (Hayes, 2006; Musso, 2015). In this respect, the European 
countries did not hold sufficient market shares or clear intentions to target 
this sector. The only exception was Italy, which had developed extraction 
activities since the mid-1940s following the discovery of important 
reserves in the Po valley, close to the most industrialised regions of the 
country (Musso, 2015). Twenty years later, the state-owned company Eni 
would hold the technical means and state support to reach the international 
market with ambitious proposals in the natural gas sector. For those 
reasons, Eni appeared to be the most suitable company for negotiations 
between Algeria and France on the energy supply of the Northern shore 
(Musso, 2015).  
With the aim to secure a steady flow between the source and the 
market that could bear geopolitical shifts more reliably than trade in 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), two ambitious transnational pipeline 
projects were proposed as early as in the 1960s: the first, which sought to 
bring natural gas from the Hassi R’Mel fields to France, via Morocco and 
Spain through the Strait of Gibraltar, was technically feasible but 
politically implausible under the prevailing political context. The second, 
which would cross Tunisia to reach Sicily, had the opposite characteristics 
(Hayes, 2006; Musso, 2015). It would be the second option, called 
Transmed, the first artery to permanently link Algerian energy to 
European consumption. Having overcome a number of vicissitudes that 
kept the project on standby during the 1970s, and assisted by Italian state 
funding and contributions from the European Community, the pipeline 
was inaugurated in May 1983. 
In that period, the rise of Chadli Benjedid to power had brought about 
important transformations in Algerian politics and economic approach 
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(Khelif, 1999). After the death of Colonel Boumédiène, the national 
company Sonatrach and the hydrocarbon sector in general, underwent 
major restructuring (Musso, 2015). At the same time, the repercussions of 
the oil crisis had brought energy dependence back to the centre of the 
European agenda (Sid Ahmed, 1993; Hayes, 2006; Mañé-Estrada, 2009; 
Musso, 2015). Against this background, Algeria could exploit the renewed 
interest in natural gas over the Mediterranean. 
The Treaty of Fraternity and Agreement signed between Algeria and 
Tunisia in March 1983 gave cross-border cooperation and South-South 
interaction a decidedly central role in comparison with the “bon 
voisinage” agreement that the two countries had ratified thirteen years 
earlier. The replacement of good neighbourliness by the concept of 
“concorde” introduced a more proactive approach which, from the point 
of view of International Law, implied a firmer commitment to long-term 
partnerships and the opening of the agreement to the rest of the Maghreb 
countries (Meliani, 1985, p. 94). With regard to border issues, Meliani 
(1985, p. 95) underlines the “passage from the concept of “no man’s land” 
to the development of a community life in the benefit of the riparians, in a 
perspective of positive neighbourhood”. In particular, the part of the 
territory that in the 1970s could not be delimited became a potential hub 
of cooperation and development agreed upon at the political level by the 
Algerian-Tunisian Grand Commission; at the political-administrative level 
by the “wilayate-jonctions” located in the border area; and at the technical 
level by the creation of joint ventures for joint industrial projects (Meliani, 
1985, p. 97). This last aspect deserves special attention: 
 
“The industrial cooperation defined by the framework 
agreement signed on 24 April 1983 between Algeria and 
Tunisia is an open, non-exclusive cooperation. The possibility 
of extending it to other Arab countries and public institutions 
(Article 1) is noted, as is the possibility of associating with a 
third party for better technology transfer (Article 1, paragraph 
2). (...) First of all, a company will be set up for each new 
project and therefore the question arises as to what its legal 
status will be. It is a bi-national company by virtue of its 
economic objective, bi or multinational by virtue of its share 
capital and decision-making power, but national by virtue of 
the applicable law. Economic objective: First of all, society 
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has the will of promoting cooperation between two 
independent national states. This bilateral cooperation requires 
the intervention of the two States concerned but also of the 
industrial promoters of the two countries (Article 1, paragraph 
2), which suggests the intervention of the private sector within 
the framework of this action. (...) The duly constituted 
company enjoys a set of privileges in fiscal and customs 
matters (Article 7), of non double taxation (Article 8), in 
marketing matters (Article 9), for the transfer of salaries of 
non-nationals (Article 10), of an import exemption for the 
company’s workers (Article II)” (Meliani, 1985, pp. 97-98). 
 
Thus, the Transmed gas pipeline would come into operation two 
months later under a favourable legal framework, which also facilitated 
the plans to integrate the electrical network between the two countries. 
Shortly thereafter, Mauritania will accede to the Treaty, for which Algeria 
will officially define its borders with that country. Several joint projects in 
the fisheries, steel and energy sectors (Aghrout and Sutton, 1990) 
promoted cooperation on the tripartite axis and isolated its Libyan and 
Moroccan flanks. They would react by announcing their reconciliation in 
May 1983, after thirteen years of discord (Aghrout and Sutton, 1990, p. 
122), and expressed their will to improve cooperation in the economic, 
political and social fields. 
Colonel Gaddafi had asserted his interest in joining the Algerian-
Tunisian axis, but he found Algerian conditions for the resolution of 
border disputes unacceptable and caused his request to be rejected 
(Aghrout and Sutton, 1990, p. 122). Thus, in August 1984, Morocco and 
Libya would sign in Oujda a treaty establishing the Arab African Union 
(AAU), which declared in Article 8 the objective of “contributing to the 
unification of the Arab Maghreb and, by extension, to the realization of 
the unity of the Arab nation” (Aghrout and Sutton, 1990, p. 122). A 
couple of months earlier, Morocco had applied for membership of the 
European Community at the Fontainebleau Council (El Kadiri, 1992). In 
November of the same year, Morocco also left the OAU in protest against 
the inclusion of SADR in the organisation. Two years later, under pressure 
from its Western and Eastern partners, Morocco cancelled its treaty with 
Libya without any major economic or political progress (Aghrout and 
Sutton, 1990). 
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In 1986, the volatile hydrocarbon sector led Algeria to a second 
impasse that was felt throughout the region, where the economy of this 
country accounted for two-thirds of the GDP and employed half of the 
Maghreb workforce (Sid Ahmed, 1993). As Sid Ahmed put it (1993, p. 
760): 
“If historical oil price readjustments lead to a fourfold 
increase in public investment in Algeria, the collapse of 
phosphate prices in 1976 marks the adoption of more 
liberal policies in Morocco with repeated rescheduling of 
debt; the same phenomenon then recurring in Algeria 
from 1986 onwards for identical reasons.” 
Algeria will then seek to consolidate its economy through 
liberalisation. The opening up of the possibility for international 
companies to participate directly in exploration and production activities 
(Sid Ahmed, 1993; Mañé-Estrada, 2008) accelerated foreign investment 
and inundated the territory of Western companies through which 
successive projects for the exploitation and commercialization of gas 
would flourish. The trend towards liberalisation in the Maghreb as a 
whole and the SAPs implemented by Morocco and Tunisia would 
consolidate the peripheral nature of the region through the so-called 
“strategic trade policy” approach (Sid Ahmed, 1993).  
The context of crisis and liberalisation coincided with a new impetus for 
intra-Maghreb relations, which flourished again from the East of the region. 
Thus, the meeting between Gaddafi and Benjedid in In-Amenas in January 
1986 was to result in the signature in Algiers of a protocol, one month later, 
creating joint ventures for oil exploitation, geophysical projects, vehicle 
assembly and maintenance and other manufacturing activities. Furthermore, 
the rupture of the AAU was to be followed by a series of gestures of 
rapprochement between Algeria and its neighbours in 1987, which would 
give rise to cross-border projects in some industrial sectors (Blin and Gobe, 
1989; Aghrout and Sutton, 1990). On the other hand, the succession of 
Bourguiba to Ben Ali in Tunisia (1987) would lead towards an improvement 
in relations with Libya that would allow for a settlement of border conflicts 
through the joint management of the resources in the Gulf of Gabès (Blin and 
Gobe, 1989; Aghrout and Sutton, 1990). In addition, the three countries 
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would sign an agreement in Tripoli establishing the Societé du Maghreb 
Arabe pour le transport du gaz naturel (Somatgaz) in June 1988, which 
would draft the route of the ‘trans-Maghreb gas pipeline’ linking Algeria to 
Libya and Tunisia (Blin and Gobe, 1989, p. 378). 
From 1988 onwards, integration would also intensify in the northwest. 
Since the 1960s, several French companies had been proposing the 
construction of pipelines to convey natural gas from Algeria to France via 
Spain (Hayes, 2006, p. 77). However, technical and political constraints had 
left the process in suspense. The wave of deregulation of the 1980s and the 
Mediterranean enlargement of the European Community, particularly 
relevant to Maghreb economies as a consequence of Spain's accession, 
fostered consensus in a number of intra-Maghreb coordination meetings and 
proposals (Aghrout and Sutton, 1990), as well as the firm intention of 
entering the world economy through the GATT gateway. On 10 June 1988, 
the five heads of state of the Maghreb met in Zeralda (Algeria) for the first 
time since independence to discuss regional concerns. The Haute 
Commission Maghrebine was created would hold its first meeting in 
Algiers just one month later (13 July). Other five specialized sub-
commissions were then put into operation. Their members gathered in all 
the Maghreb capitals in September of the same year, while new meetings of 
the Haute Commission took place in Rabat (October 1988) and Tunisia 
(January 1989) with a view to drafting a Maghreb Treaty. At the end of the 
same month, Algeria and Morocco signed a cooperation treaty aimed at 
improving communications between the two countries. Between the 6 and 8 
February 1989, the two countries ratified the creation of the Rabat-Alger 
axis during a visit to Morocco by Chadli Benjedid. They also set up a joint 
company to build the Maghreb gas pipeline, a project revitalised by the 
Spanish company Gas Natural to connect Hassi R’Mel with the Spanish 
market, crossing the Moroccan territory to reach the peninsula from the 
shortest section. Just one week later (15-17 February) the Marrakech Treaty 
was signed, ratifying the creation of the AMU. 
Article 3 of the Treaty stipulated the joint actions to be implemented 
in the international, economic and cultural fields, with particular reference 
to the promotion of joint economic agreements and seeking to avoid the 
thorniest divergences that divided them on a political level. Among the 
many institutions to which the treaty gave life, the most prominent ones 
mirrored of the philosophy and functioning of the European Council: a 
Presidential Council composed of the five Heads of State who would hold 
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the presidency in turns of six months (Aït-Chaalal, 2011, p. 47). Since 
then, Maghreb associations would proliferate and meetings would be held 
at various levels in the political, economic, cultural and technical fields. In 
January of the following year, common arrangements for defence 
cooperation, inter-regional cooperation with other Arab countries, 
relations with the EEC and regional and international conflicts of major 
impact would be further developed (Aït-Chaalal, 2011). However, the 
heightened ambition of a set of goals guided by the strengthening of the 
“fraternal ties”, the “progress for welfare” and “safeguarding peace” 
(Stora, 2011, p. 23) did not find any further development. Moreover, the 
marked intergovernmental and top-down nature of the treaty meant that its 
stability depended almost exclusively on the state of diplomatic relations 
between countries, which would continue to worsen from the very 
beginning of the following decade. 
By the time the Barcelona Process was launched, the Maghreb 
countries involved showed up separately and with little or no mention of 
the UMA. However, if one looks at energy and electricity integration, 
such an agreement made it possible to carry out important projects that 
would, in fact, integrate the Maghreb countries. However, their integration 
would aim since the beginning to integrating them subsequently into 
Europe. In this respect, the agreements that precede and establish the 
AMU can be read as a means for achieving juridical legitimacy for a 
number of projects suggested from the northern shore and accepted by the 
Southern Mediterranean when the circumstances of the 1980s propitiated 
it. Accordingly, it seems pertinent to reformulate the diagnoses of success 
or failure of the project on the basis of these goals, which seem central to 
the entire process. A further example is the meeting of Maghreb experts 
on energy held in December 1988: the proposals that emerged from this 
meeting consisted of the unification of the electrical grids of the five 
States (also linked to the European market, as we shall see in the 
following section), the construction of joint pipelines and the liberalisation 
of the exchange and production of oil products. 
The role of Spain in the region since its accession to the EEC is worth 
mentioning. In the 1980s, its accession allowed to widen its former 
colonial fishery preferences within the framework of the Common Fishery 
Policy through the agreements signed with Morocco. Then, in the 1990s, 
it became an important hub for the transformation and distribution of 
natural gas to the rest of the Community through the exploitation of the 
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centre-periphery relations that it established with Algeria (Mañé-Estrada, 
2009). From this point of view, it is important to note that North-South 
relations in the Mediterranean were not merely developed as an 
asymmetric EU-southern country exchange. On the contrary, bilateral 
relations and microeconomic integration processes are crucial in this 
process (Mañé-Estrada, 2009). Certain countries of the Community act as 
legitimate interlocutors based on legacies of historical dependence or 
interdependence. However, provided that the benefits derived from these 
asymmetric relations are shared by and accessible to the entire regional 
bloc, they enjoy the guarantee of being supported by the whole of the 
Community market. Judging by the data, European support and legitimacy 
represent a significant economic and geopolitical advantage in shaping 
inter-regional projects. 
 
4.4.4 The consolidation of ‘Non-Maghreb’ 
A few years after the establishment of the AMU, the combination of 
several domestic crises turned the Maghreb region back into an amalgam 
of countries negotiating with the North, and separately, short-term 
solutions to their respective contingencies. The rise of Islamism and 
armed conflict in Algeria (Martínez, 1998), the diplomatic isolation of 
Libya after the Lockerbie affair (Djaziri, 1998), and the prevalence the 
adjustment processes of the Moroccan and Tunisian economies blurred the 
interest in the newly created region. To this context must be added the 
diversion of regional goals towards global integration through the reform 
of investment codes and banking laws in all the countries of the AMU 
(Echeverría, 1994), the proliferation of tax-free zones and the 
improvement of facilities for the establishment of foreign companies. 
The birth of the WTO would further atomise the Maghreb reality. 
Three of the five members of the AMU would appear as “original 
members” in the WTO from that moment onwards, while the other two 
would at most reach the negotiating table in the following years (Ghérari, 
2013). Mauritania had become directly a member of GATT by the time it 
gained independence, by virtue of French membership. For their part, 
Morocco and Tunisia submitted their candidatures following the “normal” 
procedure laid down in Article XXXIII of the GATT (Ghérari, 2013). In 
this way, Morocco would become a member of the GATT on 17 June 
1987 and Tunisia would join on 19 August 1990, although the latter had 
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already embarked on the process of provisional accession in 1959 
(Ghérari, 2013). Algeria and Libya would submit their candidacies, but 
neither of them would eventually join the organisation. 
The completion of the Uruguay Round on Moroccan soil closed a 
long period of diatribes on the agricultural sector for the countries of the 
North. Instead, for the countries of the South, it entailed the partial 
withdrawal of the special treatment granted to them since 1964 by the 
right to autonomous agricultural policies on behalf of their development 
goals (Aït-Amara, 1995). In this respect, the prerogatives that sought to 
disconnect support policies for agriculture from price intervention, already 
present in SAPs as short-term measures, became permanent rules (Aït-
Amara, 1995). On the other hand, the convertibility of the currency for 
current payments and the significant tariff reduction negotiated with the 
IMF and the World Bank implied a trade opening that went beyond the 
limits agreed in the GATT framework, which provided “tariff equivalent 
mechanisms” that allowed the countries of the North considerable room 
for manoeuvre (Aït-Amara, 1995). Although those measures were also 
available to the Maghreb countries, their implementation was more 
problematic and costly, given the greater gap between domestic and world 
prices that they had to fill in this way (Aït-Amara, 1995). In view of this, 
some argue that WTO accession was worthier in terms of legitimacy than 
of competitiveness in international trade (Ghérari, 2013). Be as it may, the 
WTO was not officially informed about the AMU among the preferential 
agreements notified by Morocco and Tunisia (Ghérari, 2013). 
In a climate dominated by political instability, by the deterioration of 
intra-Maghreb relations and by the strengthening of North-South ties, the 
only integration that was to continue was that of the energy sector. From 
the heart of Algeria, gas pipelines multiplied to the north, and electricity 
grids spread across the Mediterranean connecting North and South. On the 
eastern side of the Maghreb, the second phase of the Transmed project 
was completed between 1991 and 1994, while in Libya, feasibility studies 
for bringing Libyan gas to Italy via the Greenstream gas pipeline began 
(Santis and Gangas, 2011). On the western side of the region, the Maghreb 
Europa Gas pipeline, also known as the Pedro Durán Farrell gas pipeline, 
began to supply gas to Spain in 1996 and Portugal in 1997, without the 
Algerian civil war or the closure of borders with its western neighbour 
being an obstacle to its construction and functioning. 
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In such circumstances, the purpose of Maghreb integration became 
diluted due to poor cooperation in projects not mediated by the North and 
to the proliferation of bilateral agreements with the European Union and 
other multilateral agreements such as Gafta (1997). The latter, which 
would constitute the umpteenth attempt to set up a true pan-Arab 
economic bloc, would contribute to the overflowing of the spaghetti bowl 
in the Mediterranean basin in subsequent years. Although authors like 
Abedini and Péridy (2008) attribute a 20% increase in intra-Arab trade to 
the agreement, they underscore that this occurred mainly among Mashreq 
and Gulf countries. Once again, the benefits of belonging to a regional 
grouping outside its historical flows and alliances seem dubious for the 
Maghreb countries. 
 
4.4.5 Electrical integration and the rise of renewables: the 
Mediterranean energy ring 
The new millennium began with intra-Maghreb relations diluted 
within the Euro-Mediterranean framework. The regional project gained 
momentum in the field of economic integration for its being one of the 
least integrated regions of the world (Zoubir, 2000; Martínez, 2006; 
Ehteshami, 2015). In this context, while studies on the cost of the Non-
Maghreb proliferated (Bchir et al., 2006; Ben Hammouda et al., 2006; 
Clyde, Brunel, 2008; Fernández-Molina, 2016), still the few projects that 
managed to jump over the wall were those that were aimed at 
strengthening energy exchanges with the EU. 
Although the integration of the Maghreb electricity market was a long-
standing objective, which had been pursued since 1974 by the Comelec 
(Comité Maghrébin de l'Électricité), the EU was to provide an outlet to this 
lethargy. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed in Rome on 2 
December 2003 between Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, on the one hand, 
and the EU, on the other. They agreed to harmonise policies relating to the 
electricity market in the three countries and to take the necessary measures 
to adapt them to the policy environment in the EU with the aim of creating 
an electricity market from 2006 onwards and to ensure the progressive 
integration of electricity markets of these countries into the internal 
electricity market of the EU (EC, 2003). Shortly afterwards, the IMME 
(Intégration des Marchés Maghrébins de l'Electricité) project was 
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launched, in which Spain and Algeria were the leading partners of each 
party. With the connection between Spain and Morocco via Gibraltar as a 
regional example and the process of liberalisation and integration of the 
European electricity markets as a reference model, the intra-Maghreb 
project emphasised the need to harmonise regulatory frameworks and the 
importance of the liberalisation of all activities in the sector that could be 
carried out in accordance with market laws. The particular interest in the 
liberalisation and development of the production and transport phases fits in 
perfectly with the logic that has favoured the interconnection of the 
Mediterranean gas sector since the 1980s. 
The origin of this parallel lies in the shift in Spanish-Algerian energy 
relations in the 1990s, which led Spain to the aforementioned transition to 
gas and, in Algeria, to the implementation of combi-cycle power plants 
(Mañé-Estrada, 2009). The “universal reverticalisation of the hydrocarbon 
sector” by large energy conglomerates after the crisis of the 1980s brought 
about important transformations, both in the legislative framework and in 
the structure of production and exports in countries like Algeria (Khelif, 
2001; Mañé-Estrada, 2009), which gradually accepted the precepts of the 
global market. These developments would particularly benefit Spain and 
Italy, also involved in the transition to primary energy consumption 
patterns where natural gas predominates (Hayes, 2006; Mañé-Estrada, 
2009; Musso, 2015) and alliances between gas and electricity companies 
abound (Mañé Estrada, 2009). The launch of the Barcelona Process in 
1995 would provide them with a favourable institutional framework to 
unleash the Maghrebi energy potential with the economic, political and 
legal support of the European Community (Mañé-Estrada, 2009). 
Within this framework, the IMME was launched as a comprehensive 
project of a European nature that proposed the training of personnel and 
the creation of spaces for southern cooperation to promote the 
harmonisation of rules and tariffs, the liberalization of the production and 
transport phases, the regulation of segments of the sector subject to 
monopoly regimes and the improvement of high-voltage and 
interconnections among countries. The special European interest in the 
conditions of high-speed cross-border transit and the close links between 
the gas and electricity sectors help to understand the emphasis placed on 
the liberalisation of electricity production in Algeria, since the supply of 
gas to companies located in the country was made at prices below world 
prices (EuropeAid, 2010). In this respect, it is interesting to note that one 
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of the 15 actions envisaged by IMME was precisely to promote the idea of 
“the cost of non-integration” (EuropeAid, 2010, p. 62), following the 
discursive pattern of the costs of European non-integration mentioned in 
the Cecchini report (Fernández-Molina, 2016) and which coincides in 
time with the proliferation of academic works and international 
institutions that deal with this idea. 
The EU has been pursuing a strategy of diversification of gas supplies 
since the early 2000s. Specially since 2005, the importance of securitising 
energy supplies by further entangling gas with electricity and renewable 
energies gained weight in the integration of the Maghreb electricity 
markets, which became part of the Mediterranean Energy Ring project 
(Escribano, 2010, Marín et al., 2011; Marín and Escribano, 2012). The 
series of energy security crises experienced by the EU since 2006 
triggered awareness on the issue of security of energy supply. In 
particular, the Russian-Ukrainian-European gas crises of 2006 and 2009, 
as well as the 2014 unprecedented standoff between the EU and the 
Russian Federation were turning points on this matter. The new strategy 
appeared to be a key opportunity not only for the Mediterranean area, but 
also for the integration of coastal countries of the Community into the 
European market.  
Marín and Escribano (2012) note that, to a certain degree, the 
development of the trans-European gas and electricity networks cannot be 
dissociated from the deployment of renewable energies in SMCs and the 
export of the electricity thus generated to the EU. Furthermore, in the 
regulatory field, the Euro-Mediterranean Energy Forum held in Brussels 
in 2006 insisted on the need for regulatory convergence and pointed to the 
possibility of extending the Energy Community Treaty to the southern 
Med countries (Marín and Escribano, 2012; Escribano, 2016). This 
proposal resulted in a Priority Action Plan adopted by the Med Group 
(2008-2013), which sought to harmonise and interconnect markets. In any 
case, the dominance of European - and particularly Spanish - interests was 
reflected in the implementation of projects whose export vocation was 
more pronounced than in the case of the conventional electricity sector 
(EuropeAid, 2010).  
In the light of these considerations, the question of the achievements 
of integration reveals itself a thorny one. It would be at least inaccurate to 
affirm that South-South agreements have not resulted in any sort of 
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integration. In the same vein, it appears hazardous to argue that the goals 
of those agreements have not been achieved, mostly if this statement is 
build on sole analyses of trade and growth. The contingencies related to 
the creation of the AMU and the sectorial changes that followed in the 
Western Mediterranean suggest that, before assessing whether its goals 
have been achieved, it is needed to wonder what those objectives were in 




Figure 4.26 Chronology: the role of energy on Euro-M
aghreb relations 
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4.5 THE AGADIR AGREEMENT: SOUTH-SOUTH INSERTION 
IN THE ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE 
Among the regional agreements in the Mediterranean that awoke 
more interest in recent years, we find the Agadir Agreement (2004), 
ratified in 2006 and implemented since March 2007. Agreed in 2001 
between Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan and open to all the 
Mediterranean countries linked to the EU through AAs, it aimed to create 
a Mediterranean Arab Free Trade Area (MAFTA). This South-South 
agreement, which aimed to tackle the collisions between AAs and the pan-
Arab trade liberalisation process after the GAFTA, endorsed the acquis 
communautaire (Wippel, 2005; De Ville, Reynaert, 2010) with the 
intention to consolidate the pan-Euro-Mediterranean system of rules of 
origin. Although it was expected to be progressively extended to the rest 
of Mediterranean countries, the persistence of non-tariff barriers among 
States and the diversion of trade triggered by asymmetric implementation 
of the complex system of RoOs, drove the project to a standstill (De Ville 
and Reynaert, 2010). From the Maghreb perspective, its main setback is to 
include only two of the countries of the region, with similar economic 
structures and no common border in between.  
Certainly, the distinctive features of this particular South-South 
agreement had to do with its regulatory origins and goals. In the context of 
interweaving North-South and South-South integration, such arrangement 
pursued the intensification of Southern Mediterranean exchanges by 
enhancing regulatory convergence with the EU and by eliminating 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs). Notwithstanding, this implies that the 
standard for convergence was set by a Northern partner that remained 
formally out of the scope of the agreement.  
Thus, the Agadir Agreement is to be placed within the context of the 
interaction between Arab and Euro-Mediterranean regional integration. As 
mentioned above, two overriding frameworks coalesced at the beginning 
of the 2000s:  
 The Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement (GAFTA), endorsed in 
1997 by 14 Arab countries and established in 2005, whose results 
have been mitigated so far 
 The demand by a number of Mediterranean countries to set or re-
negotiate bilateral AAs with the EU. Tunisia and Morocco had 
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been the first countries to endorse them in 1995 (ratified in 1998 
and 2000, respectively). They were followed by Jordan (1997, 
ratified in 2002), Israel (2000), Algeria (2001, ratified in 2005), 
Egypt (2001, ratified in 2004) and Lebanon (2002, ratified in 
2004). All of them implied reciprocal trade liberalisation and 
gradual harmonisation with EU norms and regulations, supported 
by technical and financial assistance. It was by this means that 
Euro-Mediterranean Association pursued a Mediterranean FTA 
compatible with WTO rules (Hoekman, 2016). 
A key technical provision of the AAs are the RoO (i.e. technical 
criteria that establish the requirements for a product to enjoy duty free or 
other preferential access under a certain agreement). The underlying 
principle for regional integration through North-South bilateral 
agreements in the Mediterranean was hence the so-called ‘diagonal 
cumulation of rules of origin’. This consists on the possibility to cumulate 
rules of origin also among Arab countries, provided that they belong to a 
common free-trade area. Consequently, according to these mechanisms, 
Euromed integration appeared as a process of ‘pre-adhesion to 
globalisation’ (Frikha, 2002) that entailed a multifold process of regional 
flows that adopted the shape of the European market without, however, 
belonging to it. In practice, this procedure implied a wide array of far-
reaching obligations that Arab countries had to meet in exchange of a 
easier access to the Common Market.  
As shown in the first part of this chapter, the evolution of trade and 
FDI in the area did not experience any significant shift since the 
establishment of the Agadir Agreement. In fact, the most recent debates 
on the issue have focused on the causes of its failure rather than on the 
assessment of its performance (Jarreau, 2011). In this vein, among the 
reasons argued, some criticise EU’s ‘normative power’ (Whitman, 2011) 
and the structure of ‘hub and spokes’ fostered through its bilateral and 
differentiated North-South approach (De Ville and Reynaert, 2010). 
Others mention the fact that the arrangement is structurally hampered by 
the fact that the four member states are producing the same goods and 
hence competing against each other (Péridy, 2005). Also, some authors 
point to the fact that vertical integration clearly prevails in these countries 
and put into question their real intention to trade between each other and 
(Jolly, 2014). Finally, others question the profitability for those countries 
of endorsing so many structural transformations to come closer to 
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European standards (Hoekman, 2016). Be as it may, there is certain 
consensus on underscoring that EU’s goal to spread its norms and 
standards through the formula of entangled AAs and South-South 
agreements has shown its limits. However, are these limits to be assessed 
in terms of the goals stated by orthodox theories of economic integration? 
 
4.5.1 Beyond trade figures: goals and results of the Agadir 
Agreement 
Among the reasons argued to justify the need for regulatory 
harmonisation among Agadir members, TBTs were central in the 
discourse of the EU. With the support of a wide array of studies held by 
IEOs and scholars (Jarreau, 2011), the idea is that convergence reduces 
uncertainty, increases spillovers and helps reaching significant dynamic 
effects of integration. Also, it has been argued that the elimination of NTB 
remained a key potential source of gains (Jarreau, 2011).  
In the case of the Agadir Agreement, TBTs are covered by Articles 8 
and 23 of the document. In this respect, the Agadir Technical Unit (ATU) 
was established in April 2007 in Amman, Jordan. Mainly funded by the 
EU, the ATU was charged with a number of duties (SIDA, 2017): 
i. To ensure the implementation of the Agreement 
ii. To follow-up on the decisions of the Committees of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade 
iii. To offer technical advice 
iv. To offer recommendations to the member countries and 
institutions on any trade issues covered by the agreement 
In 2011, the ATU started a project of cooperation with the Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) to accompany the 
process of harmonisation. The Support to Quality Infrastructure in Agadir 
Countries (SQIA) project was supposed to be held in complementarity 
with the work of the ATU in terms of capacity-building, awareness-raising 
and advocacy-related activities that, eventually, were expected to facilitate 
the implementation of the agreement. In 2017, the SIDA released a study 
on the results of the SQIA project. The main findings of the report were 




“The overall expected impact of the project is to reduce 
poverty through increased trade, economic development and 
FDI. However, the logical chain between the project design 
and its overall objective is indirect at best. (...) The 
underlying assumption is that competition stimulates 
innovation and that countries over time can take advantage 
on changes in comparative advantage and new opportunities. 
This is a simplistic free-trade logic that ignores the many 
structural issues and constraints that prevent low and middle 
income countries from taking advantage of trading 
opportunities, and the uncertainty involved in the link 
between freer trade and large-scale job creation” (SIDA, 
2017, p. 16) 
 
By underscoring the “extremely weak” analysis of “the deeper 
economic structures and political forces at play and of the local ownership 
of the Agadir process” (2017, p. 18), the study openly criticised the 
vertical and categorical nature of its implementation, as well as its failure 
to integrate properly private and public local stakeholders. Missing 
mechanisms of coordination among member countries, scarce economic 
and human resources, as well as a widespread lack of information both in 
the industrial sectors and the government bodies directly engaged with the 
project on its terms and possibilities were, according to the SIDA, not 
only the result of a misguided implementation, but also of the mismatch 
between the ambitions of the project and those of the signing countries: 
 
“Today, there is little evidence or enthusiasm to suggest 
that the [SQIA] project or indeed the Agadir Agreement is 
relevant any more. The four countries appear to have little 
appetite for trade amongst one another. Lack of interest can 
also be gauged from the fact that, under article 24 of the 
agreement, the Foreign Trade Ministers who were supposed 
to meet with each other at least once a year, have met only 
twice in that capacity in the last six years. (...) Furthermore, 
the entire SQIA project is funded by SIDA, with no financial 
contributions from any of the benefiting countries. For quite 
some time now both Swedish partners and local stakeholders 
have been stating that for harmonisation to occur there must 
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be a clear demand for a harmonisation process. That demand 
has not been demonstrated.” (SIDA, 2017, p. 19-20).  
 
Now, taking into account that trade and investment figures confirm 
the most sceptical scenarios about the Agadir Agreement, together with 
the fact that the core goals of the process in terms of TBTs and 
harmonisation have not been met, it would be easy to affirm that such 
arrangement has utterly failed in its purposes. Nevertheless, it would be 
quite hazardous to assume that no ambition was met or that Euro-
Mediterranean projections were totally wrong about the possible 
outcomes.  
Integration may occur in many ways, and the specificities of the 
Agadir Agreement are not neutral. Choosing to establish a South-South 
agreement based on the rules of a market to which the integrated region is 
not expected to belong is not neutral either. Disregarding the option of an 
arrangement respecting just international rules and hence, less likely to 
collide with further schemes of cooperation or different partners, is a 
binding political decision. Finally, the continuous insistence and generous 
funding for compliance with the acquis communautaire deserves, at least, 
a careful insight on what this implies in the current framework of Euro-
Mediterranean relations.  
 
4.5.2 The Agadir Agreement as an European instrument of 
Foreign Policy 
Rather than focusing on the causes of the sluggish increase in intra-
regional trade in the Agadir process, the central question that this work 
tries to answer relates to the goals that guided such a choice. As 
mentioned before, there are IOs and international regulatory frameworks 
establish and follow-up a series of norms and standards applying to any 
country willing to engage them. Therefore, what is the purpose of EU in 
placing itself as a sort of ‘intermediary agent’ for Southern Med countries 
to integrate in global economic relations? And what do partner countries 
expect from their endorsing European rules without having the possibility 
to gain Membership in exchange? A careful insight on the origins, role 
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and scope of the acquis communautaire appears necessary to answer those 
questions. The EU defines it as follows:  
 
“(…) the body of common rights and obligations that are 
binding on all EU countries, as EU Members. It is constantly 
evolving and comprises: 
 the content, principles and political objectives of the Treaties; 
 legislation adopted in application of the treaties and the case law 
of the Court of Justice of the EU; 
 declarations and resolutions adopted by the EU; 
 measures relating to the common foreign and security policy; 
 measures relating to justice and home affairs; 
 international agreements concluded by the EU and those 
concluded by the EU countries between themselves in the field of 
the EU’s activities. 
Applicant countries are required to accept the acquis before 
they can join the EU. Derogations from the acquis are granted 
only in exceptional circumstances and are limited in scope. The 
acquis must be incorporated by applicant countries into their 
national legal order by the date of their accession to the EU and 
they are obliged to apply it from that date.” 
 
What is clear from this explanation is the intimate relationship 
between acquis and EU Membership. As Cagiano et al. (2013) put it, the 
acquis communautaire “represents the conditio sine qua non for becoming 
a Member State of what is now the EU”. What is paradoxical, is that 
accession is by no means contemplated for Southern Mediterranean 
Countries (SMCs). Indeed, the concept of acquis belongs to an 
intrinsically European jargon that does not have clearly defined borders 
(Jorgenssen, 1999; Cagiano et al., 2013, p. 191), but many authors agree 
on the fact that it is intimately linked to European enlargement: 
 
“Every single enlargement of the EU has prompted 
debates on issues as applicants’ qualifications, the possible 
need for EU self-reform, impact on policies like agricultural 
and regional policy, the balance between widening and 
deepening —issues which have all been described in a rich 
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literature on EU enlargement. However, it is also worth 
noticing that every single enlargement has been accompanied 
by a fairly brief but distinct and seemingly powerful 
emergence of the so-called acquis communautaire (Jorgensen, 
1999, p. 1).  
 
In this vein, given the characteristics of such array of rules, accession 
to the EU appears as a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ game (1999, p. 3). 
Furthermore, a core feature of the acquis lies in its “historical 
contingency” (Pescatore, 1981) or “sedimentation in time” (Cagiano et al. 
2013). That is, the acquis is the result of a long period of accumulation of 
rules, norms and values that has been going on since UK’s request of 
accession in 1963 (Jorgensen, 1999). For instance, the first Mediterranean 
enlargement added democratic principles and respect for human rights to 
the acquis. Later on, the demand of accession by Central-Eastern 
European countries in the 1990s bolstered the concretisation of its 
principles into what became the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ (1993), which, 
according to the same authors, “aimed at making more challenging the 
application for the new candidate countries” (Cagiano et al., 2013, p. 192). 
Under such circumstance, the acquis was divided into 31 negotiation 
chapters that ranged from the four freedoms, to agriculture, fishing, 
transport, taxation, employment, IT, cooperation in justice and home 
affairs, as well as common foreign and security policies. In the mix, legal 
and political commitments have grown intertwined in a ‘piecemeal 
fashion’ (Jorgensen, 1999). Cagiano et al. (2013, p. 193) affirm:  
 
“Europe’s borders are not geographical or physical 
boundaries, but essentially political borders, because the 
Community project has become more and more political. 
Also, the ability of integration of the EU does not depend on 
the geography of Europe, but on its ability to expand. (...) So 
we can conclude that the political frontier of the EU is the 
acquis communautaire and that the enlargements of the EU 
represent the opening of this border”.  
 
Now, the most significant exception to the couple acquis-membership 
lies in (a number of) trade agreements between the EU and its 
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neighbouring countries. With many of them, the historical track of 
economic and political relations is characterised by increasing requests of 
adaptation to an increasingly integrated Europe. In fact, for the EU, 
internal and external integration have run parallel since the very inception 
of the EEC. As Hoekman (2016, p. 1) puts it: “The EU, as did the EEC in 
the pre-1993 period, has negotiated numerous trade agreements aimed at 
reducing or removing barriers to trade, reflecting a long history of using 
trade as an instrument of foreign policy”.  
The growing weight of political and legal issues in European foreign 
economic relations became evident with the shift from ‘shallow’ to 
‘deeper’ agreements. Whereas the first focused on the liberalisation of 
merchandise trade, the second include services, public procurement 
markets, cross-border investment and national regulatory regimes as well 
(Hoekman, 2016). The first ENP (2004) was key to this transformation. 
Among its provisions, the ENP opened the door to a ‘Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements’ (DCFTA) by widening the scope 
of AAs with those governments interested. The wide array of so-called 
‘behind-the-border’ or ‘non-tariff’ measures that underlie such 
arrangements might be one of the main reasons for its scarce appealing 
and mitigated success among Eastern and Southern neighbours (Hoekman, 
2016). 
After the events of 2011 in Southern Mediterranean countries, the 
European Council agreed to a negotiating mandate for DCFTA talks with 
the four countries of the Agadir Agreement (Hoekman, 2016, p. 2). Only 
Tunisia and Morocco accepted to open the discussions. However, further 
internal and external circumstances brought both negotiations to a halt. In 
any case, Hoekman (2016) makes two interesting points to this concern. 
On the one hand, by taking the case of the four Eastern countries that 
accepted to negotiate, he underscores hegemonic rivalry as a major 
underlying feature for both the offer and its failure. Colliding frameworks 
and strategies between the EU and Russia stimulated a race to keep the 
Eastern neighbourhood linked to their orbit. On the other hand, by 
emphasising the fact that this formula of integration was but one possible 
option and not the simplest one, he puts into question the political goals 
and economic suitability of the European option. To this extent, he 
reminds that the EU has also been negotiating other deeper trade 
agreements with non-ENP countries as Canada, Japan or the US that were 
not explicitly linked to the acquis communautaire, despite containing 
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behind the border issues. His interpretation of this double game is the 
following: 
 
“The pursuit of deeper trade agreements with OECD 
member countries implies that alternative approaches can be 
pursued to foster greater integration of markets, and that 
convergence to the acquis is not necessarily needed in order 
for partner countries to sell goods and services on the EU 
market and for firms to be able to invest and establish 
commercial operations in EU countries. DCFTAs differ 
from other types of PTAs in that they involve significant 
convergence towards EU norms and legislation, but do not 
offer the partner countries much of a say, if any, on what the 
rules of the game are.” (Hoekman, 2016, p. 2) 
 
At this point, it is necessary to understand why this binding 
engagement is required only to neighbouring countries and, above all, 
why in the Southern neighbourhood were Agadir members the most 
directly involved in this issue. To answer those questions, it appears that 
analysing the political economy of DCFTAs might be key to understand 
this South-South peculiar framework of integration. In this respect, 
Hoekman (2016, p. 6-7) points out: 
 
“The big change associated with DCFTAs was that they 
were far more prescriptive. DCFTAs are similar to the EMP 
trade agreements in terms of the issue areas covered, but 
they differ substantially in the approach taken to address 
them. Instead of extensive ‘soft law’ language, they establish 
specific, binding (enforceable) disciplines and aim at the 
(gradual) convergence of policies in covered areas with 
those of the EU. (...) DCFTAs build on WTO rules and 
practices —the WTO is the baseline— but go beyond the 
WTO in many of the covered areas”. 
 
In this realm, many debates have taken place in different disciplines 
and from diverse epistemological approaches. For some, the accent on the 
acquis derives from the will by the EU to act as a ‘soft power’ or 
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‘normative power’ (Manners, 2000) that exports its values and standards. 
In a similar line, others point to a matter of hegemonic conflicts, be it 
from a political point of view or face to pragmatic issues like the 
securitisation of energy provisions (Rubino, 2014; Hoekman, 2016). There 
are also those who interpret it as an intention to enhance credibility and 
democracy, and hence mitigate instability in the region (Freyburg et al., 
2010). Hoekman (2016) addresses the reduction of uncertainty to favour 
investment and the provision of technical and financial assistance as 
susceptible of attractiveness among neighbouring countries. At this point, 
however, it is necessary to clarify that empirical evidence on the effects of 
this type of harmonisation is limited and results are quite uneven. In any 
event, he arrives to a conclusion in this regard that is also key to our 
contribution: 
 
“These questions require case-by-case analysis and the 
answers will depend on the objectives of partner countries, 
their geography and the structure of their economies. As 
mentioned, in practice, decisions to pursue a DCFTA may 
have less to do with economics and center more on political 
and foreign policy motivations” (Hoekman, 2016, p. 8). 
 
Regardless of the benefits or setbacks of such an approach, the 
stalemate in which most of this agreements have fallen and the relative 
alleviation of these binding engagements by the reformed ENP (2015) 
suggest that the goal of convergence has failed in its ambitions. And, 
given the major importance that the Agadir Agreement attributed to such 
defy, it seems that the diagnosis of bad performance should stem from the 
analysis of such harmonisation, rather than from the evolution of solely 
trade and FDI.  
In recent years, the turbulence following the entry into force of the 
new Agricultural (2012) and Fisheries (2014) Agreements with the EU 
illustrates well the role of trade as a central instrument of EU foreign 
policy, but this works also for Morocco. In this respect, it is necessary to 
highlight the significance of the transitions implemented by the latter in 
terms of so-called economic diplomacy (Fernández-Molina, 2016): in its 
relations with the EU as a whole, Morocco has more than ever linked its 
trade agreements to migration policies (El Qadim, 2010; Ortiz, 2015). At 
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the same time, in the realm of South-South initiatives, neither the 
Maghreb nor the Agadir process are recalled as strategic projects in the 
realm of Moroccan foreign affairs. As mentioned in chapter 3, South-
South ambitions have been completely diverted towards the African 
continent. 
Be as it may, the network of infrastructures exchanges that linked the 
Maghreb internally and to Europe in previous years did not stop 
functioning and, in some cases, expanding. Micro-economic integration 
(Mañé-Estrada, 2008) through cross-border projects was further pursued 
and reinforced under the umbrella of liberalisation, policies of mise à 
niveau, the rhetoric of GVCs and outsourcing arrangements. Similarly, the 
alliances forged with selected Maghreb countries throughout the means of 
privileged Neighbourhood are still vivid under the reformed ENP. 
However, the role of these overlapping arrangements in preserving the 
integration of Maghreb countries into the European market on account of 
their shared colonial past, finds little room in the economic analyses that 
evaluate South-South integration on the basis of a figure of intraregional 
trade that has remained frozen for more than half a century. 
 
4.6 CONCLUSIONS 
Building on the findings on chapter 3 about the path of international 
integration followed by Morocco since its independence, this chapter 
deepens into two central aspects derived from that assessment. Namely, it 
examined, on the one hand, the contradictory assertions by IEOs about the 
allegedly satisfactory performance of Morocco in the realm of integration 
and its dubious effects in terms of welfare improvement. On the other 
hand, it focused on the unsuccessful attempts by Morocco to strengthen 
South-South integration through its involvement in regional agreements 
with other Mediterranean countries.  
To that end, we have firstly analysed the factors beneath trade and 
growth figures that might explain the mismatch between these and 
welfare indicators. By deepening into data like the structure of exchanges, 
migratory flows or income distribution by region and gender, we 
conclude that the direct relationship between trade and welfare that theory 
and IEOs assume when promoting economic integration is not a clear-cut 
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one. Secondly, we have focused on the interplay between North-South 
and South-South in the Euro-Mediterranean region by choosing two case 
studies. The first one regards the establishment of the AMU at the end of 
the 1980s, while the second looks at the Agadir Agreement among 
Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan in 2004.  
Following an analogous reasoning to the one employed in Chapter 3 
for North-South integration, parts 3 and 4 of this chapter have built a 
plausible explanation to the rationale behind these agreements by 
widening the scope of research to political and micro-economic reasons 
that are mostly absent from IEOs’ analyses. From this assessment it arises 
that Maghreb integration in 1989 was spurred by the will to establish a 
stable energy market in the Western Mediterranean under the leadership 
of Italian and Spanish corporations and supported by the EEC due to its 
strategic geopolitical role. With regard to the Agadir Agreement, the 
binding links it entailed with the European acquis communautaire reflect 
the nature of trade agreements as instruments of foreign policy. In this 
vein, we argue that the neglect of the political aspects of economic 
integration entails misleading conclusions about the achievements and 
performance of this sort of arrangements. Finally, both cases illustrate the 
role of the EU in the Moroccan path of integration and, more generally, in 










For critics and supporters of the current structure of multilateral 
regionalism, the European case remains a central archetype of economic 
integration. Nonetheless, whereas the EU appears to embody the virtuous 
circle of integration, the Euro-Mediterranean area is one of the most 
prominent examples of its opposite. In this regard, a vast literature has 
examined Euro-Mediterranean relations on the grounds of a wide North-
South income gap that the meagre outcomes of integration projects have 
failed to tackle. Despite successive attempts to mitigate the prevalence of 
vertical trade flows and the scarce horizontal integration in this area, a 
structure of hub and spokes has prevailed over the set of overlapping 
initiatives undertaken since decolonisation at different levels and speeds. 
In areas like the Maghreb, helped by the active commitment by IEOs and 
the EU itself, a number of South-South initiatives have been implemented 
with the support of empirical evidence on the potential welfare effects of 
trade and the costs of non-integration. However, in view of their sluggish 
outcomes in terms of exchanges and FDI flows, scholars and institutions 
coincide in pointing out the mitigate success of these projects.  
By choosing the case of Morocco on the basis of its geostrategic 
position and ambivalent relationship with vertical and horizontal 
integration in the Mediterranean, the main scope of this work stems from 
two aspects that previous research has frequently overlooked. The first 
one relates to the interplay between the promotion and endorsement of 
North-South and South-South agreements in the Euro-Mediterranean 
area. The second one has to do with the apparently contradictory 
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Moroccan choices and behaviours in terms of economic integration. In the 
light of these unsolved questions, this research has been held with the 
overriding objective to seize the reasons and goals underlying the 
overlapping, contradictory and ill-performing South-South initiatives 
endorsed by Morocco within the framework of its strong commitment to 
North-South relations with the EU. This general goal was pursued by 
tackling four interwoven specific objectives. 
The first one was to assess the links between the theories of 
economic integration, their empirical assessment and the changing nature 
of regional processes. The second one was to analyse the role of the 
agents involved in the regulation and evaluation of specific schemes of 
integration. The third one was to grasp the options, choices and 
outcomes of the Moroccan path of economic integration since 
independence. Finally, the fourth objective was to evaluate the interplay 
between North-South and South-South integration in the Euro-
Mediterranean region.  
Following these goals, this research was divided into two parts, each 
of them comprising two chapters that tackled, each of them, one of the 
stated goals in the order they have been enumerated. Therefore, the first 
two chapters developed a critical review of the theoretical and 
empirical approaches of orthodox economic integration, with a focus on 
their relationship with the process of European integration. To this extent, 
a close examination of the role of IEOs in the regulation and promotion of 
regional arrangements on the basis of the European example put into 
question the dubious universality of these recipes, especially regarding 
countries in the global South. The second part of this work used archival 
research, official documents and economic data to grasp the options, 
choices and outcomes of the Moroccan path of integration since 
independence, with a special accent on the role of South-South projects 
within the prevailing North-South ties that the country has preserved 
until our days.  
Thus, regarding the first part of this work, our main findings suggest 
that the unparalleled correspondence between the core tenets of orthodox 
theories of economic integration and the European case appears to be 
rooted in the geopolitical circumstances in which both emerged. The 
inception of the EEC in a context of post-war recovery and Cold War 
hegemonic struggles, bolstered great interest among authors of IR and 
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International Trade. For the latter, economic integration appeared as a 
second-best solution whenever multilateral trade is not possible and 
certain conditions are fulfilled. The concepts of trade creation (TC) and 
trade diversion (TD) put forward by Viner (1950) became central 
concepts in the study of CUs. Balassa (1961) would complete the core 
premises of the discipline by providing a description of the degrees of 
economic integration as an evolutionary process going from PTAs to a 
monetary and fiscal union. Another major contribution by this author was 
the distinction between static and dynamic effects of integration. Indeed, 
this distinction founded one of the two major key axes of debate in the 
discipline that have remained vivid until our days. The second one is 
given by the specificities of North-South relations. In this regard, 
whereas orthodox scholars readapted some of the conventional axioms of 
the theory to the goals of developing countries in terms of 
industrialisation, protectionism or market expansion, heterodox 
approaches criticised mainstream regionalism for reproducing the 
unbalanced nature of international economic relations. They also 
criticised the Eurocentric perspective of mainstream academic 
disciplines on the issue and proposed other formulas that prioritise the 
balancing of international unequal exchanges. 
In the 1970s, the relative stagnation of European integration 
provoked a decline in academic contributions to the field of integration. 
However, New Theories of Trade (NTT) (Krugman, 1991) and the 
upsurge of open regionalism along the wave of rising neoliberalism since 
the 1980s renewed the interest in these processes. North-South 
regionalism gained salience in this period, and the birth of the NAFTA 
(1994) would consolidate the advance of ‘open regionalism’. The 
pervasiveness of PTAs and FTAs, which Bagwati (1995) would call the 
‘spaghetti bowl’ effect, fostered debates on the relationship between 
regionalism and multilateralism. This issue was also tackled by less 
orthodox approaches like New Regionalism (Hettne, 1994) and the New 
Regional Approach (Soderbaum, 2004), which developed a wide 
discussion on regionalism as a ‘stumbling block’ or a ‘stepping stone’ for 
multilateralism.  
As far as empirical approaches are concerned, the critical analysis of 
variables and methods of assessment of economic integration reveal the 
cleavage between theoretical assumptions and the possibilities of their 
empirical demonstration, as well as their moderated success in bridging 
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the gap between theory and reality. Besides, the examination of 
conventional approaches along the lines of the static-dynamic effects and 
the North-South divide identified before, show that, on the one hand, 
empirical approaches reproduce, to a large extent, the theoretical 
contradictions between the importance of dynamic effects and the 
abundance of static analyses. On the other hand, North-South 
divergences in the empirical assessment of integration do not lie in the 
methods employed or the variables under study, but in terms of their 
assumed goals. In this regard, when it comes to LDCs, the underlying 
assumption is that regionalism should serve to bring them to the 
preconditions that allowed for economic integration in the North, which 
might imply the neglect of the specific goals and features of the former. 
Moreover, the scarce developments on theoretical approaches and 
empirical proposals tailored to the specificities of the South demonstrate 
the unbalanced agenda of integration between the two hemispheres. 
From this critical review, a number of missing debates were 
identified that have to do with the above-mentioned gap between theory 
and reality (Combes et al., 2008; Amin, 2014b) and with the role of IEOs 
in the regulation and promotion of certain types of regionalism. A number 
of contributions from the field of IR, namely from IPE, served to provide 
description of the main IEOs concerned by regional integration (WTO, 
UNCTAD, IMF, WB and regional actors like the EU), as well an 
explanation of the ideological functions they deploy in this realm. Their 
duty to ensure compliance goes along with their capacity to influence the 
agenda of regional integration or to act in a ‘clientelist’ manner with 
certain countries that directly support their survival and/or hold a 
privileged position within those institutions.  
The second part of this work focused on the path of integration 
undertaken by Morocco combining three different assets: historical 
research, documentation from IEOs and economic data. Guided by the 
consideration of international trade as a sector of foreign policy shaped by 
international agreements and socioeconomic circumstance, the third and 
four chapters paid great attention to the role of the EU on this path. This 
choice was made not only because of the prominence of the European 
model in theoretical approaches, but also in consideration of the colonial 
ties binding Euro-Moroccan relations and of European leadership in the 




Historical literature and archival research on the transition from 
bilateral relations under the French Protectorate to AAs with the EEC 
showed that Euro-Mediterranean relations and the integration agreements 
signed in the area in recent decades were highly determined by previous 
colonial relations, particularly between France and Maghreb countries. 
Indeed, Moroccan dependency from the European market has been 
maintained since the colonial period through a set of AAs that helped a 
process of peripheral reconnection whereby Moroccan development is 
bound to the political decisions and economic performance of the EU. By 
legitimating former privileged relations with France and extending them 
to the Communitarian framework, the Moroccan economic structure and 
its international exchanges remained attached to the Mediterranean 
orbit of the EU. Furthermore, the wavering needs and interests of the 
European markets due to successive phases of enlargement determined 
the shape and scope of Euro-Mediterranean integration more than intra-
Mediterranean dialogue did. 
In this regard, the contributions made by IEOs about Moroccan 
integration suggest that, although Morocco must still make certain efforts 
to improve economic stability in the domestic sphere and competitiveness 
in the international market, its commitment to international integration 
appears as solid, progressive and relatively successful. Regarding its path 
of regional integration, the Moroccan relationship with developed 
countries is presented as an example both in the Mediterranean basin and 
in its relations with the United States, due to their signature of a a 
pioneering FTA in Africa. Also, its prominent role in intra-African 
relations is increasingly underscored. 
However, when comparing the results reported by IEOs with 
economic data, it appears that the correlation between trade, growth 
and welfare assumed in these assessments is not as straightforward as 
theory implies. The evolution of features like the structure of exchanges, 
migratory flows or income distribution by region and gender mitigates, 
to a large extent, the positive outcomes that might be deduced from solely 
aggregated trade and growth figures.  
Finally, concerning the interplay between North-South and South-
South integration in the Euro-Mediterranean, the case studies of the 
UMA and the Agadir Agreement suggested that the goals of South-South 
integration might as well differ from those stated by economic theory. An 
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analysis of these two cases from the approach of political economy and 
with special attention to the geopolitical interests of the actors involved, 
revealed that the endorsement of those South-South agreements by no 
means collide with the North-South structure of the Euro-Mediterranean 
region. Rather, according to the findings put forward in chapter four, it 
can be argued that, to a large degree, they acted as a means to enhance 
vertical relations in the area by facilitating micro-economic integration 
and a rapprochement to European rules.  
In particular, it arose that Maghreb integration in 1989 was spurred 
by the will to establish a stable energy market in the Western 
Mediterranean under the leadership of Italian and Spanish corporations 
and supported by the EEC due to its strategic geopolitical role. With 
regard to the Agadir Agreement, the binding links it entailed with the 
European acquis communautaire reflect the nature of trade agreements 
as instruments of foreign policy. In this vein, we argue that the neglect of 
the political aspects of economic integration entails misleading 
conclusions about the achievements and performance of this sort of 
arrangements. By these means, both cases illustrated the role of the EU in 
the Moroccan path of integration and, more generally, in the current shape 
of Euro-Mediterranean relations. 
Therefore, in line with the framework of analysis that has been 
developed along the four chapters of this dissertation, we suggest that any 
intent to comprehend the current state of affairs or future prospects of 
Moroccan integration ought to consider the political economy of such 
processes. This entails not only a careful assessment of domestic and 
foreign economic relations, but also awareness on the historical path 
followed hitherto and on the surrounding geopolitical context. Once this 
is accomplished, agents ought to be placed in such context, since the 
political and socio-economic nature of their actions should be taken into 
account. In the same vein, the straightforward causality whereby 
economic integration is supposed to pursue welfare through the increase 
of trade and growth, fails to appraise the complex set of factors that might 
unleash regional projects and, as a consequence, to properly evaluate its 
achievements.  
As for Euro-Mediterranean relations, our work shows that the 
dominant role played by the European Union is apparent in Moroccan 
decisions of integration even when the Community is not directly 
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involved. As a reaction, Morocco has held since the 1990s a strategy of 
triangular games to balance power relations, as well as a search for 
alternatives that replace or complement the influence of the EU. 
Nevertheless, the lack of integration resulting from those attempts does 
not mean an absence of effects. In fact, some of those outcomes might 
coincide with those predicted by theories of economic integration, but it is 
also undeniable that many other overcome the limits of orthodox 
postulates on this topic.  
Despite its focus on long-term trends and its strong accent in past 
relations, our framework of analysis offers some keys of interpretation 
that may be helpful to interpret the current state of affairs in the Euro-
Mediterranean area.  
At the bilateral level, the current impasse of the Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) between the EU and 
Morocco, as well as the mitigate achievements of the ENP, are only but a 
few outcomes of the unbalanced nature of Mediterranean relations. 
Furthermore, the instability derived from the contested validity of 
Agricultural and Fishery Agreements proves the ambiguous legitimacy of 
a structure of exchanges rooted in colonial relations. To this extent, a solid 
bilateral framework is to be sought through arrangements whose terms are 
neither contingent on European internal affairs, nor exclusively guided by 
the will to preserve longstanding relations of mutual interdependence. At 
the regional level, the ambivalent effects and increasing confusion 
generated by the overlapping initiatives to foster South-South integration 
through North-South integration in the Mediterranean suggest that 
attempts to enhance Euro-Mediterranean integration should give more 
priority to the needs and features of Southern countries than they do to 
harmonisation with EU standards and red lines.  Finally, given the evident 
interrelation between foreign policy affairs and economic integration, a 
comprehensive approach is needed that offers a coherent and solid 
framework to the flows of goods, capitals and people. Beyond economic 
effects, the unfulfilled requests by Southern countries have generated a 
great social fracture that has turned Euro-Mediterranean affairs into a 
laboratory of crisis management.  
The implications of this work for the research previously held in this 
field, as well as the limitations inherent to its accomplishment, call for 
further research in this realm. Certainly, the constraining features of 
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holding a critical approach with a focus on Southern countries, namely the 
lack of a solid methodological corpus and the relative scarcity of sources 
and literature focused on the specificities of the chosen case study, are 
only but a demonstration of the need to deepen into the subject. In this 
regard, also the choice of an approach that builds on other disciplines than 
International Economy implies relevant constraints regarding the 
possibility to develop every specific field of inquiry. Notwithstanding, the 
performance of the methodology and approach built to meet the objectives 
of the research indicate that further efforts in this direction might open 
new gateways to comprehend the complexity of interregional and 
intraregional relations in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. Indeed, our 
accent on the need to take into account the socio-political, geographic, 
historical and geopolitical features of regional processes on a case-by-case 
nature implies that similar exercises could be held in other areas of the 
globe with diverging but original outcomes.  
In sum, this work argues that regional integration is a multifold 
process that cannot be duly explained under one-size-fits-all principles. In 
addition, when it comes to the Global South, a further warning might be 
observed on the asymmetric scope of the analyses that apply to them the 
premises that work for the North/Western centres of international 
economy —which are also the centres of international governance and 









Rexionalismo e multilateralismo aparecen hoxe en día como dúas 
pezas complementarias do crebacabezas global. As diferentes disciplinas 
das Ciencias Sociais que estudan a estrutura das relacións internacionais 
comparten a premisa fundamental de que estas se desenvolven en 
bloques. Independentemente da natureza dos fluxos analizados ou do 
contexto no que se sitúan, no punto de partida atópanse a miúdo unha 
serie de factores que suscitan amplo consenso. 
O primeiro deles é o rexionalismo, tal e como o coñecemos, baséase 
nas cinzas da Segunda Guerra Mundial. A reconstrución en Europa tras a 
segunda posguerra mundial e a descolonización no Sur Global 
converteranse en elementos clave no campo de batalla dunha longa 
Guerra Fría. En grande medida, as dimensións xeopolíticas e económicas 
da disputa Este-Oeste constrinxía a alianzas transnacionais a quen 
pretendese ter voz no ámbito internacional. Esta lóxica axuda a 
comprender por que a configuración dos movementos do Terceiro Mundo 
e a propia recuperación europea se pensaron como proxectos 
transnacionais. 
O primeiro documento económico identificado por Fritz Machlup 
(1977, p. 10) na súa investigación sobre a xenealoxía da integración foi 
manexado por George F. Kennan no deseño do Plan Marshall. En 1947, 
Kennan recibiu de tres economistas a proposta dun “Programa 
Coordinado de Recuperación Europea” dirixido “cara a unha Europa forte 
e integrada economicamente”. Así, a necesidade de avivar o peso 
económico e político da Europa de posguerra conduciría a empurrar as 
preocupacións proteccionistas cara as fronteiras rexionais (Machlup, 
1977). Neste contexto, o economista canadense Jacob Viner (1950) tratou 
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de dilucidar as condicións nas que unha unión aduaneira non suporían un 
menoscabo ao incremento do output mundial nun contexto no que o 
multilateralismo -aínda sendo a opción preferida- non é viable a curto 
prazo. A publicación de The Customs Unions Issue (Viner, 1950) deu 
lugar a numerosas contribucións que, ao longo da década, construirían o 
corpus teórico da disciplina respondendo, completando, criticando ou 
aplicando os devanditos argumentos nos estudos de caso nos que, sen 
dúbida, o proxecto europeo gozaba de especial atención. Isto condúcenos 
directamente ao segundo punto de partida.   
Outro argumento que xera consenso é a posición da Unión 
Europea (UE) como arquetipo de integración económica. Nos países 
occidentais do Norte, a coincidencia entre as primeiras contribucións 
teóricas ao fenómeno e o establecemento da Comunidade Económica 
Europea suscitaría un permanente paralelismo entre o avance da 
integración e o desenvolvemento da disciplina que dura até os nosos días. 
No Sur, tanto aquelas correntes que aspiraban a ‘acadar’ aos países 
desenvolvidos, como aquelas que tiñan como vontade desvincularse da 
súa hexemonía, compartiron dende o inicio unha ampla atención ao 
proceso europeo. Así mesmo, os debates actuais sobre o rexionalismo 
europeo difiren nos seus xuízos sobre os efectos do devandito proxecto, 
pero non no alcance do seu impacto. Neste senso, nos últimos anos 
gañaron peso os enfoques críticos que sosteñen que a UE actúa coma 
unha potencia rexional hexemónica que utiliza o seu peso económico e 
normativo para construír unha serie de relacións bilaterais asimétricas 
para a transferencia das súas normas e valores (Haukkala, 2011). A este 
respecto, varios autores coinciden en sinalar a vontade da UE de 
“replicarse fomentando a integración rexional en todo o mundo” 
(Nicolaïdis y Howse, 2002). Secasí, apuntan, esta estratexia oculta a 
miúdo que o que se está promovendo “non é a UE como tal, senón unha 
EU-topía” (Nicolaïdis y Howse, 2002). 
O último elemento de consenso que cómpre sinalar é que a 
“dirección” do rexionalismo importa. En calquera corrente do corpus 
teórico que estuda o rexionalismo, as condicións, obxectivos e resultados 
da integración veñen ditados, en última instancia, pola súa natureza 
Norte-Norte, Norte-Sur ou Sur-Sur. En particular, a economía ortodoxa 
considera este último esquema como unha especie de terreo de proba que 
precede o salto á globalización dos países en desenvolvemento.  
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A especial incidencia destes tres argumentos no Mediterráneo 
atraeron durante décadas a atención de académicos e institucións. Aínda 
que o Ecuador non atravesa a zona, poucos definirían as relacións Euro-
Mediterráneas como Norte-Norte. Neste sentido, mentres que a 
integración europea aparece como o epítome do círculo virtuoso da 
integración, as relacións Euro-Mediterráneas póñense a miúdo como 
exemplo arquetípico do seu oposto. De feito, se a área Euro-Mediterránea 
é un exemplo destacado nos estudos rexionais, é precisamente o seu 
liderado en termos de fenda Norte-Sur e de non integración Sur-Sur. Pese 
aos sucesivos intentos de mitigar a prevalencia dos fluxos comerciais 
verticais e a escasa integración horizontal nesta área, a súa estrutura de 
eixes e radios imponse con contundencia sobre o conxunto de iniciativas 
Sur-Sur emprendidas dende a descolonización a diferentes niveis e 
velocidades. En zonas como o Magreb, o rexionalismo Sur-Sur 
fomentouse desde os oitenta dende distintos ámbitos internacionais ao 
amparo da evidencia empírica sobre os posibles efectos do comercio no 
benestar e os costes da non integración. A este respecto e malia os seus 
magros resultados, as institucións internacionais e, sobre todo, a UE, 
permanecen aínda hoxe entre os seus máis activos promotores. No 
entanto, o grande interese que suscitan estes aspectos contrasta cun 
limitado esforzo por investigar as causas profundas da non integración. 
Ao escoller o caso de Marrocos pola súa posición xeoestratéxica e a 
súa ambivalente relación coa integración vertical e horizontal no 
Mediterráneo, a razón de ser deste traballo deriva precisamente de dous 
aspectos que, con frecuencia, investigacións previas pasaron por alto. O 
primeiro ten que ver coa interacción entre a promoción e implementación 
de acordos Norte-Sur e Sur-Sur na zona Euro-Mediterránea. O segundo 
refírese ao errático comportamento de Marrocos nas súas estratexias de 
integración económica. Á luz destas cuestións, esta investigación levouse 
a cabo co obxectivo de comprender as razóns e propósitos subxacentes ás 
contraditorias e pouco eficaces iniciativas Sur-Sur apoiadas por Marrocos 
no marco do seu firme compromiso coas relacións Norte-Sur coa UE. 
Este obxectivo xeral articúlase en base a catro obxectivos específicos.  
O primeiro é avaliar os vínculos entre as teorías da integración 
económica, a súa avaliación empírica e a mutabilidade inherente aos 
procesos rexionais. O segundo é analizar o papel dos axentes implicados 
na regulación e avaliación dos distintos esquemas de integración que 
coexisten no ámbito internacional. O terceiro é dilucidar as opcións, 
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eleccións e resultados da senda de integración marroquí dende a súa 
independencia. Por último, o curto obxectivo consiste en avaliar a 
interacción entre a integración Norte-Sur e Sur-Sur na rexión Euro-
Mediterránea a través do caso marroquí. 
Conforme a estes obxectivos, esta investigación divídese en dúas 
partes, cada unha delas composta por dous capítulos que abordan, 
respectivamente, cada un dos obxectivos propostos seguindo a orde na 
que foron enumerados. Polo tanto, os dous primeiros capítulos 
desenvolven unha revisión crítica dos enfoques teóricos e empíricos da 
integración económica ortodoxa, centrándose na súa relación co proceso 
de integración europea. Neste sentido, un exame minucioso do papel das 
institucións internacionais na regulación e promoción do rexionalismo 
sobre a base do exemplo europeo pon en tea de xuízo a dubidosa 
universalidade das citadas receitas, especialmente no que respecta aos 
países do hemisferio Sur. A segunda parte deste traballo baséase na 
investigación arquivística, documentos oficiais e datos económicos para 
comprender o proceso de integración internacional e rexional de 
Marrocos desde a independencia, facendo especial fincapé no papel 
instrumental dos proxectos Sur-Sur para o reforzo dos imperantes 
vínculos Norte-Sur que o país preservou ata os nosos días. 
Así pois, na primeira parte deste traballo, os nosos principais achados 
suxiren que a correspondencia sen parangón entre os principios básicos 
das teorías ortodoxas da integración económica e o caso europeo está 
arraigado nas circunstancias xeopolíticas nas que ambos os dous xurdiron. 
No contexto de posguerra, reconstrución e loita hexemónica da Guerra 
Fría, a fundación da CEE espertou grande interese entre académicos das 
Relacións Internacionais e do Comercio Internacional. Para estes últimos, 
a integración económica presentábase como unha second best option 
cando o comercio multilateral non é posible baixo certas condicións 
específicas. Os conceptos de creación e desviación do comercio 
presentados por Viner (1950) convertéronse en aspectos centrais do 
estudo das unións aduaneiras. Balassa (1961) completaría as premisas 
básicas da disciplina ao describir os graos de integración económica como 
un proceso evolutivo que partía dos acordos preferenciais e que tiñan 
como cumio a unión monetaria e fiscal. Outra contribución esencial deste 
autor foi a distinción entre os efectos estáticos e dinámicos da integración, 
que fundaría un dos principais eixes de debate que se mantiveron vixentes 
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na disciplina ata os nosos días. O segundo eixe deriva da estrutura das 
relacións Norte-Sur. 
No marco do debate establecido por Viner e Balassa sobre as unións 
aduaneiras, un bo número de académicos prestou atención aos seus 
efectos sobre o benestar en función do nivel relativo de desenvolvemento 
(Linder, 1961; Sakamoto, 1969; Bhagwati, 1971) ou segundo o tamaño 
das economías participantes (Kreinin, 1964), cuestionando a visión 
puramente negativa da desviación do comercio para o benestar nos países 
menos industrializados (Bhambri, 1962; Sakamoto, 1969). Neste senso, 
Cooper e Massell (1965) sinalaron que para os países do Sur, unha unión 
aduaneira pode entenderse como unha política proteccionista eficiente e 
potencialmente beneficiosa para a industrialización. Nesta liña, a 
intensificación do comercio entre as rexións do Norte durante a década de 
1960 e as febles relacións comerciais entre os países do Sur levaron a 
varios autores a promover o concepto de “rexionalismo pro-
desenvolvementista” (Sloan, 1971). Fronte a estes, outras correntes 
(Hirschman, 1945; Perroux, 1954; Myrdal, 1957,1958) criticaron o 
excesivo optimismo das teorías de integración e a súa escasa 
adaptabilidade aos problemas do Sur (Amin, 2013).  
Os debates Norte-Sur acadaron o seu apoxeo nos anos sesenta, 
bautizados polas Nacións Unidas como a “Década do Desenvolvemento”. 
No campo da economía ortodoxa, W. W. Rostow (1960) publicou o libro 
que algúns consideran unha obra fundacional da economía do 
desenvolvemento baixo o título The Stages of Economic Growth. Deste 
xeito, namentres que a economía ortodoxa estaba preocupada por como 
dirixir aos países do Sur cara a senda do crecemento dentro do 
capitalismo global, numerosos autores (Meier, 1960; Allen, 1961; 
Bhambri, 1962; Mikesell, 1963; Balassa, 1965; Cooper, Massell, 1965) 
argumentaron que a análise neoclásica da integración económica fora 
deseñada por e para os países industrializados e, polo tanto, resultaba de 
pouca aplicabilidade nos países do Sur. Para estes, a incongruencia da 
análise radicaba nos propios obxectivos expostos polas teorías ortodoxas, 
que a miúdo ignoraban que a cuestión central para os países do Sur 
radicaba en como principiar o camiño do progreso sen afondar na 
dependencia estrutural do Norte. O obxectivo de inverter a estrutura da 
división internacional do traballo herdada do colonialismo europeo 
situouse no centro das súas achegas ao rexionalismo Sur-Sur, que 
consideraban un medio para incrementar a súa autosuficiencia e a súa 
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capacidade de negociación no comercio internacional (Baer, 1972). Neste 
senso, as teorías da dependencia criticaron amplamente a retórica do 
desenvolvemento coma un instrumento para ocultar a perpetuación das 
relacións de poder coloniais a través do que André Gunder Frank (1966, 
p. 27-28) nomeou o “desenvolvemento do subdesenvolvemento”. 
Trala crise do petróleo de 1973, as negociacións Norte-Sur no marco 
da UNCTAD remataron co establecemento do NIEO (Amin, 1980). 
Inspirados polos cambios no equilibrio de poder xerados pola crise do 
petróleo (Dumas, 1976), os países del Sur esixiron un marco que 
permitira un axuste á alza dos prezos das materias primas e a 
recuperación do control sobre os seus recursos. Neste contexto, os 
enfoques da dependencia alcanzaron o seu punto culminante (Gunder 
Frank, 1969; Marini, 1973; Sunkel, Peace, 1975; Wallerstein, 1979). 
Sucesivamente, tamén os enfoques norteamericano e británico da 
Economía Política Internacional (Keohane y Nye, 1977; 1987; Cohen, 
2009) situarían as relacións de poder nos debates Norte-Sur. En 
consecuencia, entre as preocupacións centrais sobre o fenómeno da 
integración, xunto coa “integración para que”, apareceu a cuestión da 
“integración por que” (Krauss, 1972). Despois, o xurdimento do chamado 
rexionalismo aberto dende a década de 1980 fortalecería a visión de Sur-
Sur e Norte-Sur como unha forma de “preadhesión á globalización” 
(Frikha, 2002). En calquera caso, destas análises despréndese que, dende 
a década de 1950, as características centrais que definen aos proxectos 
rexionais definíronse en base ao hemisferio xeopolítico dos participantes. 
A partir desta revisión crítica, identifícanse unha serie de debates 
practicamente ausentes entre as principais correntes da integración 
relacionadas coa fenda entre teoría e realidade (Combes et al., 2008; 
Amin, 2014b) e co rol das OEI na regulación e promoción de certos tipos 
específicos de rexionalismo. Coa axuda de varias achegas do eido das 
relacións internacionais, a saber, da Economía Política Internacional, 
caracterízanse as principais organizacións económicas internacionais que 
se ocupan da integración rexional (a OMC, a UNCTAD, o FMI, o Banco 
Mundial e axentes rexionais como a UE), con especial atención ás 
funcións ideolóxicas que exercen nesta área. Entre elas, obsérvase que a 
súa responsabilidade reguladora incide directamente na súa capacidade de 
influír na axenda da integración e de actuar dun xeito propio do 
“clientelismo” con determinados países que, por diversos motivos, 
ocupan unha posición privilexiada ao interior de devanditas institucións.  
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A segunda parte deste traballo céntrase nun percorrido da integración 
marroquí a través dunha análise fundamentada en tres elementos: 
investigación histórica, documentación das organizacións internacionais e 
datos económicos. Guiados pola consideración do comercio internacional 
como parte integrante da política exterior configurado polos termos dos 
acordos internacionais e pola conxuntura socioeconómica e xeopolítica, 
os capítulos terceiro e cuarto prestan grande atención ao papel da UE 
neste proceso. Esta elección non só obedece á importancia do modelo 
europeo nas formulacións teóricas, senón tamén á consideración das 
ligazóns coloniais que fundamentan as relacións euro-marroquís e o 
liderado europeo no deseño do marco actual das relacións euro-
mediterráneas.  
A literatura histórica e a investigación de arquivo sobre a transición 
das relacións bilaterais dende o protectorado francés aos Acordos de 
Asociación coa CEE amosan que as actuais relacións euro-mediterráneas 
están fondamente marcadas polas relacións coloniais precedentes, 
particularmente entre Francia e os países do Magreb. De feito, a 
dependencia marroquí do mercado europeo mantense dende o período 
colonial a través dun conxunto de acordos de preferencia que favoreceron 
un proceso de reconexión periférica polo que o desenvolvemento 
marroquí permanece ligado ás decisións políticas e ao desempeño 
económico da UE. Ao lexitimar as antigas relacións privilexiadas con 
Francia e estendelas ao marco comunitario a través do Tratado de Roma 
(1957) e dos Acordos de Asociación (1969, 1976, 1996), a estrutura 
económica marroquí e os seus intercambios internacionais permaneceron 
ancorados á órbita mediterránea da UE. Por outra banda, constátase que 
as necesidades e intereses vacilantes dos mercados europeos en función 
das sucesivas fases de ampliación tiveron un maior impacto na forma e 
alcance da integración euro-mediterránea que o propio diálogo intra-
Mediterráneo. 
No entanto, a análise de máis de 230 informes publicados polas 
organizacións económicas internacionais sobre a integración marroquí 
durante as últimas tres décadas suxire que, se ben Marrocos aínda debe 
realizar algúns esforzos para mellorar a estabilidade económica no ámbito 
nacional e a competitividade no mercado internacional, o seu compromiso 
coa integración internacional semella sólido, progresivo e relativamente 
satisfactorio. No relativo ao seu camiño de integración rexional, a 
relación de Marrocos cos países desenvoltos preséntase coma un exemplo 
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tanto na cunca mediterránea, como na súas relacións cos Estados Unidos. 
Así mesmo, sublíñase cada vez máis o seu destacado papel na 
dinamización das relacións intra-africanas. 
Porén, ao comparar os resultados publicados polas ditas 
organizacións con outros indicadores económicos, a relación entre 
comercio, crecemento e benestar que estas suxiren é menos clara do que a 
priori se deduce. Entroutros, a evolución da estrutura dos intercambios, os 
fluxos migratorios ou a distribución do ingreso non só per capita, senón 
tamén por rexión mitiga, en grande medida, os resultados positivos das 
cifras agregadas de comercio e crecemento. 
Por último, no que respecta á interacción entre esquemas de 
integración Norte-Sur e Sur-Sur no Euromediterráneo, os estudos de caso 
da Unión do Magreb Árabe e o Acordo de Agadir suxiren que os 
obxectivos da integración Sur-Sur tamén difiren dos establecidos pola 
teoría económica para este tipo de acordos. Unha análise destes casos 
dende o enfoque da economía política e con especial atención aos 
intereses dos axentes involucrados revela que a aplicación destes acordos 
Sur-Sur non choca en absoluto coa estrutura Norte-Sur da rexión euro-
mediterránea. Ao contrario, de acordo coas conclusións presentadas no 
capítulo catro, pódese argumentar que, en grande medida, os ditos 
acordos empregáronse coma un medio para acelerar as relacións verticais 
na zona, ao facilitar, por unha banda, a integración microeconómica en 
sectores de especial interese para os países mediterráneos da UE e, pola 
outra, o achegamento dos países do Sur ao acervo comunitario.  
En particular, o capítulo catro propón que a integración do Magreb en 
1989 estivo incentivada pola vontade de establecer un mercado enerxético 
estable no Mediterráneo Occidental baixo o liderado de empresas italianas 
e españolas, co apoio da Comunidade Europea debido ao estratéxico rol 
xeopolítico do sector. En canto ao Acordo de Agadir, os estreitos vínculos 
que este comporta co acervo comunitario europeo reflicten a natureza dos 
acordos comerciais como instrumentos de política exterior. Neste senso 
aínda que por distintas vías, ambos os dous casos ilustran o papel da UE 
na senda de integración marroquí e, máis en xeral, na configuración actual 
das relacións euromediterráneas. 
Polo tanto, en liña co marco de análise que se desenvolve ao longo 
dos catro capítulos desta tese, suxerimos que calquera tentativa de 
comprender a situación actual ou as perspectivas futuras da integración 
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marroquí considere a economía política de tales procesos. Isto implica 
non só unha avaliación coidadosa das relacións económicas domésticas e 
internacionais, senón tamén a consideración da estrutura histórica das 
relacións económicas e do contexto xeopolítico da contorna. Así mesmo, 
a natureza política e socioeconómica que guía as accións dos actores 
implicados debe situarse en dito contexto. A este respecto, a simple 
relación de causalidade pola que se supón que a integración económica 
persegue o benestar a través do aumento do comercio e o crecemento, 
subestima o complexo conxunto de dinámicas que subxacen aos 
proxectos rexionais e, en consecuencia, avalía o seus efectos sen 
comprender os seus propósitos.  
En canto ás relacións euro-mediterráneas, o noso traballo demostra 
que o papel dominante xogado pola Unión Europea é evidente nas 
estratexias de integración de Marrocos, incluso cando a Comunidade non 
está directamente implicada. Como reacción a este papel preponderante, 
Marrocos mantivo dende os anos noventa unha estratexia de xogos 
triangulares (Fernández-Molina, 2016) para equilibrar as relacións de 
poder, así como unha constante busca de alternativas que substitúan ou 
complementen a influencia da UE. En calquera caso, a escasa integración 
resultante destas tentativas non significa unha ausencia de efectos. De 
feito, algúns destes resultados poderían coincidir cos prognosticados polas 
teorías da integración económica, mais tamén é innegable que moitos 
outros  superan os límites dos postulados ortodoxos sobre este tema.  
En resumo, neste traballo sostense que a integración rexional é un 
proceso multiforme que non pode explicarse segundo o principio one size 
fits all. Ademais, no que se refire ao Sur global, o desafío non radica só 
en analizar a estrutura asimétrica das relacións internacionais, senón en 
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Official Name:   People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria
Form of Government:  Semi-presidential republic
Head of State:  Abdelaziz Bouteflika
Head of Government: Abdelmadjid Tebboune
Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (National People’s Assembly)
National Liberation Front (FLN) 165 Future Front 14
National Rally for Democracy (RND) 100 Socialist Forces Front (FFS, social democrat) 14
Movement of Society for Peace (islamist) 34 Algerian Popular Movement (MPA, democrat) 13
Rally for Hope for Algeria 19 Workers’ Party (PT, communist) 11
Ennahdha – FJD (islamist) 15 Others 78
Population
Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions): Algiers (2.63)
Main urban agglomerations (population in millions): Oran (0.86); Constantine (0.43); Blida (0.42); El Djelfa (0.41)
Area km2: 2,381,740 Population age <15 (%): 29
Population (millions): 39.7 Population age >64 (%): 6
Population density (hab/km2): 174 Total fertility rate (births per woman): 2.93
Urban population (%): 71 Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years): 73/77
Average annual population growth rate (%): 1.9 Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive): 22
Economy
GDP & Debt Economic Sectors
GDP (millions $): 164,779 Agriculture, value added (% of GDP): 13
GDP per capita ($, PPP): 14,518 Industry, value added (% of GDP): 39
GDP growth (%): 3.8 Services, value added (% of GDP): 48
Public Debt (in % GDP): 8.8 Labour market
Public Deficit (in % of GDP): -15.4 Labour participation rate, female (%): 16.8
External Debt (millions $): 4,677 Unemployment rate (%): 11.0
Inflation Rate (%): 4.8 Youth unemployment rate (%): 26.3
FDI Employment in
Inflows (millions $): -587 Agriculture (% of total employment): 11.4
Outflows (millions $): 103 Industry (% of total employment): 35.1
International tourism Services (% of total employment): 53.5
Tourist arrivals (000): 1,710 Energy
Tourism receipts (million $): 357 Production (millions mt oil eq): 137.7
Migrant remittances Consumption (millions mt oil eq): 47.6
Receipts (millions $): .. Consumption per capita (kg oil eq): 1,246
Receipts (in % GDP): .. Import (% energy used): -189
Total trade Imports Exports Balance Main Trading Partners 
in goods and services (millions $) 63,487 37,162 -26,325 Import:  China (16%), France (10%),  Italy (9%), Spain (8%), 
Germany (7%)in goods (millions $) 52,441 33,460 -18,981
in services (millions $) 11,046 3,702 -7,344 Export:  Spain (18%), Italy (15%), France (13%), United Kingdom (7%), 
United States (6%)in goods and services (% GDP) 34.3 20.1 -14.2
Society
Education Development 
Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%): 86.2/73.1 Human Development Index (Value): 0.745
Net enrolment rate (primary): 97 Human Development Index (Position in ranking): 83
Gross enrolment rate (secondary): .. Health
Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): 38 Physicians density (per 10,000): 12.1
Mean years of schooling: 7.8 Hospital beds (per 10,000): 17.0
Public expenditure jn education (% of GDP): 4.3 Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): 7.2
R&D expenditure (% of GDP): .. Emissions
Water CO2 Emissions (mt per capita): 2.9
Water resources (km3): 11.7 Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): 79
Water withdrawal (m3 per capita): 225 Protected areas
Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): 59 Terrestrial (% of total land area): 7.9
Water withdrawal by sector (% industry): 5 Marine (% of territorial waters): 1.2
Desalinated water production (millions m3): 615 ICT
Security Mobile subscriptions (per 100): 92.9
Total armed forces (000): 317 Households with computer (per 100): 28.2
Military expenditure (% GDP): 6.2 Internet users (per 100): 18.1
LIBYA
Official Name:   State of Libya
Form of Government:  Provisional parliamentary republic
Head of State:  
Head of Government: Fayez al-Sarraj
Political Parties represented in the current Parliament  (seats)
Uncertain state due to the collapse of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in 2011. During the month of March 2016, UN-backed Prime Minister-
designated, Fayez al-Sarraj, came back from self-exile with the task of uniting the country after an ongoing civil war between the Council of 
Deputies in Tobruk and its supporters, the New General National Congress in Tripoli and its supporters, and various jihadist and tribal 
elements controlling parts of the country
Population
Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions): Tripoli (1.13)
Main urban agglomerations (population in millions): Benghazi (0.76); Misrata (0.70); Zawiya (0.20)
Area km2: 1,759,540 Population age <15 (%): 30
Population (millions): 6.3 Population age >64 (%): 5
Population density (hab/km2): 4 Total fertility rate (births per woman): 2.53
Urban population (%): 79 Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years): 69/75
Average annual population growth rate (%): 0.3 Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive): 11
Economy
GDP & Debt Economic Sectors
GDP (millions $): 29,763 Agriculture, value added (% of GDP): ..
GDP per capita ($, PPP): 9,052 Industry, value added (% of GDP): ..
GDP growth (%): .. Services, value added (% of GDP): ..
Public Debt (in % GDP): .. Labour market
Public Deficit (in % of GDP): -75.7 Labour participation rate, female (%): 27.8
External Debt (millions $): .. Unemployment rate (%): 19.2
Inflation Rate (%): 9.8 Youth unemployment rate (%): 47.7
FDI Employment in
Inflows (millions $): 726 Agriculture (% of total employment): 20.2
Outflows (millions $): 354 Industry (% of total employment): 25.2
International tourism Services (% of total employment): 54.6
Tourist arrivals (000): .. Energy
Tourism receipts (million $): .. Production (millions mt oil eq): 67.1
Migrant remittances Consumption (millions mt oil eq): 17.0
Receipts (millions $): .. Consumption per capita (kg oil eq): 2,711
Receipts (in % GDP): .. Import (% energy used): -263.1
Total trade Imports Exports Balance Main Trading Partners 
in goods and services (millions $) .. .. .. Import:  China (15%), Italy (13%), Turkey (12%), France (6%), 
Tunisia (6%)in goods (millions $) 22,881 9,369 -13,512
in services (millions $) .. .. .. Export:  Italy (33%), Germany (11%), France (9%), China (8%), 
Spain (6%)in goods and services (% GDP) 56.3 23.1 -33.3
Society
Education Development 
Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%): 97.0/85.8 Human Development Index (Value): 0.716
Net enrolment rate (primary): .. Human Development Index (Position in ranking): 102
Gross enrolment rate (secondary): .. Health
Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): .. Physicians density (per 10,000): 19.0
Mean years of schooling: 7.3 Hospital beds (per 10,000): 37.0
Public expenditure jn education (% of GDP): .. Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): 5.0
R&D expenditure (% of GDP): .. Emissions
Water CO2 Emissions (mt per capita): 7.7
Water resources (km3): 0.7 Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): 329
Water withdrawal (m3 per capita): 928 Protected areas
Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): 83 Terrestrial (% of total land area): 0.3
Water withdrawal by sector (% industry): 5 Marine (% of territorial waters): 4.3
Desalinated water production (millions m3): 70 ICT
Security Mobile subscriptions (per 100): 157.0
Total armed forces (000): 7 Households with computer (per 100): ..





































Official Name:   Kingdom of Morocco
Form of Government:  Parliamentary constitutional monarchy
Head of State:  King Mohammed VI
Head of Government: Saadeddine Othmani
Political Parties represented in the current Parliament  (seats) (House of Representatives)
Justice and Development Party (PJD, Islamist) 125 Socialist Union of People’s Forces (USFP) 20
Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM, liberal) 102 Constitutional Union (UC, centrist) 19
Istiqlal Party (PI, centre-right, nationalism) 46 Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS, communist) 12
National Rally of Independents (RNI, centre-right, liberal) 37 Democratic and Social Movement (royalist) 3
Popular Movement (MP, conservative) 27 Others 4
Population
Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions): Rabat (2.00)
Main urban agglomerations (population in millions): Casablanca (3.54); Fes (1.20); Marrakech (1.17); Tanger (1.01); Meknes (0.74)
Area km2: 446,550 Population age <15 (%): 27
Population (millions): 34.4 Population age >64 (%): 6
Population density (hab/km2): 77 Total fertility rate (births per woman): 2.56
Urban population (%): 60 Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years): 73/75
Average annual population growth rate (%): 1.3 Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive): 24
Economy
GDP & Debt Economic Sectors 13
GDP (millions $): 100,593 Agriculture, value added (% of GDP): 29
GDP per capita ($, PPP): 8,180 Industry, value added (% of GDP): 58
GDP growth (%): 4.5 Services, value added (% of GDP):
Public Debt (in % GDP): 64.1 Labour market 25.3
Public Deficit (in % of GDP): -4.2 Labour participation rate, female (%): 9.7
External Debt (millions $): 42,989 Unemployment rate (%): 20.4
Inflation Rate (%): 1.5 Youth unemployment rate (%):
FDI Employment in 33.5
Inflows (millions $): 3,162 Agriculture (% of total employment): 20.5
Outflows (millions $): 649 Industry (% of total employment): 45.9
International tourism Services (% of total employment):
Tourist arrivals (000): 10,177 Energy 1.9
Tourism receipts (million $): 7,765 Production (millions mt oil eq): 18.9
Migrant remittances Consumption (millions mt oil eq): 564
Receipts (millions $): .. Consumption per capita (kg oil eq): 90.1
Receipts (in % GDP): .. Import (% energy used): 91.0
Total trade Imports Exports Balance Main Trading Partners 
in goods and services (millions $) 40,706 32,717 -7,989 Import:  Spain (14%), France (13%), China (8%), United States (7%), 
Germany (6%)in goods (millions $) 32,738 18,484 -14,255
in services (millions $) 7,968 14,234 6,266 Export:  Spain (22%), France (19%),  India (4%), United States (4%), 
Italy (4%)in goods and services (% GDP) 40.5 32.6 -7.9
Society
Education Development 
Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%): 81.9/62.0 Human Development Index (Value): 0.647
Net enrolment rate (primary): 98 Human Development Index (Position in ranking): 123
Gross enrolment rate (secondary): 69 Health
Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): 28 Physicians density (per 10,000): 6.2
Mean years of schooling: 4.8 Hospital beds (per 10,000): 11.0
Public expenditure jn education (% of GDP): 5.3 Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): 5.9
R&D expenditure (% of GDP): 0.71 Emissions
Water CO2 Emissions (mt per capita): 1.6
Water resources (km3): 29.0 Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): 71
Water withdrawal (m3 per capita): 316 Protected areas
Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): 88 Terrestrial (% of total land area): 33.6
Water withdrawal by sector (% industry): 2 Marine (% of territorial waters): 1.3
Desalinated water production (millions m3): 7 ICT
Security Mobile subscriptions (per 100): 126.9
Total armed forces (000): 246 Households with computer (per 100): 66.5



































Official Name:   Republic of Tunisia
Form of Government:  Semi-Presidential Republic
Head of State:  Beji Caid Essebsi
Head of Government: Youssef Chahed
Political Parties represented in the current Parliament  (seats) (National Constituent Assembly)
Call for Tunisia (NT) (Secularism, Social democracy) 86 Congress of the Republic (CPR) (Secularism, Social liberalism) 4
Ennahdha (Islamist) 69 Democratic Current (Pan-Arabism) 3
Free Patriotic Union (UPL) (Secularism, Liberalism) 16 National Destourian Initiative 3
Popular Front (FP) (Secularism, Socialism) 15 People’s Movement (Secularism, Socialism) 3
Tunisian Aspiration (Secularism, Liberalism) 8 Others 10
Population
Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions): Tunis (2.01)
Main urban agglomerations (population in millions): Sfax (0.73); Sousse (0.67); Kairouan (0.57)
Area km2: 163,610 Population age <15 (%): 23
Population (millions): 11.3 Population age >64 (%): 8
Population density (hab/km2): 72 Total fertility rate (births per woman): 2.16
Urban population (%): 67 Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years): 73/77
Average annual population growth rate (%): 1.1 Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive): 14
Economy
GDP & Debt Economic Sectors
GDP (millions $): 43,156 Agriculture, value added (% of GDP): 10
GDP per capita ($, PPP): 1,148 Industry, value added (% of GDP): 28
GDP growth (%): 1.0 Services, value added (% of GDP): 61
Public Debt (in % GDP): 57.2 Labour market
Public Deficit (in % of GDP): -4.4 Labour participation rate, female (%): 25.1
External Debt (millions $): 27,363 Unemployment rate (%): 15.2
Inflation Rate (%): 4.9 Youth unemployment rate (%): 36.1
FDI Employment in
Inflows (millions $): 1,002 Agriculture (% of total employment): 11.9
Outflows (millions $): 33 Industry (% of total employment): 29.5
International tourism Services (% of total employment): 58.6
Tourist arrivals (000): 5,359 Energy
Tourism receipts (million $): 1,869 Production (millions mt oil eq): 7.3
Migrant remittances Consumption (millions mt oil eq): 10.4
Receipts (millions $): 2,347 Consumption per capita (kg oil eq): 956
Receipts (in % GDP): 5.4 Import (% energy used): 29.9
Total trade Imports Exports Balance Main Trading Partners 
in goods and services (millions $) 21,965 17,116 -4,848 Import:  France (18%), Italy (15%), China (8%), Germany (7%), 
Spain (4%)in goods (millions $) 19,069 13,947 -5,122
in services (millions $) 2,896 3,170 274 Export:  France (29%), Italy (18%), Germany (10%), Spain (5%), 
Algeria (4%)in goods and services (% GDP) 50.6 39.4 -11.2
Society
Education Development 
Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%): 89.7/72.8 Human Development Index (Value): 0.725
Net enrolment rate (primary): 99 Human Development Index (Position in ranking): 97
Gross enrolment rate (secondary): 88 Health
Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): 35 Physicians density (per 10,000): 12.2
Mean years of schooling: 7.1 Hospital beds (per 10,000): 21.0
Public expenditure jn education (% of GDP): 6.2 Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): 7.0
R&D expenditure (% of GDP): 0.64 Emissions
Water CO2 Emissions (mt per capita): 2.3
Water resources (km3): 4.6 Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): 84
Water withdrawal (m3 per capita): 304 Protected areas
Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): 80 Terrestrial (% of total land area): 5.4
Water withdrawal by sector (% industry): 5 Marine (% of territorial waters): 2.7
Desalinated water production (millions m3): 19 ICT
Security Mobile subscriptions (per 100): 129.9
Total armed forces (000): 48 Households with computer (per 100): 33.2
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